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The semiotic phenomenology 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Michel Foucault
Richard L. Lanigan
International Communicology Institute, Southern Illinois University 
SPCM Dept. MC 6605, Carbondale, Illinois 6290-1-6605,US A 
e-mail: rlanigan@siu.edu
Abstract. Postmodern methodology in the human sciences and philosophy 
reverses the Aristotelian laws of thought such that (1) non-contradiction, (2) 
excluded middle, (3) contradiction, and (4) identity become the ground for 
analysis. The illustration of the postmodern logic is Peirce’s (1) interpretant. 
(2) symbol, (3) index, and (4) icon. The thesis is illustrated using the work of 
Merleau-Ponty and Foucault and the le тёте et I ’autre discourse sign where 
the ratio [Self:Same :: Other:Different] explicates the communicology of 
Roman Jakobson in the conjunctions and disjunctions, appositions and oppo­
sitions of discours, parole, langue, and langage.
0. The problematic of identity
The problematic with which we are confronted, the “concept of iden­
tity”, is an ancient one with many testimonies in both Eastern and 
Western philosophies. In the West, the notion of identity is founda­
tional in Aristotle and yet, it is turned on its head in Postmodemity 
(Lanigan 1995a, b). Following the foundational work in semiotic 
phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958) and Ernst 
Cassirer (1923; 1979; 1995), Postmodemity deals with the symbolic 
world of culture in which the Aristotelian model of a natural world 
logic is turned on it head. In short, Aristotle’s “law of thought” are 
questioned, found to be inappropriate to human experience, reversed 
in sequence and reformulated as positive constitutions. Lest the
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modem reader be lost in this postmodern move, I shall begin my 
analysis by staying with the Aristotelian statement of the laws о 
logic, with one exception. I shall reverse the order of the four laws, 
beginning with Aristotle’s fourth, then, third, second, and first. This 
step allows us to approach the postmodern problematic by asking if 
there is a paradigm conscious experience that contradicts the Law(s) 
and thematically suggests what a positive statement of that Law(s) 
would be.
The Aristotelian logic of (1) formations (experiences) constituting 
(2) transformation (consciousness) is reversed such that consciousness 
(logic transformations) constitutes experience (logic formations) in the 
first instance. This to say that in the symbolic cultural world, logic 
transformations lead to formations (consciousness experience) which 
are the subject matter and process of the Human Sciences such that 
consciousness is formed by the rule sequence: (Postmodern 1; 
Aristotle 4) Law o f Non-Contradiction [a thing cannot at once be and 
not be; a statement cannot be true and false at the same time], 
(Postmodern 2; Aristotle 3) Law o f  Excluded Middle [a thing must be 
or not be; a statement must be either true or false], (Postmodern 3; 
Aristotle 2) Law o f  Contradiction [one thing is not another thing; a 
statement is different from other statements], and (Postmodern 4; 
Aristotle 1) Law o f  Identity [one thing is only one thing; a statement is 
a statement].
In short, Aristotle’s logic is constructed by moving from (1) to (4) 
as the “classical laws of thought”.1 Later on in the philosophy of
1 The name “laws of thought” was developed in the middle ages to describe the 
three basic formation rules that Aristotle uses to construct the transformation rules 
of his famous syllogism or logic o f propositions. A typical textbook on logic 
(Schipper. Schun 1959: 375-376) will explain that Aristotle has three prepositio­
nal rules: (1) Identity, (2) Excluded Middle, and (3) Contradiction [also conflated 
as “Non-Contradiction”]. These qualitative rules derive from the combination of 
four quantitative types of propositions: (1) Universal Affirmative, (2) Universal 
Negative, (3) Particular Affirmative, and (4) Particular Negative. Both universal 
affirmative and universal negative propositions are examples of the Identity rule 
they just have a different numerical valence (positive or negative signification) 
All logicians know this.
However, non-logicians worry about the ontology of valences. They start with
(1) Identity where “a=a”, then (2) go to the Contradiction of “a” where “no a = b” 
then (3) in excluded Middle, they choose between either “a or not a” [knowing 
“not a” can be “b” or anything else as an interpretant of Step 2!], and then (4) they 
can see that you cannot have it both ways, that is, you cannot have both “a” and
science, Leibniz extends the Aristotelian logic to cover all possible 
worlds, not just the natural world of experience on Earth. Much of the 
Postmodern view in Culture can be attributed to the constant need by 
old school (Modernist, Rationalist) positivists to modify Aristotle’s 
logic as it applies to current mathematical logic in science.
To focus the postmodern problematic, we need to restate the logic 
transformation as they are affirmatively used by Postmodernists like 
Cassirer, Peirce, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault to make positive 
constitutions of described conscious experience in the world of com­
munication and culture. The Postmodern Logic Propositions listed 
below are stated in an inclusion order of constitution:
1. Phenomenological Law o f  Non-Contradiction — a thing can at once 
be and not be; a statement can be both true and false at the same time. 
Eidetic/Empirical example: an interpretant (Peirce 1931-1958). 
The eidetic and empirical example here is human embodied con­
sciousness that is a sign o f  a sign, what Husserl calls “intentionality”. 
Or even more simply as an example, take an oral/written/visual image, 
which is and is not a statement/sentence/proposition that Michel 
Foucault made into a famous semiotic example, namely, Magritte’s 
painting L ’usage de la parole (1928-1929): “This is not a pipe” plus 
the image of a pipe. In this example, the image refers to the sentence 
and vise versa (Lanigan 1992: 104). As Peirce (2.28) summarizes:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates 
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed 
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The 
sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes [e.g., 
1.551] called the ground of the representamen. (Peirce 2.28; my bold 
emphasis, R. L.)
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“not a” (the Law of Non-Contradition). Step (2) is a quantitative redundancy for 
logicians who thus have three laws of thought, but Step (2) is a qualitative 
embodied experience (ontology) for the rest of us who have four laws of thought. 
The ontological issue caused Aristotle to invent Enthymemes (“syllogisms” with a 
missing proposition supplied by the observer) and many other ontological (non- 
logical) rules like the Law of Contradiction that are critical to Peirce’s Post­
modern version of Aristotle (Lanigan 1995b).
2
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2. Phenomenological Law o f Excluded Middle — a thing must bot e 
and not be; a statement must be both true and false. The Postmo era 
constitution of reflectivity.
Eidetic/Empirical example: a symbol (in C. S. Peirce’s sense).
The eidetic and empirical example is a symbol o f  a sign (repre­
sentation of a presentation). Writing is the the well know index of 
speaking. Peirce (2.247) specifies that “A Symbol is a sign which 
refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an 
association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be 
interpreted as referring to that Object.” For example, Peirce (2.298) 
suggests, “Any ordinary word, as ‘give,’ ‘bird,’ ‘marriage,’ is an 
example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever may be found to 
realize the idea connected with the word; it does not, in itself, identify 
those things.”
3. Phenomenological Law o f  Contradiction — one thing is another 
thing; a statement is both the same as and different from other 
statements. The Postmodern constitution of reversibility.
Eidetic/Empirical example: an index (in C. S. Peirce’s sense).
The eidetic and empirical example is the spatial locations o f  a sign 
such as an oral contract written down on paper, explicated in Roman 
Jakobson’s theory of “redundancy features” (Lanigan 1992: 230). 
Peirce (2.247) says that “An Index is a sign which refers to its Object 
that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object.” 
“ ....And, it is not the mere resemblance o f its Object, even in these 
respects which makes it a sign, but is the actual modification of it by 
the Object.” Peirce’s (2.285) example: “A rap on the door is an index. 
Anything which focuses the attention is an index.”
4. Phenomenological Law o f  Identity —  one thing is always another 
thing; a statement is another statement. The Postmodern constitution 
of reflexivity.
Eidetic/Empirical example: an icon (in C. S. Peirce’s sense)
The eidetic and empirical example is the temporal location o f  a 
sign such as the “experience of consciousness” (“I made a mistake!”) 
and the “consciousness of experience” (“I am alive!”) explicated by 
Roman Jakobson’s theory of “distinctive features” (Jakobson 1972* 
43; Lanigan 1992: 230). As Peirce (2.247) notes, “An Icon is a sign 
which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of
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characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether 
any Object actually exists or not”. “Anything whatever, be it quality, 
existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like 
that thing and is used as a sign of it.” Peirce’s (2.275) relevant 
example is “any material image, as a painting.” This very notion of the 
Icon is common knowledge among all the computer users of the world 
as a mere function of learning the difference between virtual images, 
memory images, and functions on the computer screen.
That the Aristotelian, Modernist concept of identity cannot be foun­
dational is the positive thematic of Ernst Cassirer in his communico- 
logical turn in culture and in Charles Sanders Peirce’s phenomeno­
logical turn in normative logics, i.e., semiotics. The rejected Moder­
nist view of Aristotelian logic is also fundamental in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and his semiotic turn in phenomenology. That the con­
cept of identity is the effect of understanding [rather than the cause — 
Aristotle] is the thematic of Michel Foucault and his phenomeno­
logical turn in semiotics. To be explicit, the concept of identity is a 
logical function only insofar as it is derived from its ontological 
context of the embodied person (a phenomenology of phenome­
nology). The Postmodems take the French view that the ontology of 
“Both the Self and the Other as Both the Same and Different” [le 
тёте et Г autre] constitutes the essence of human embodiment as:
(1) expression and perception in the consciousness o f  experience 
[the contribution of phenomenology]; and,
(2) the source of logical abstraction and phenomenological description in the 
experience o f consciousness
[the contribution of semiotics].
The core domain of this Postmodern analysis is concisely articulated 
by Roman Jakobson (1972: 43): “The cardinal property of language 
noted by the initiator of semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839- 
1914), namely the translatability of any verbal sign into another, more 
explicit one, renders an effective service to communication in that it 
counteracts ambiguities caused by lexical and grammatical homonymy 
or by the overlapping of elliptic forms”.
The task of explicating human communication as such a Post­
modern ontology of both ambiguity in Merleau-Ponty and alterity in 
Foucault has its ground in the human science of Communicology
(Lanigan 1997). Here, the fundamental focus is on the conjunctive 
theory and method of semiotic phenomenology at work in the 
semiosphere (Lotman 1990) where human communication (discourse) 
is, to use Merleau-Ponty’s famous triadic formula, the reflectivity, 
reversibility, and reflexivity of culture (practice). The philosophy of 
communication explicated by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault will serve 
as a paradigmatic case as these themes of discourse and practice are 
applied in the French context. Before we can advance into the philo­
sophic application of communication, however, we require a founda­
tional understanding of how communication is viewed by Continental 
philosophers in general and by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault in 
particular.
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1. Roman Jakobson’s theory of human communication
Prerequisite to a grasp of contemporary Communication Theory (not 
machine instantiated Information Theory or Informatics) is a brief 
understanding of the theory advanced by Roman Jakobson. All con­
temporary discussion of communication derives from a fundamental 
understanding of Jakobson’s work. It is no exaggeration to say that 
understanding the main positions and counter-positions of any con­
temporary author within the domain of the Philosophy of Commu­
nication is grounded in the use o f Jakobson’s definitional theory. It is 
certainly true that European philosophers of communication in the 
Continental tradition assume their readers, professional or lay, know 
the fundamental propositions demonstrated in the eidetic proofs and 
empirical demonstrations of Jakobson on the structure and function 
human communication. His theory work and applied research are 
preeminent as cited in the September 1972 journal issue of Scientific 
American.
Rather than a “theory” is the limited sense of a model, Jakobson’s 
theory is a complete account of human communication from the 
microscopic to the macroscopic level of application. As such, 
Jakobson is the only person to have offered a legitimate Theory of 
Communication (illustrated in Fig. 1) with both eidetic and empirical 
application, i.e., a Communicology. The basic ELEMENTS of com­
munication are capitalized in the diagram, while the Elements o f com­
munication are given in italics. While the logical and phenomeno-
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logical relations and correlations of this theory are worked out in great 
detail (Lanigan 1992: 229-236; 1997), our present discussion must be 
limited to this brief version.
CONTEXT 
[Referential /  Cognitive]
M ESSAGE
[Poetic]
ADDRESSER-----------------------------A D DRESSEE
[Emotive /E xpressive] [Conative /  Interpretive]
CONTACT
[Photic]
CODE
[Metalinguistic /  Glossing]
Figure 1. Roman Jakobson’s (1960) theory of communication.
In Jakobson’s theory, each element is contextual to the rest in binary 
(logical) pairs (phenomenological) and the system of pairs constitutes 
a Function. For example, in the poetic function of the Message, there 
are four relations for the Addresser (Ar) and Addressee (Ae) pair, 
namely, (1) Ar to Ar [Self embodiment). (2) Ae to Ae (Other embodi­
ment), (3) Ar to Ae (thetic intentionality), and (4) Ae to Ar (Operative 
intentionality). Similar binary pairs exist for Context and Contact, and, 
for Message and Code. The poetic function per se is the rule o f  
reversibility in which any syntagmatic category (i.e., a horizontal line 
of categories) can interchange with a paradigmatic category (i.e., a 
vertical line of categories). We need not work our way through all the 
relational possibilities for the formation of categories. C. S. Peirce has 
already done it for us and there are sixty-four (64) non-redundant 
categories, the basic three of interest to us being already mentioned: 
Symbol, Index, Icon. The discussion and illustration of the Jakob- 
sonian categories as elements and functions is detailed in Lanigan 
(1992: 229-236).
It is important, as a matter of context, to note that the Addresser/ 
Addressee relationship and it four functions (emotive, expressive,
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conative, interpretive) are experienced as four network levels of 
communication transaction in human comportment. Demonstrated in 
the foundational work of Jürgen Ruesch, Semiotic Approaches to 
Human Relations (1972 reprint ed.), then Jürgen Ruesch and Gregory 
Bateson in Communication: The Social Matrix o f  Psychiatry (1951: 
277), the commonly accepted networks of human discourse are (1) the 
Intrapersonal Level (or psychiatric/aesthetic domain of emotive 
communication) where the Addresser and Addressee may be one 
person whose communication is thought, emotion, etc.; (2) the Inter­
personal Level (or social domain of expressive communication) in 
which the two person dyad is an example of behavioral exchange; (3) 
the Group Level (or cultural domain of conative communication) 
where an Addresser, one person, communicates with a group (an 
egocentric culture like the USA), or, the reverse context (a socio- 
centric culture like P. R. China) where a group as the Addresser 
influences an addressee, one person; and (4) the Intergroup Level (or 
transcultural domain of interpretive communication) in which one 
group addresses another group with such consequences as war, peace, 
the diffusion o f innovation, and so on. In short, these four inter­
connected network levels contain the communicological process 
outlined by Roman Jakobson’s theory of human communication. 
Historically speaking, the coincidence of this research and theory 
work accomplished by Ruesch, Bateson,and Jakobson in the early 
1950 established the academic discipline of Communicology (human 
communication) in American universities.
Let me now briefly define each communication Element by it 
corresponding Function as a way of glossing Jakobson’s (1960) 
Theory of Communication and its relevant parts. The Addresser is the 
human, embodied origin o f  communication and in consequence is not 
a mechanical “sender” or “signal source”, but the expressive consti­
tution of emotion. In linguistic terms, the Addresser is the verbal 1st 
Person (persona) who is speaking. The person may be the psychic 
voice the Greeks called mythos, or the persona whose oral speaking is 
audible as the interpretant logos of a person. As such, the Addresser 
gives (data) a Message that constitutes a Code and selects a Context 
for Contact (“choice of context” or analogue logic). Lotman (1990: 
22) provides a detailed analysis of the motivation that occurs between 
message and code, code and message, in the formation o f discourse as 
practice, communication as culture.
The Addressee element of communication is basically the reverse 
phenomenological intentionality of the Addresser. The Addressee is 
the human, embodied origin o f  culture and in consequence is not a 
mechanical “receiver” or “signal destination”, but the interpretive 
constitution of conation. In linguistic terms, the Addressee is the 
verbal 2nd Person (persona) who is spoken to. The person for whom 
oral listening is audible becomes the interpretant logos for the psychic 
voice the Greeks called hexis, or the embodied practice of culture. As 
such, the Addressee takes (capta) a Code that constitutes a Message 
and selects a Contact for Context (“context of choice” or digital logic).
Context is the referential function of the communicative act in 
which signification is denotive within a cognitive system of meaning. 
In linguistic terms, Context is the 3rd person, someone or something 
spoken o f  It is crucial to recall that Jakobson rejects Saussure’s notion 
of an arbitrary sign (signifier in opposition to signified). Rather, 
Jakobson demonstrates that communication is a “choice of context” 
such that signs have a relative, but necessary, motivation to one 
another (signifier in apposition to signified). As Holenstein (1976: 
157) explains Jakobson’s use of Peircian semiotics, a sign‘s “own 
constitution reflects the relational structure of the thing represented”. 
Hence, we have Peirce’s preferred name for the sign as a repre­
sentamen.
Contact is the phatic function operating in human communication 
such that a physical (interpersonal) and psychological (embodied, 
intrapersonal) connection is established between the Addresser and the 
Addressee. The best eidetic/empirical example in linguistics is the 
concept of an emblem. An emblem is the anthropologist's name for a 
word that stands in place of a gesture, or, the gesture that replaces a 
verbal message. The emblem is a sign with a culturally known inter­
pretant that moves from (1) physical contact (signification) between 
Addresser and Addressee to (2) mutual psychic sharing (meaning).
The Message displays the phenomenology of the poetic function in 
communication. Rather than a mundane reference to poetry, the 
essence of poiesis is the shifting of verbal elements exterior to the 
system of language in which case you have rhetoric, or, interior to the 
language in which case you have poetic. While there is a long, 
detailed phonological analysis that is relevant at this point, we must be 
content to explain the poetic function in verbal communication as 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic reversal of words as units in sentences.
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For example, once you know the words in a sentence by grammatica 
function, any word in that category can replace any other wor n t 
sentence, “The cat ate the dog.” you immediately see that if you are a 
dog lover the message can be reversed as “The dog ate the cat . 
Moreover, you immediately know that any noun in the sentence can 
be replaced by a pronoun, and, any verb can substitute for any other 
verb. The vertical (paradigmatic) and horizontal (syntagmatic) word 
shifts can be remembered as a whole set, what Jakobson calls the 
“Prague Prism” or ever expanding matrix (hence, the Ruesch and 
Bateson use of the “social matrix” in the subtitle of their book). 
Jakobson concludes that messages are unique in language because 
human speaking {parole) consists of: (1) a linguistic utterance, (2) 
language as an individual, private property, and (3) the individua­
lizing, centrifugal aspect of language (where centrifugal means 
moving from individual out to group, from person into culture). 
Message interpretation relies on perceiving the diachronic (“then and 
there” historical sequences) of verbal or nonverbal usage. Egocentric 
cultures stress the importance of messages over codes, individuals 
over groups.
The concept of a Code entails the understanding of the meta­
linguistic or glossing function in communication. Every communi­
cation system, verbal or nonverbal, has both an object language 
(discourse about extralinguisitic entities) and a metalanguage (dis­
course about linguistic entities) that specify synchronic relationships 
(“here and now” existential moments). Linguists refer to this code 
phenomenon as “double articulation”, since an utterance or gesture 
refers both to itself as an entity and beyond itself to its context in a 
system. Most people experience the complexity of the language code 
when they look up a word (message) in a dictionary (code) only to 
find themselves referred to other words (messages in the same code), 
thus acting to no avail in an unknown code. Jakobson also judges that 
codes are unique in language because social language (langue) 
consists o f (1) linguistic norm, (2) language as supraindividual, social 
endowment, and (3) the unifying, centripetal aspect o f language 
(where centripetal means moving from group to individual, from 
culture to person). Sociocentric cultures stress the importance of codes 
over messages, groups over individuals.
The conjunction of egocentric and sociocentric cultures and the 
people who communicate in them is thematic for Postmodern philo
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sophers of communication. In particular, French semiotic phenome­
nology represented by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault focuses on the 
ontology of le тёте et I ’autre: “Both the Self and the Other as Both 
the Same and Different”. This ontological proposition built into a 
linguistic aphorism of French philosophy constitutes a specific expli­
cation of Roman Jakobson’s theory of communication. Where human 
beings seek their identity with others in a shared lived-world, we 
inevitably confront the ambiguity o f  identity in the Self encountering 
that which is the Same — time and again. And, we confront the 
alterity o f  identity in the Other who is Different — home and away.
2. Merleau-Ponty’s thematic of embodied identity: 
ambiguity
The essence of embodied identity constitutes ambiguity (explicated as 
Self consciousness/Same experience; see Fig. 2), as Merleau-Ponty 
reminds us in the Phenomenology o f  Perception.
I can remain within the sphere of absolute self-evidence only if I refuse to 
make any affirmation, or to take [capta] anything for granted, if, as Husserl 
has it, I stand in wonder before the world, and ceasing to be in league with it, I 
bring to light the flow of motivations which bear me along in it, making my 
life wholly aware of itself, and explicit. When I try to pass from this 
interrogative state to an affirmation, and a fortiori when 1 try to express 
myself, I crystallize an infinite collection of motives within an act of 
consciousness, I revert to the implicit, that is, to the equivocal and to the 
world’s free play. My absolute contact with myself, the identity of being and 
appearance cannot be posited, but only lived as anterior to any affirmation. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1981: 295; my emphasis and insert, R. L.).
In one concise argument, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that the 
Cartesian world built on Aristotelian thinking, in which the logic of 
experience dictates the constitution phenomenona, cannot apply to 
embodied consciousness. Furthermore, the Aristotelian ground of 
logic cannot be sustained inasmuch as identity (the experience per­
ceived and expressed) is the effect, result of consciousness (“wonder 
before the world”), and not the cause.
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SELF OTHER
Legend:
<2 %
<9 \
SAME DIFFERENT
Consciousness (as parole parlante; corps propre):
Self—Other 
[parole]**
Same—Other 
[discours]
= Synecdoche: part/whole1
= Metaphor substance/whole
Experience (as parole parlee; corps vefu):
Same—Different 
[langue]
Self—Different 
[langage]
4444
= Metonymy: substance/attribute
= Simile [positive];
Irony [negative]: part/attribute
= “Self’ combination 
= “Same” combinations
Figure 2. Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguity model (Lanigan 1992: 110).
* Note the respective syntagmatic relationships, e.g., 
Self - part, Other = whole, etc.
** Traditional linguistic descnptions.
For semiotic clarity in these complex phenomenological relations, I 
should point out that Figures 1 is an explication o f consciousness of 
experience [C>E] as a semiotic phenomenology of existential being 
that Husserl calls an “order o f experience” [experiencer > ex­
periencing > experienced]. In Fig. 2, the reverse reading which is the 
experience of consciousness [E>C] is what Husserl calls an “order of 
analysis” [experiencer < experiencing < experienced] (Lanigan 1992: 
20). When the “order of experience” is assumed to match the “order of
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analysis” [i.e., no reflexivity, no reversibility, no reflectivity], then we 
have positive science. We have the positivististic, natural attitude 
assumption that posits the Cartesian, Aristotelian identity o f  
appearances as “being”, wherein consciousness and experience are 
erroneously hypostatized as paradigmatic equivalents (Jakobson’s 
sense).
Figure 2 sketches the basic elements in Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
le тёте et Г autre model of identity as ambiguity in human com­
munication and behavior. The background analysis for this model is 
found in Lanigan (1988; 1992; 1997).
At this point, let me only summarize the basic position that his 
many works suggest. Merleau-Ponty’s major work on expression, 
Signs (1960), as well as his Phenomenology o f  Perception (1945), 
relate semiotics, the theory of signs (aesthetic, logical, social systems), 
to the phenomenology of embodiment (Jakobson’s communication 
elements: context, message, contact, code, addresser, addressee). In 
his explication of both perception and expression, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that there are two levels of discourse: (1) existential dis­
course in which a person expresses his or her speaking in an original 
and perceptive speech, that is a “speech speaking” {parole parlante) 
that proffers an authentic message and (2) empirical discourse where 
a person merely expresses what has already been said by others, i.e., a 
“speech spoken” {parole parlee) that legitimizes the social code. In 
the speech speaking case, there is a rhetorical function of identity 
where consciousness of experience is the original reference to 
existential meaning., i.e., the authentic act of expression that is the 
linguistic message embodied in the person (corps propre) as 
addresser (Jakobson 1960; 1971; Holenstein 1976).
First, Merleau-Ponty corrects Saussure’s static notion of parole by 
making it the dynamic parole parlante or what Roman Jakobson calls 
the “message” in his parallel correction of Saussure. Second, Merleau- 
Ponty corrects the concept of langue by the more existential parole 
parlee or what Jakobson in agreement calls the “code”. In this second 
category of speech spoken, the rhetorical function is banal (corps 
vegu) and evokes an experience of consciousness, i.e., the common­
place meaning that is the linguistic code discovered by the addressee 
(Jakobson’s sense).
Finally, let us note that Merleau-Ponty offers a major correction to 
the method of Husserl’s phenomenology by stressing the importance
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of*of semiotics in the description of phenomena, the importance 
structural analysis in defining (reducing) phenomena, and t e impor 
tance of hermeneutic principles for the interpretation of phenomena. 
The three step method of Description, Reduction, and Interpretation is 
the result of his focus on the reversible, reflexive, and reflective 
relations between perception and expression —  all of which are the 
foundation for Foucault’s analysis of social embodiment and institu­
tional comportment.
3. Foucault’s thematic of embodied identity: alterity
The social essence of embodied identity constitutes alterity (ex­
plicated as Other consciousness/Different experience; see Fig. 2), as 
Foucault reminds us in Fearless Speech.
When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own life is exposed, 
you are taking up [capta] a specific relationship to yourself; you risk death to 
tell the truth [parrhesia] instead of reposing in the security of a life where the 
truth goes unspoken. Of course, the threat of death comes from the Other, and 
thereby requires a relationship to the Other. But the parrhesiates primarily 
chooses a specific relationship to himself: he prefers himself as truth-teller 
rather than as a living being who is false to himself. (Foucault 2001: 17; my 
emphasis and inserts, R. L.)
Figure 3 illustrates the basic components in Foucault’s use of the le 
тёте et Vautre model of identity as alterity in human communi­
cation and behavior. Again, I note that the background analysis for 
this model is found in Lanigan (1988; 1992; 1997). Also note, in 
particular, that the model is essentially the same as presented in Fig. 2. 
Having said that, it is critically important to see that we are reversing 
directional relations by moving from the Other over to the Self, and 
from the Different over to the Same. This movement is stressed in the 
presentation of the Legend information given in Fig. 3
Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses [Words and Things] 
(1966), intentionally retitled by him for its English translation as The 
Order o f  Things: An Archaeology o f  the Human Sciences, and it’s 
appendix essay L archeologie du savoir [The Archaeology o f Know­
ledge (sic) <Understanding>, 1969] add a methodological dimension 
to Merleau-Ponty’s view. Foucault argues that Merleau-Ponty’s
second, empirical code level of discourse (enonciation) that we know 
(connaissance) as the cultural code of social power hides the first, 
existential message level of “stating” discourse (enonce) that we 
understand (savoir) as desire. This agonistic or contested process of 
rhetorical levels forms a “rupture” or ongoing discontinuity of 
discourses constructing and deconstructing one another in apposition 
[both are equally opposed to] to the embodied person.
SELF OTHER
*> *
*
#  R>
* сь
SAME DIFFERENT
Legend: Consciousness (as enonce; savoir):
Other—Self = Synecdoche: part/whole*
[parole]**
Other—Same = Metaphor substance/whole
[discours]
Experience (as enonciation; connaissance)'.
Different—Same = Metonymy: substance/attribute 
[langue]
Different—Self = Simile [positive];
[langage] Irony [negative]: part/attribute
= “Other” combinations
O O O O  = “Different” combinations
Figure 3. Foucault’s alterity model (Lanigan 1992: 110).
* Note the respective syntagmatic relationships, e.g.,
Other = part, Self = whole, etc.
** Traditional linguistic descriptions.
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By using the method of (1) “ archaeology” (one of ^ USSer^ cg 
concepts) or knowing (connaissance or knowing as the expenenc 
consciousness; Jakobson’s “horizontal” syntagmatic category о 
“code”) and the method of (2) “ genealogy” (savoir or understanding 
as the consciousness o f  experience; Jakobson’s “vertical paradig­
matic category of “message”), Foucault engages his third level, which 
he names (3) “ critical methodology” in his L ’Ordre du discours 
(1971). Here, the “order of discourse” defines parrhesiastic rhetoric 
(Lanigan 1984). I should also make the relevant comment that in 
developing this three step methodology, Foucault begins with Edmund 
Husserl, as did Merleau-Ponty, and develops his three steps in parallel 
function to Merleau-Ponty’s methodological steps of (1) Description, 
(2) Reduction, and (3) Interpretation. Clearly, both Merleau-Ponty and 
Foucault account for a systematic application of semiotic phenome­
nology to existential perception (Merleau-Ponty) and social expres­
sion (Foucault).
Note that Foucault’s archaeology is a method of “oppositions” or 
“exclusions” (Jakobson’s “distinctive features”), while genealogy is a 
method of “interstices” or “ensemble” (Jakobson’s “redundancy 
features”). This critical model subjects both archaeology and genea­
logy to one another as a dialectic of both opposition and apposition as 
Foucault’s “reversal-principle” (Jakobson’s “poetic function” of para­
digmatic and syntagmatic interchange). Foucault is following 
Merleau-Ponty’s prescription that the first step of analysis is a “pheno­
menology of phenomenology”. That is, the conjunctions of both 
consciousness and experience in discourse are seen as reversible, 
reflexive, and reflective in judgment.
Hence, Foucault offers a critical approach to discourse viewed as a 
phenomenological semiotic (Husserl’s “order of analysis”) that 
completes Merleau-Ponty’s approach of a semiotic phenomenology 
(Husserl’s “order of experience”). In short, while Merleau-Ponty 
examines the place of personal perception in public expression 
(intentionality as as a message/code), Foucault critically studies the 
reverse, i.e., the place o f public expression in personal perception 
(embodiment as a code/message) as illustrated, for example in the 
narratology of his study of the hermaphrodite, Herculine Barbin
By way of a brief conclusion, let me suggest that it is clear that 
where Merleau-Ponty is existential, Foucault is social Where 
Merleau-Ponty interrogates perception, Foucault questions expression
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Where Merleau-Ponty explores the ambiguity of the individual’s 
comportment, Foucault journeys into the institutions of the group and 
the community as political actuality. Both thinkers are grounded in 
traditional axiology, stressing the aesthetics, logics, and politics of 
perception and expression, i.e., the worldview of Communicology in 
which semiotics and phenomenology are in a constant Postmodern 
dialectic of discourse and practice, habitus and hexis — to cite 
Bourdieu’s parallel system of cultural analysis in the French milieu of 
the Postmodern human sciences.2
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Семиотическая феноменология Мориса Мерло-Понти и 
Мишеля Фуко
Постмодернистская методология в гуманитарных науках и в фило­
софии отворачивается от законов мышления Аристотеля, где (1) 
непротиворечивость, (2) исключенное третье, (3) противоречивость 
и (4) тождество становятся основой анализа. Примером постмодер­
нистской логики служат пирсовские (1) интерпретант, (2) символ, (3) 
индекс, и (4) икон. Этот тезис автор иллюстрирует с помощью работ 
Мерло-Понти и Фуко, используя знак дискурса 1е тёте et Г autre, где 
соотношение [Сам: Такой же :: Другой: Отличающийся] эксплици­
рует теорию коммуникации Якобсона как коньюнкции и дизъюнк­
ции, апозиции и оппозиции терминов discours, parole, langue и 
langage.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty ja 
Michel Foucault’ semiootiline fenomenoloogia
Postmodernne metodoloogia humanitaarteadustes ja filosoofias pöördub 
ära aristotellikest mõtlemisseadustest, milleks on (1) mittevasturääkivus,
(2) välistatud kolmas, (3) vasturääkivus, ja (4) samasus kui analüüsi alus. 
Postmodernse loogika näiteks on Peirce’i (1) tõlgend, (2) sümbol, (3) 
indeks, ja (4) ikoon. Seda väidet illustreeritakse Merleau-Ponty ja Fou­
cault töödega ning le тёте et 1’autre diskursusemärki kasutades, kus 
suhe [Ise:Sama :: Teine:Erinev] eksplitseerib Roman Jakobsoni kom- 
munikoloogia kui discours, parole, langue, ja langage konjunktsioonid ja 
disjunktsioonid, apositsioonid ja opositsioonid.
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The semiotics of George Herbert Mead and 
its implications to biosemiotics, semiotic matrix 
theory, and ecological ethics
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Sleep Research Laboratory, The University Hospital of Bern 
3010 Bern, Switzerland 
e-mail: ecopsicologie@yahoo.fr
Abstract. This examination of the often-inaccessible work and semiotics of 
George Herbert Mead focuses first on his pivotal ideas of Sociality, 
Consciousness, and Communication. Mead’s insight of sociality as forced 
relatedness, or forced semiosis, appearing early in evolution, or appearing in 
simple systems, guarantees him a foundational place among biosemioticians. 
These ideas are Mead’s exemplar description of multiple referentiality 
afforded to social organisms (connected to his idea of the generalized other), 
thus enabling passing from one umwelt to another, with relative ease. Al­
though Mead’s comprehensive semiosis is basically sound, and in con­
cordance with modern and contemporary semiotics (and biosemiotics), it 
nevertheless lacks a satisfactory explanation of how conscious organisms 
achieve passing into new frames of reference. Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT), 
its pansemiosis, describes falsifiable existential and cognitive heuristics of 
recognizing Energy requirements, Safety concerns and Possibility or Oppor­
tunity as “passing” functions. Finally, another type of emergence, ecoethics, is 
an embedded constant in biosemiosis. Not all semiosis is good semiosis, not 
all text is good text. Because our species is moving away from ancient bio­
semiosis and interrelatedness, this historicity, even ductile enough to invent 
synthetic semiosis or capricious umwelten, is facing the ecological reality and 
consequences of an overly anthropocentric text.
Tarantula: an insect whose bite is only cured by rnus
Melvyn Bragg’s (2003: 213) ent^_^nf| 
selection from Johnson s Dictionary ( )
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1. In troduc tion
It is an understatement to write that Mead’s idea of sociality, and the 
mechanism of passing from umwelt to umwelt, are underused and 
understudied in biosemiotics today. With notable interpretations and 
exceptions to his contributions in general (see Wiley 1994; Harries- 
Jones 1995; Kilpinen 2002), a neglected obligation to his crucial ideas 
is due partly to the intractability of Mead’s text, often promising to 
continue in development where some of his ideas seem to walk a step 
further but no more, or suddenly stopping altogether, his freedom to 
produce additional text restricted due to his multiple academic and 
administrative responsibilities.1 The antiquated and modem term 
sociality, perhaps an unfortunate choice and label today, seems also so 
biased toward purely human semiosis, thus turning off potential 
biosemiotic readers in search of a biological synthesis.
Without deciphering what Mead meant by this term and, in general, 
with the apparent lack of relevance of Mead to biosemiotics, judging by 
the smaller ratio of his name in references to the names of other tum-of- 
the-20th-century semioticians, in my opinion, has forced many con­
temporary writers to almost reinvent the “Mead Wheel”. Specifically, if 
sociality is understood as he meant it, forced and pervasive, even 
inescapable, relatedness or semiosis, it provides an additional historical 
foundation for understanding biosemiotics proper, from endosemiosis to 
the human text. This is clearly illustrated when Arthur Murphy, a better 
interpreter of Mead than I, while trying to summarize Mead’s commu­
nicative processes, says, “[...] the appearance of mind is only the 
culmination of that sociality which is found throughout the universe”.2
! My paraphrase of John Dewey’s personal evaluation of Mead’s literary 
productivity in his prefatory remarks in The Philosophy o f the Present 1934a
- This universal and biosemiotic sounding description was written in 1932 a 
good seventy or so years before Jesper Hoffmeyer’s Signs o f Meaning in the Uni­
verse, in 1996. This comparison is made partly out of respect to J H ffm ’ 
work and also because his name is associated with a canonical-now in bi § 
semiotics providing a useful historical frame of reference.
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From endosemiotical-hormonal to human communication, Mead’s con­
cept of sociality, in tandem with his ideas and definitions of conscious­
ness and communication, leaves little doubt that he was thinking of a 
grander biosemiosis while finally being canonized by history as the 
father of American sociology.
These words are obviously a tease of a more complex and syner­
getic semiosis that must explain all three concepts to present-day 
biosemioticians. It may be difficult to do justice, in this short exami­
nation, to all of Mead’s writings, in which, in fragmentary manner, 
these concepts are used as the foundations of other elemental ideas. So 
I have opted instead to focus on The Philosophy o f  the Present (Mead 
1930, 1932) as the most cited source and text for further analysis and 
discussion, yet other references and works will be cited. In the next 
section, I will try to illustrate in broad strokes, how sociality, 
consciousness, and communication are intimately connected, thus, 
once again, anticipating the writings of present day non semiotician, 
semiotician, and biosemiotician scholars alike. Section Three will 
connect all three concepts of sociality, consciousness, and of commu­
nication, if not in a logical system, at least into a coherent definition 
and semiosis that exemplifies what evolved semiosis could look like.
2. Living with more or less consciousness: 
When is a ‘thing’ really a part of its Umwelt?
“Always”, might answer Mead, with the rest of biosemiotics, at least 
since the moment it became an organism. But there are differences 
and degrees of differences of existential embeddedness and the ability 
to extract meaning from different umwelten. Depending on the orga­
nism’s evolution of consciousness and the ability to communicate 
with gestures or signs whose meanings are constantly derived from 
existential doings; depending on the degree of embeddedness and the 
ease with which an organism passes from umwelt to umwelt; then its 
mind can reach a certain threshold referred to earlier as multiple 
referentiality, on in Mead’s term, the capacity for continued emer­
gence.
These abilities, which Mead (1932) traces in evolutionary and 
relativity theory terms, as he understood them, finally place the very 
construction and manipulation of a ‘se lf within and as part of all the
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objects found in the umwelt. That is, when an organism is capa e о 
referring to itself as an object among other objects, utilizes the sensa 
tions and experiences in reference to its umwelten, and is ab e to 
communicate the meanings of all these interactions to itself as well as 
to others, then that organism has acquired consciousness in Mead s 
(Mead 1932: 82) interpretation of this concept: “[...] the organism 
responds to itself as affected by a tree and at the same time to the tree 
as the field of possible interactions”.
The interpretative participation of the ‘se lf emerging from and 
always embedded in a social universe dominates Mead’s semiotics. 
The earlier allusion of the Batesonian phrase describing, in a pithy 
phrase we have all made into a slogan, the condition of interpretation, 
‘a difference which makes a difference’ (Bateson 1979), would mean 
for Mead the following:
Signification has [...] two references, one to the thing indicated, and the other 
to the response, to the instance and to the meaning of the idea. It denotes and 
connotes. When the symbol is used for the one, it is a name. When it is used 
for the other, it is a concept. But it neither denotes nor connotes except, when 
in form at least, denotation and connotation are addressed both to a self and to 
others, when it is in a universe of discourse that is oriented with reference to a 
self. If the gesture simply indicates the object to another, it has no meaning to 
the individual who makes it, nor does the response which the other individual 
carries out become a meaning to him [...]. (Mead 1922: 246)
In short, the “difference” that would make a difference for Mead is 
that of a social entity that has internalized its social umwelt entirely, 
knows itself as a SELF, and within the province of this self, assumes 
universal interpretation of its broadcasted sign. This is the beginning 
of multiple referentiality, or the beginning of a theory of mind 
(Premack, Woodruff 1978).
In achieving multiple referentiality, and while addressing the 
human condition specifically, social beings are able to internalize the 
roles of others into a meta-schema that Mead made famous: The 
Generalized Other. Many books and articles written across different 
disciplines have elaborated upon, co-opted and attempted to 
deconstruct Mead’s concept of the generalized other. M ead’s concept 
anticipates or stands side by side with Piaget’s (1932 1972' or 
Vygotsky’s beginning of social ‘otherness thought’, 1934),’depending 
how one interprets history, emphasis on intelligence being predicated 
on the ability to take on the perspective of the other, tracing its
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development of scheme from reflexes to circular reactions to ego­
centrism, and beyond, to formal operations.
‘Theory of Mind’ researchers and theorists (Premack, Woodruff 
1978; Woodruff, Premack 1979; Dennett 1983; Whiten, Byrne 1988; 
Byrne, Whiten 1988; Dennett 1991; Byrne, Tomasello 1995; Whiten 
1996 — as well as detractors — see Heyes 1993; 1998) must always 
pay tribute to Mead in some fashion or another, and the generalized 
other, by any other pseudonym or novel coinage, whether apes do it, 
rats do it, or human children after the age of four do it, establishes 
intelligence as that capacity to somehow internalize the thinking of the 
other for any number of social and personal uses from deceit to 
altruistic empathy. Speaking of altruism, and extending Piaget’s and 
Mead’s ideas into the realm of moral reasoning, Kohlberg (1981) 
seeks and is able to demonstrate with empirical confirmation to 
Piaget’s (1932) and his original intuitions that the abilities in 
perspective-taking and higher social consciousness set the stage for 
higher rational ethical thought.
More recently, with the increased focus on Emotional Intelligence 
(Goleman 1995), the idea of the generalized other can be placed on a 
practical and even empirically testable continuum that even Mead 
might approve of, beginning with the total neglect of the other as 
being significant to one’s own selfish survival, proceeding further in 
development to familiarity with someone, continuing perhaps into 
tolerance for someone, graduating into sympathy and finally having 
empathy for others. Even within our own species, the higher end of 
this ethical continuum, as the many mansions and umweiten of possi­
bilities of relatedness, is not achieved universally or consistently as 
Kohlberg’s later data show (Colby et al. 1987).
A more important reason for revisiting Mead’s triple conception of 
sociality, consciousness and communication, in addition to paying 
tribute to his foundational ideas, is that in his thinking there is in a solid 
base and independent confirmation that a mind that evolves in rich 
social contexts is nicely suited to: (1) extending the range of relatedness 
to such a fine point where it becomes the other, (2) that this now social 
mind is obligated to communicate the meanings derived from 
perceiving itself and using the capacity to be the other embedded in ever 
changing umwelten; and (3) that this mind so embedded in a social 
(objectively external and/or internalized) realm and exposed to a myriad 
of interactive opportunities has the potential to grow consciousness so
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as to integrate, no devour, umweiten that are truly extant to other less 
embedded organisms, as Piaget suggested (1972).
2a. Consciousness and sociality
For Mead the journey of a mind on the way to acquiring conscious­
ness ends up being a communicative and thus semiotic odyssey. He 
speaks of a first prerequisite of consciousness as an organism selects a 
new umwelt at will based on its own organismic needs and sensiti­
vities and amalgamates this ability of selection with the new environ­
ment, resulting in further interaction possibilities in the newly forming 
umwelt. O f this process he writes:
[...] its first characteristic [the characteristics of a mind acquiring conscious­
ness] is consciousness, that emergent which arises when the animal passes 
from the system in which it formerly existed to an environment that arises 
through the selectiveness of its own sensitivity, and thus to a new system 
within which parts of its own organism and its reactions to these parts become 
parts of its environment. (Mead 1932: 84)
The intimacy and degree of subjective participation in Mead’s rendi­
tion of a functional circle marks him as a biosemiotic thinker of note4 
when he underlies the importance of this embeddedness:
[...] the systems to which I have referred are in all cases interrelations between 
the organism and the world that reveal itself in an environment, determined by 
its relationship to the organism. Any essential change in the organism brings 
with it a corresponding change in the environment. (Mead 1932: 84)
The next step in minds acquiring consciousness is due both to 
sensorial and cognitive peculiarities that place the interpreter in a 
Peircian triad (Peirce 1916/1966) in a situation of mental reflection. In 
Mead’s own words, “this next step is reached with the dominance of
But realistically speaking, the majority of social agents cannot pull this off, 
and humans, in our example, are more ergodic than non-ergodic, thus being 
limited to only finite sets of relatedness by their genotypic and phenotypic boun­
daries, and by their experiential and psychological experiences and limitations.
Or even mark him as an ecopsychologist like Kurt Lewin (1935; 1936- 1939 
1951) expressing a similar, non-topological description of Life Space.
The realm o f continued emergence 33
the distance senses and the delayed responses to these”.5 In con­
temporary terms, a 300 millisecond delay between processing a distal 
stimulus and its final cognitive recognition, plus additional compu­
tation time in higher order, intermodal associative cortex, in commu­
nicative animals, offers or enforces a reflective capacity that I believe 
Mead finds to be crucial for the emergence of consciousness.
The final step in the acquisition of consciousness occurs when, “the 
characters of the environment constitute the stuff out of which values and 
meanings later arise when these characters can be isolated though 
gestures in communication”. Therefore, Mead links consciousness itself 
with valuative communicative processes. Another way to encapsulate this 
process, as I understand Mead, is to say that consciousness is a semiosis 
on a grander scale, of meaningful and mediated (through communicative 
exercises) existential responses with a sense of historicity,6 This final 
leap, according to Mead, opens the door for an appreciation of universals, 
a signature of evolved consciousness.
Furthermore, it is important to highlight the fact that Mead is 
perfectly aware of the distinction between consciousness and Self- 
consciousness, and I believe the final step he refers to in the acqui­
sition of consciousness is really the possession of Self-consciousness. 
This is clear to me, when, for example, we read him in Mind, Self, and 
Society making this distinction:
It is the social process of influencing others in a social act and then taking the 
attitude of the others aroused by the stimulus, and then reacting in turn to this 
response, which constitutes a self Our bodies are parts of our environment; 
and it is possible for the individual to experience and be conscious of his 
body, and of bodily sensations, without being conscious or aware of himself 
(Mead 1934b: 171)
5 In concordance with Heinz Werner’s (1934; 1963) developmental description 
and move from juvenile syncretic, sensorial, and affective (implying faster and 
unreasoned limbic processes) processes, to more mature mental states that are 
discrete, objective and language based. Also Ernest Schachtel’s (1959) distinction 
between an earlier developmental experiential realm dominated by autocentric 
senses, or the intimate senses of touch, smell and taste, toward, with increased 
maturity, to an ascending dependency on allocentric or distal senses such as 
vision and hearing and the mediation of reality through language.
6 I am co-opting the term historicity from its other uses, in semiotics and 
biosemiotics. Within semiotics itself it has been used as a term used to move away 
from a decontextualized Saussurean (1916/1983) Synchronic analyses. See page 
eleven in this work for my own qualified biosemiotic meaning of historicity.
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This interpretation and read of Mead may leave some biosemioticians 
with a blank stare and perhaps even disappointed. So, to the extent 
that Mead’s consciousness is so dispatched and made to be the unique 
property of certain types of creatures who do valuative communicative 
processes, it may rub the wrong way and upset biosemioticians and 
other students of consciousness who have described consciousness as 
ubiquitous in the animal kingdom (from the inorganic realm to the 
plant kingdom and beyond), present from the beginning in the origin 
of our universe, albeit in some minor quality form, or teleologically 
evolving toward a certain type of universal presence-consciousness, 
thus opening the door for moralizing or simply imagining the random 
adaptation of species as guided development toward a god-like state 
(Davis 1999).
But Mead “saves the day,” in a manner of speaking, because he 
makes his concept of sociality the genesis and integral component of 
his biosemiotics, if we can begin to be comfortable describing his 
semiotics as such. Since sociality is, simply put, forced relatedness, or 
forced semiosis, which appears early in evolution, and is present at the 
lowest levels o f organismic interaction , he is admitting to the primacy 
of semiosis, from the beginning, while pointing out that we must be 
mindful of the obvious qualitative differences that arise when different 
types of creatures achieve different possibilities of relatedness with 
their respective umweiten. The highest degree of relatedness that 
humans understand and can empirically test in nature is the sociality 
he terms, The Realm o f  Continued Emergence. Only creatures like we 
who can meaningfully evaluate our actions in the face of a changing 
environment and ask ourselves, in our own minds, the question, 
“What are my acts in relation to a changing environment?” or “What 
could these acts mean in possible X or Y environments?”, can achieve 
this sort of specialized consciousness.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, Mead is naming and 
describing this particular set of ideas with the intention of determining 
what the real existential moment is for any creature. Does existence lie 
in the past? Does it lie ahead in the future? Mead’s answer is nay, 
relatedness with an umwelt is always in the present, even though 
historicity, in the way of habits and learned responses, predisposes a
Mead specifically mentions a semiosis of hormonal functioning, “There is in 
the physiological system such a system of communication carried out bv 
hormones.” (The Philosophy o f The Present, p. 83.)
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certain biased attitude with respect to accommodating a new umwelt. 
As Arthur Murphy (1932) interprets Mead, “The present is the locus 
of reality”. But humans, who supposedly live in The Realm o f Conti­
nued Emergence, are ductile in their accommodability to novel situa­
tions and in their possibility/opportunity to derive, constantly, new 
meanings from most changing environments, and to re-apply them. 
Not only do we inhabit this singularity of the present, but also, 
according to Mead’s own read and interpretation of relativity theory, 
we could inhabit several umwelten at the same time. In order to 
explain how this comes about he employs the functionality of passing 
as the mechanism allowing this multiple referentiality.
I will turn next to Mead’s idea of passing, the mechanism through 
which an organism moves from umwelt to umwelt while preserving 
the integrity of crucial aspects of its historicity, and at the same time, 
adapting its historicity to new experiential realms.
3. Passing
It may be easier to summarize the interpretative and organizational 
function of passing using a simple organism and example. A simpler 
organism such as a cicada (or, e.g., Uexkiill’s example of relatedness 
in ‘flowers and girls’, see Uexküll 1992; 1926; 1982), or any other 
similar creature is forced to relate semiotically with a (finite) set of um­
welten and could organize each new circumstance by means of habits 
(which I have replaced here with a new sense of historicity to include 
both learned behaviors and instinctual repertoires of responses, and 
conscious-voluntary and unconscious-involuntary responses — a 
probability value of the likely actions we expect to see displayed 
given the sum total, or the appropriate dispending, of one or more of 
these factors), by somehow recognizing and reacting to a new 
circumstance, and finally by accommodating the new umwelt of 
experience.
Assuming that the cicada has a sense of the limits of its own body­
shell, of self-enclosure or any sense of being an entity with a certain 
set of constant peculiarities and functions (it feeds, it flies, it fights, it 
mates), then it can adapt to the new forced semioses with historicity. 
Historicity itself facilitates the passing from umwelt to umwelt 
although historicity itself does not guarantee that a cicada (or any
other organism) will be able to accommodate a new situation in a 
manner that maximizes survival. If the cicada was a more complex or­
ganism, an organism with a mind, it might even be able to also select 
and organize the new umwelt so its historicity acquires new meaning 
in the novel circumstance. But alas, the mostly ergodic cicada is 
enslaved to play only limited sets of expected roles. Passing, 
according to Mead, from umwelt to umwelt, includes all of these 
functions and it allows an organism a higher probability of not only 
interpreting the new scenario appropriately, but also of deriving new 
meanings that can then be transferable, to use a behaviorist and 
cognitive concept, into new environments-umwelten-circumstances.
From previous sections then, it follows logically that conscious 
beings who possess multiple referentiality, due to their social expertise 
and the ability to simulate the other many times over within their own 
minds, are able to transmute historicity into practically anything they 
need to in order to manage the new circumstance. To them is be­
stowed the greatest prize of all: to privately, in their own minds, think 
up umweiten ad infinitum, or ad nauseam if you prefer, and relate to 
these even when these worlds do not materially exist. For example, 
imaginary umwelten could conceivably extend into complex dreaming 
life, particularly into a semiotics of lucid dreaming, when conscious­
ness reappears and can be manipulated at will while exploring 
uncanny dreamscape semiosis (Conesa 2003; 2004).
For now, let us accept the idea that multiple referentiality, to some 
degree or another, is achievable by most members of a given species 
endowed with consciousness and that this is generally a good thing. 
This is a big assumption, but if true, then Mead asserts that we are 
now in the position to inhabit multiple frames of references at once 
and that only conscious organisms that exist in The Realm o f 
Continued Emergence can do so.
That is, a human being, and only a human being, can imagine 
being a passenger inside an imaginary rocket ship traveling at the 
speed of light and, simultaneously, a stationary person who remains 
on the face of the earth watching the rocket rise and then disappear. 
The fact that we can inhabit both perspectives (umwelten) is shown by 
the fact that many individuals of our species, for example Einstein, are 
(were) able to imagine such a dual perspective or circumstance at the 
same time. Mead did not say this, but if he could, he would say that 
relativity theory can only be a product of a conscious mind, and that in
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passing from one frame of reference to another, this mind is also able 
to maintain or retain so much historicity as to be able to make both 
realities part of their real present. Mead also uses examples more 
mundane than the one given above, including the meaning of a dollar 
to several individuals. He cites, for example, that even though the first 
two individuals may be seeing the value of a dollar in a restricted 
sense, and each from their own unique perspective, a third individual 
can incorporate both perspectives and synthesize, to boot, a novel 
perception that gives him the monetary or investment advantage. 
Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this examination, that maintaining 
multiple referentiality while passing from umwelt to umwelt confers 
upon the conscious organism a tremendous advantage and opens the 
door to unimaginable possibilities, that even though removed from the 
utility of the present, allows semiosis to overreach and, if lucky, make 
possible umwelten that previously did not exist. By the way, his 
position is also an argument against absolute incommensurability, 
within a conscious species’ passsing (Kuhn 1983; Feyerabend 1987), 
since no probable umwelt is truly extant from this sort of advanced 
consciousness. Despite Mead’s convincing and interesting elaboration 
(realistically speaking, only a smaller number of individuals belonging 
to a conscious species might be able to experience full-blown multiple 
referentiality as in the case of Einstein’s insight8) of the real expe­
rience of inhabiting several perceptual spaces, simultaneously, this 
idea does not explain passing itself, at least not without first 
determining what bridges are (can be) built between probable um­
welten that renders null the idea of two truly incommensurable 
environments. In the next section, I will try to show how the 
transferability of these elements, as explained by Mead, is not 
sufficient to track the successful passing from umwelt to umwelt and 
that SMT already has a vocabulary that handles these passings. In 
short, passing as explained by Mead seems to be dependant mostly on 
whatever cognitive or general talents are available to an organism thus 
lessening the potentiality, in the electrical sense, of a sort of impos­
sible existential relativism that would prohibit movement and adap­
tation to a novel umwelt.
8 One person’s multireferential insight is all it takes. After the fact, an entire 
culture can benefit from this insight without a thorough understanding of this 
accomplishment or what it ‘really’ means.
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4. The elemental currency of “passing”:
A pansemiosis or heuristics of matricial doings
The reader is referred to a more complete treatment of the original 
version of SMT (Conesa 1999), and to a relatively more recent and 
succinct version of the same ideas (Conesa 2001) that present the 
following and more basic existential, adaptational arguments in a 
thumbnail sketch. The following basic positions have been changed 
here to address the Mead discussion presented thus far. These pro­
positions, if you like, are as follows:
(1) Living organisms (and other “things”) are matrices9. Therefore, in 
living entities, Energy, Safety, and Possibility need and functions, and 
their feedback interactions, are consubstantial giving rise to the 
emergent dynamics of what I define as matricial activity, or a matrix 
as an integral entity.
(2) As matrices ‘we’ embody Energy, Safety and Possibility needs and 
the umwelt provides sensorially and perceptually comprehensible sets 
of invariant information that can then be turn into affordances 
(Gibson, 1979). Affordances can then be interpreted as providing these 
basic matricial needs. This is why SMT is a biosemiotic theory, 
because it takes into account that a seamless and pervasive existential 
complementary exists between the object, the sign, and the interpreter 
which provides the basic sustenance for all meanings. This existential 
complement and yoked-in triad permeates and predates all sign 
systems, and all sign transactions. The historicity of an organism, 
partly programmed by its own genome and partly learned, is funda­
mentally and existentially the historicity of Energy, Safety and Possi­
bility needs however this historicity is played out in the diverse 
attempts to deal, and to eke out an existence.
(3) Organic (maenadic-animals and ensilic-plants matrices) matrices 
have evolved countless metabolic, physiological, behavioral, and 
mental adaptations to express and complement these matricial needs 
by first reacting, responding, identifying or labeling objects in any
9 In actuality, and biosemiotically speaking, anything could be a matrix as long 
as it meets the definitional requirements of even being perceived as one. The idea 
of God is therefore a matrix and so is currency.
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environment that they encounter as resources to meet these needs. 
Thus, a biosemiotic structure might be derived from a description, 
understanding, and prediction of these interactions. I have argued that 
the topological mathematics of Kurt Lewin’s (1936 and 1939) Life 
Spaces may be a computational first step to learn something about 
these interactions, if only Lewinian terms are replaced with matricial 
functionality and jargon.
(4) All human knowledge, in all areas of interest, is an attempt to 
describe, understand, and/or predict how these matricial interactions 
occur. Incommensurability across these fields exists only insofar as 
lower level, technical jargon is used to define (without interdiscipli­
nary effort) their phenomena of interest, a continua of biosemiosis1 .
(5) The summary of this quest and understanding agrees with Systems 
Theory somewhat in that life transactions are all ecological (systemic). 
However, there are limitations to Systems Theory addressed by SMT 
(Conesa 1999; 2001).
(6) To understand the ‘system’ is to have a science that predicts how 
the system might behave. This understanding must also be semiotic as 
others intuited, pointed out and corrected (Maturana, Varela, 1980; 
1987). In this sense, a good ‘life’ theory, psychological, biological, 
economical, etc., describes significant matricial events that occur in a 
system and is able to make predictions about these.
(7) Ecological Ethics, or Ecoethics, is an emergent necessity and the 
backbone describing the manner and nature of these relationships/ 
interactions insofar as development proceeds from one smaller and 
physiologically restrictive matrix, to a larger one, and yet to a larger 
one (zygote, womb, mother, family, school, community, nation, pla­
net, etc.). The passing from simpler to increasingly complex um­
welten, if it is to succeed, must include a see-through universal
10 By the way, I do believe that incommensurability is pervasive for less 
complex organisms with respect to more complex ones to the extent that mind is 
absent in the former. An insect, for example, cannot understand the concept or 
idea humanness; but an intelligent dog, for example, an organism with a fairly 
complex mind, can sympathize in many non-commensurable moments with its 
human partner.
biosemiotics rooted in more or less easy to interpret, or easy to learn 
signs that assists the ‘becoming’ of an organism during its onto­
genesis. To this end, human organisms (and other species) invent 
“rules” of ecological engagement that allow them to maximize poten­
tial within reason, without destroying the delicate balance of these 
tenuous relations. Sometimes an organism ignores these ethical rules 
in order to maximize matricial procurements (to dysfunctionally, in 
the sense of ignoring the consequences to its ecological setting, mono­
polize) it does this at the developmental or matricial detriment of 
others and while causing injury to an ecosystem. Biosemiotics, in the 
end, has to deal with ethical questions, and Mead’s passing, specifi­
cally, must include a notion of functional limits found in each umwelt 
lived.11
(8) Life processes allow an almost infinite number of strategies for 
achieving organismic potential; but at the root of these endeavors are 
the matricial beta elements'. Safety, Energy, and Possibility.
(9) Semiotic Matrix Theory specifies the way in which biosemiosis 
can be structured through an empirical program that tests the eco­
logical validity of these interactions that then can be applied to any 
study that examines systems.
(10) Encapsulated physical bodies are ‘simply’ the phenotypic ex­
pression of these matricial forces encountering and surviving diverse 
environments. Moreover, both genomic and phenotypic adaptations 
and developments are servicing, through simple and complex feed­
back systems, the achievement of a matricial homeostasis. Being that 
all organic systems are being drafted, consciously or not, toward this 
end, matricial integrity, then the entire enterprise of merely surviving 
and/or meaningful existence is participating in a common ground of 
‘being’. If so, then surely a biosemiosis dominates from the bottom up 
and anything else we can explain or discover about semiosis is really a
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11 Joseph Chilton Pearce (1971 and 1977), first laid out the developmental 
sequence just mentioned, and proposed the ideas that are foundational to SMT. Even 
his idea and use of the term 'matrix', used in this developmental sense, makes a 
better case for this progression than I am making here. I encourage readers to revisit 
his thought provoking and controversial book, Magical Child {1977).
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forced relatedness or a forced semiosis and sociality that it is always 
matricial at its core.
(11) The historicity of an organism, any system, however complex, 
colorful or idiosyncratic, makes an explicit or an implicit reference to 
matricial necessities. It is an existential situation, from the bottom up 
and in reverse, where a pervasive (and/or perverse if you wish) 
biosemiotic field is, in my opinion, inescapable. In its new formu­
lation, and contrasted to Mead’s ideas, I call it a hermetic biosemiosis.
If the above points can be accepted at face value, at least for the 
purposes of this aim, namely, to elucidate the problem12 of passing 
from one frame of reference to another while maintaining a principal 
and primordial existential objective, then the following might make 
more sense. The cicada, an organism with limited ‘mind’ and thus 
with limited frames of references, as well as a human being, an orga­
nism who inhabits the multi-referential realm of continued emergence, 
in moving from one existential circumstance to another, must both 
maintain a common denominator and heuristic that transcends the 
‘many flavors’ of speciation, the exuberant display of multiplicity of 
signs, and the many opportunities for passage from umwelt to umwelt. 
In addition to all transferable commodities that assist the passage from 
one frame of reference to another (including: instinctual responses; 
acquired cognitive skills; cultural and genetic adaptations; the 
grandiose ‘se lf; short-term or long-term learning; or any other bodily 
or mental propensities that one may wish to even remotely associate 
with my term transferable commodity) and give life, purpose, and 
meaning to their expression is an ontological semiosis that reads a 
universal matricial manual before commencing to select, organize and 
then get cozy in a new frame of reference. This thoroughly enveloping 
ontosemiotic baseline, at least a facilitator of passing, is even more 
crucial for organisms who are mentally ductile in multiple referen­
tiality, because they have an even greater need for an ontological 
compass, given that some automaticity of responding can now be 
supplemented or taken over altogether by the ‘little voice inside the 
head,’ and given that the little voice may be sometimes wrong.
12 I see it as and call it a problem, Mead may have not thought of it as a problem. 
His writings assume and are hopeful that the generalized other would be passport 
enough (pun intended) between umwelten.
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When the ‘little voice in the head’ is wrong, along with the rest of 
the little voices inside the heads of the society from which individual 
Self-consciousness emerges, then we might be partaking of dys­
functional semiosis. As Erich Fromm (1955) said, “That millions of 
people share in the same forms of mental pathology does not make 
those people sane.” The next section presents the position that deep 
ecological and green psychological movements put forth, namely the 
necessity of re-establishing an authentic and long neglected bio­
semiosis, at the cultural level, absence which is the cause of individual 
unhappiness and illness, as well as a societal disintegration.
5. M ead, SM T, and ecological ethics
The apparent existential freedom of continued emergence also comes 
with a social and psychological price to pay (Fromm 1955) and a duty 
to ecological ethics (an ecological morality). That is, to deep eco­
logists (Naess 1973; Sheppard 1973; Naess 1979; Sheppard 1982; 
Devall, Sessions 1985) and green psychologists1' (Roszak 1979; 1992; 
Metzner 1971; 1999) who see BEING, and in particular healthy 
BEING, as predicated in the natural and specifically in the wild, such 
creative semiosis could turn out to be a dysfunctional semiosis, 
precisely because it may deviate and stray into purely fictional and 
aberrant semiosis (culturally driven or subjectively creative, both 
types could be delusional in the sense that Erich Fromm stated in an 
earlier passage) from an original telluric and biosemiosic ground 
(Sheppard 1973; 1982). As Paul Sheppard brilliantly demonstrated (an 
idea that continues to be debated), “the tender carnivore” has been 
domesticated by an agricultural and deviant text and semiosis and 
therefore has long ceased to be in harmony with ancient patterns and 
is no longer socially or mentally sound. But the above criticism is not 
new, and even before many were blaming modernism as another non- 
inclusive ‘ism’ that lacked this or that, or that was not addressing the 
needs of this or that group, a modernist voice and philosopher, George 
Santayana, recognized in a speech that was later to be printed, that
13 Peter Kropotkin's (1914) name must be added as a precursor to this list of 
ecopsychologists (Roszak 2001) for he contributed, to the budding concept of an 
'ecosystem,' being dependent on mutual, interspecies aid.
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something was wrong with European philosophy with respect to 
ecological ideas when he said:
A Californian whom I had recently the pleasure of meeting observed that if 
the philosophers had lived among your mountains [California mountains], 
their systems would have been different from what they are. Certainly very 
different from what those systems are which the European genteel tradition 
has handed down since Socrates; for these systems are egotistical; directly or 
indirectly they are anthropocentric, and inspired by the conceit notion that 
man, or human reason, or the human distinction between good and evil, is the 
center and pivot of the universe. That is what the mountains and the woods 
should make you at least ashamed to assert. (Devall 1985: 46)
It is not certain whether the “Californian” Santayana was referring to 
was none other than the Scott naturalist and founder of The Sierra 
Club, John Muir. But William Devall (1985) certainly thought that 
this modernist voice was the beginning of a new era when he writes, 
“[the speech at The University of California at Berkeley]...was a 
historical turning point in the development of the contemporary search 
for an alternative worldview and an environmental ethic that would 
not be subjectivist, anthropocentric, and essentially materialistic”. 
Devall’s statement is also an example of and recognition that contrary 
to stereotypical descriptions of a particular age, each epoch conve­
niently invents derogatory as well as admiring terms for other epochs 
while rewriting their own history, and in so doing, highlights or 
ignores text when this text is either beneficial or contradictory of their 
stated positions, respectively. Thus every epoch is more or less 
modem or more or less dark in comparison to another. Santayana’s 
text speaks of a sentiment that was not really completely lost in 
European thought (Nash, 1982; Devall, Sessions 1985). After all, John 
Muir, a Scott, who migrated to North America, hiked and fell in love 
with this wilderness and pushed “American” politics and psyche from 
the romantic ideal of nature toward the observation of its intrinsic 
right to be sustained and thus protected.
Interestingly, both William Devall (1985) and Erich Fromm (1955) 
go further into history to bring back another voice, Spinoza’s, who can 
validate their shared thesis that a particular collection of dysfunctional 
meme-texts can be admitted as normal by a given culture or at least 
tolerated to a certain degree. Erich Fromm (1955: 24) quotes a passage 
from Spinoza’s Ethics (IV) that it is worth examining,
Many people are seized by one and the same affect with great consistency. All 
his senses are so strongly affected by one object that he believes this object to 
be present even when it is not. If this happens while the person is awake, the 
person is believed to be insane.. .But if the greedy person thinks only of money 
and possessions, the ambitious one only of fame, one does not think of them 
as being insane, but only as annoying; generally one has contempt for them. 
But factually greediness, ambition, and so forth are forms of insanity, 
although usually one does not think of them as illness. (Spinoza: 44)
I share the above passage to suggest that any predisposed or learned 
behavioral singularity that it is not ecologically edifying, a fetish , is a 
form of illness. There is at least a logical implication in Mead’s 
yoking of ‘se lf with ‘society’ (Mead 1932), or the social, that allows 
the conclusion that the ethical clarification within the self of what is 
right or wrong (even sane or not in Fromm, 1955) emerges from the 
semiosis between Self and society:
Since society has endowed us with self-consciousness, we can enter 
personally into the largest undertakings which the intercourse of rational 
selves extends before us. And because we can live with ourselves as well as 
with others, we can criticize ourselves, and make our own values in which we 
are involved through those undertakings in which the community of all 
rational beings is engaged. (Mead: 90)
If so, it is equally probable that: a ‘se lf, originating within the social 
realm as it does, while intuiting, apprehending and utilizing its 
universal meme-text, is capable o f  realizing that his polis, the cultural 
semiotic world that gave origin to the ‘little voice' inside his head, is 
thoroughly corrupted and so is the text inside his head. This is the 
beginning of healing for the above-mentioned deep ecologists and 
green psychologists.
If we are creatures of continued emergence that can grasp 
universals, above and beyond the very social matrix that gave us the 
power to so do, then we can also fix the corrupted meme-text. In 
attempting to do so there is, first, a need to describe, biosemiotically, 
how this dysfunctional, industrialized or agricultural, text might be 
looping into nonsense or even illness, looping into perversion and 
narcissism, and moving faster and farther from a true concept of 
community, and intimation with each other as umwelten and with wild 
nature as the most authentic backdrop for these intimations. As hinted 
at earlier, any of these are dysfunctional social loops, or fetishes,
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because they deny identification with a larger ecology hyper selecting, 
thus reducing, a larger potential field of biosemiosis. For example, 
who would argue with the thesis that mass, ravenous consumerism, an 
inclination toward the artificial, and a reduced ability to tolerate the 
inclemency’s of bad weather make for a stronger self or a more factual 
biosemiosis?
Deep ecologists as well as green psychologists are awaiting a more 
earnest effort and dogged contribution from our lot. Without our 
concerted ensemble contribution dictionary entries such as the one I 
shared at the beginning of this text, “Tarantula: an insect whose bite is 
only cured by musick [sic]”, in another form (such as the still prevalent 
bad habit of avoiding using the word ‘animal’ to designate humans) will 
continue as examples offetish, or anthropocentric semiosis.
To conclude this section, it is fair to say that the biosemiotic 
intellectual paradigm, with the assistance of other ecological (deep 
and shallow) disciplines, if it chooses to lead in that direction, could 
actively be involved in these deep ecological discussions and build a 
more inclusive semiotics where biosemiosis is not limited to the sign- 
in-nature, but more broadly puts forward an authentic effort in exa­
mining the consequences of the absence of the original sign in the 
present human text. Even though there are already noteworthy succes­
ses of this kind of extended a more inclusive biology within bio­
semiotic writings (Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 2001; Kull 1998), the deep 
ecological sentiment in biosemiotics is not well covered. Also, a 
recent review of theories of emergence (life, consciousness, bio­
semiotics) did not list Mead as a reference. I only mention this be­
cause, at least to me, it seems important and even logically necessary 
to connect theories of emergence, biosemiosis with those of ecological 
ethics.
6. Discussion
Thus far, I have argued that in phylogenic and ontogenetic forms of 
‘becoming’, and while passing from umwelt to umwelt, matricial truth 
and aims are reiterated. Ecological ethics are also obligated if we 
agree with Joseph Chilton Pearce’s developmental model (Pearce 
1977). This fractal iteration of BEING grounded on matricial neces-
sities, or another biopansemiosis that could replace it, is falsifiable at 
face value, if we consider the following, as George Santayana (1955) 
would say, brute facts. As negative examples, if an existential biopan­
semiosis did not exist, of the sort described by SMT, then any suffi­
ciently distinct frame of reference would be truly incommensurable, 
thus intraversable and impassable, within (and without) the spaces o f  
se lf and cultural semiosis. Passing would be, if not impossible, extre­
mely difficult, reducing the range of semiosis we observe in the life 
(and historicity) of this planet to indescribable and unthinkable sense­
less events. Logically, speciation would not be possible, assuming that 
we describe speciation semiotically, as passing from a vanishing set of 
existential accommodations to another emerging set of significantly 
different existential accommodations, in varying degrees of difference 
and success.
Moreover, if passing is also understood as intra-species accommo­
dation, interpretation or deployment of instinctual behaviors, and 
some biosemiotic mechanism did not facilitate the functions, then 
every organism would go hungry and starve to death for no apparent 
reason. Copulation, as an example of primal forced relatedness or 
forced semiosis would be a bizarre undertaking, or would not take 
place at all. Equally, without a biosemiotic set of guidelines there 
would be no need for nests, burrows, or houses with thermostats and 
fences, or the distinction between enemy and friend. Bluntly put, there 
would be ‘nothing’ instead of ‘being’.
To conclude, focusing on the sign, myopically; on human culture 
and semiosis, myopically; on the little sounds we make with moving 
lips, myopically; on the little sounds that birds make when they sing, 
myopically; on poetry, myopically; we risk missing a grander bio­
semiotic phenomenon: everything does the same things except a little 
bit differently,15
It is quite probable, as Mead intuited and defended, that only social 
organisms who also achieve multiple referentiality are in a position to
14 SMT traces the existential doings of organic matter and of life to inorganic, 
energetic beginnings. Thus, in this more inclusive sense, the terms pansemiosis or 
biopansemiotic are used.
15 As my grandmother Carmen Sevilla Perez from Cadiz told my Catalan mother, 
Montserrat Sevilla de Conesa, bom in Paris, and my mother continually reminds us 
when we unjustly, stereotypically, compare the ways and customs of diverse peoples 
and countries: “En todas partes del mundo se comen habas”, or “Everywhere, 
everyone eats [some sort of] beans. ” “Just a little bit differently,” I add.
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maintain so many points of view at once as to begin to apprehend 
universals. This capacity may sometimes be simply a wishful subjec­
tive projection rather than the discovery or intimation of an actual and 
bona fide universal or natural habit. Sometimes this capacity simply 
produces mental aberrations and illness. But sometimes this capacity 
pays off, substantially, and produces an explanation that incorporates 
extant frames of reference. However, depending on how extant the 
new frame of reference is, it may or may not be thoroughly in­
corporated into human culture as a semiosis of mental associations 
and meanings. Most people, I would venture, do not understand basic 
principles in physics, psychology, chemistry or biology even though 
the technologies and ideas that spun from these fields are routinely 
employed by all of us. This lack of in depth understanding does not 
mean that these fields are incommensurable from each other, or that 
the average person cannot grasp the essential insights found in all of 
these fields. But, practically speaking, the average person simply does 
not have the time to be so comprehensive or inclusive, or he/she 
simply chooses to specialize in one field at the exclusion of other 
fields.
Thus, an existential drive can be summed up by the following 
questions: Can I make a ‘living’ today? If so, then: What basic ele­
ments gathered from raw reality do I employ to even begin to make a 
‘living’? And, how many of these elements are, biosemiotically 
speaking, significantly foundational and enduring so that I can 
continue making a living tomorrow? If a given organism can achieve 
the Realm of Continued Emergence as an added bonus, then life may 
seem either more pleasant and interesting or twice as horrifying, 
depending on one’s myopic frame of reference. But through happy 
dreams or through nightmares, one can be certain that everything does 
the same things, except a little bit differently. Sociality as forced  
relatedness, or forced semiosis, and, sociality as the driver and engine 
for semiosis, does so: it makes sure we tug the same ontology along, 
always matricial at its core.
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Область продолжающего творчества: семиотика 
Джорджа Герберта Мида и ее результаты в биосемиотике, 
теории семиотической матрицы и экологической этике
Данное исследование обращает внимание прежде всего на поворот­
ные идеи Дж. Г. Мида о социальности, сознании и коммуникации. 
Мидовское понимание социальности как принудительного отноше­
ния или принудительного семиозиса, который появляется уже на 
раннем этапе эволюции и проявляется в простых системах, гаранти­
рует ему место основоположника среди биосемиотиков. К идеям 
Мида принадлежит и описание мультиреференциальности, которая 
свойственна социальным организмам (это связано с его идеей об­
общенного другого), позволяя сравнительно легко переходить из 
одного умвельта в другой. Хотя широкое понимание Мидом семио­
зиса звучит убедительно и соответствует принципам современной 
семиотики (и биосемиотики), все же в нем отсутствует удовлетвори­
тельное объяснение того, каким образом организмы, обладающие 
сознанием, способны переходить на новые основания референции. В 
развиваемой автором “теории семиотической матрицы” пансемиозис 
описывает в качестве функции “перехода” фальсифицируемые экзис­
тенциальные и когнитивные методы эвристики распознавания 
потребностей в энергии, забот о безопасности и благоприятной 
возможности. Не каждый семиозис сам по себе хорош, как хорош не 
каждый текст. Так как наш вид отходит от первобытного семиозиса 
и взаимозависимости, то историчность (пусть и изобретая послушно 
синтетический семиозис или капризные умвельты) сталкивается с 
последствиями экологической реальности и слишком антропо­
центрического текста.
Jätkuva loomingu valdkond:
George Herbert M ead’i semiootika ja selle tulemid biosemiootikas, 
semiootilise maatriksi teoorias ja ökoloogilises eetikas
Käesolev uurimus George Herbert Mead’i semiootika teemal pöörab 
peatähelepanu ta pöördelistele ideedele sotsiaalsusest, teadvusest, ja 
kommunikatsioonist. Meadi arusaam sotsiaalsusest kui sunnitud suhesta­
tusest, või sunnitud semioosist, mis ilmub evolutsioonis varakult ja aval­
dub lihtsais süsteemides, garanteerib talle rajaja koha biosemiootikute 
hulgas. Nende Meadi ideede hulka kuulub multireferentsiaalsuse kiidelda-
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mine, mis on omane sotsiaalsetele organismidele (seotult ta üldistatud 
teise ideega), võimaldades üleminekut ühest omailmast teise suhteliselt 
kergelt. Kuigi Meadi avar semioosi mõiste on veenev ning vastavuses 
praegusaegse semiootikaga (ning biosemiootikaga), siiski puudub selles 
rahuldav seletus sellele, kuidas teadvusega organismid suudavad üle 
minna uutele võrdlusalustele. Autori poolt arendatav ‘semiootilise maat­
riksi teooria’ kiijeldab falsifitseeritavaid eksistentsiaalseid ja kognitiivseid 
heuristikuid, et eristada “ülemineku” funktsioone ‘energeetilisteks eeldus­
teks’, ‘kindlustatuseks’ja ‘võimaluseks’. Samuti, teistsugust tüüpi loovus, 
ökoeetika, on biosemioosis peituv konstant. Mitte iga semioos pole hea, 
nagu pole hea mitte iga tekst. Kuna meie liik liigub eemale ürgsest 
biosemioosist ja vastastikusest seotusest, siis ajaloolisus, küll kuulekas 
leiutamaks sünteetilist semioosi või tujukaid omailmu, põrkub ökoloo­
gilise reaalsuse ja üleliia antropotsentrilise teksti tagajärgedega.
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Abstract. This study looks at the relation between mathematical discovery 
and semiosis, focusing on the famous Fibonacci sequence. The serendipitous 
discovery of this sequence as the answer to a puzzle designed by Italian 
mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci to illustrate the efficiency of the decimal 
number system is one of those episodes in human history which show how 
serendipity, semiosis, and discovery are intertwined. As such, the sequence 
has significant implications for the study of creative semiosis, since it suggests 
that symbols are hardly arbitrary products of human reason, but rather un­
conscious probes of reality.
Introduction
One of the most famous mathematical discoveries of all time is the 
one that pertains to a sequence of integers connected by the following 
simple rule — for every three consecutive integers, the sum of the first 
two integers produces the third in the sequence, {1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 
13, So, for example, 3 = 1 + 2 ,  5 = 2 + 3, 8 = 3 + 5, and so on. 
The sequence is known as the “Fibonacci Sequence” (henceforward 
FS). So much has been written on this sequence that it would be 
presumptuous to claim that anything new can be said about it that has 
not already been said. Indeed, mathematicians have been studying the 
FS ever since its discovery in 1202 by Italian mathematician Leonardo 
Fibonacci (1170-1240). However, lacking from the relevant literature 
is a semiotic consideration of the implications this sequence has for
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understanding the nature of discovery. The purpose of the present 
paper is to do exactly that — to reflect upon the FS and its relation to 
mathematical discovery from a semiotic perspective.
Resorting to semiotically-based ideas (whether overtly or in­
directly) in order to investigate mathematical features and facts is not 
new — indeed, over the last few decades it has become quite common 
to do so (e.g. Rotman 1988; Reed 1994; MacNamara 1996; Radford, 
Grenier 1996; Antenos-Conforti et al. 1997; English 1997; Lakoff, 
Nunez 2000; Anderson et al. 2000). The mindset that guides this line 
of inquiry in general is the connection between symbols, mathematics, 
and discovery. It is, in my view, an important perspective because it 
leads to an insightful reformulation of the classic questions of mathe­
matical philosophy that originated with the ancient Pythagoreans: 
What is mathematics? Why does it allow us to discover natural laws? 
As Arthur Koestler (1959: 34) so eloquently put it: “Nobody before 
the Pythagoreans had thought that mathematical relations held the 
secret of the universe. Twenty-five centuries later, Europe is still 
blessed and cursed with their heritage.” And as the great Neapolitan 
philosopher Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) argued throughout his 
life, such relations do not come about by an exercise of strict logical 
thinking, but rather through a creative form of understanding that he 
called the fantasia — a unique blend of imagination and reasoning 
(Bertland 2004).
The fact that the FS is the direct product of a clever puzzle 
constructed by Fibonacci to show how Hindu-Arabic numerals can be 
used efficiently, bears great relevance to the question at hand. Puzzles 
are as old as civilization. There has never been a period of time, nor 
has there ever been a culture, without some kind of puzzle tradition. 
Very few other kinds of artifacts have had the broad appeal that 
puzzles have. Throughout history, riddles, mazes, magic squares, 
geometrical puzzles, and the like have been used for pedagogical, 
recreational, and various other kinds of social functions. The “puzzle 
instinct,” as it can be called (Danesi 2002), continues to manifest itself 
in the widespread popularity today of modem puzzle artifacts, from 
crosswords to the Rubik’s Cube. It may even go back as far as 10,000 
years BCE, as evidenced by several bones found in the Ishango Tribe 
that have marks on them representing numbers and which were
1 A version of the present paper was presented at the meeting of the Semiotic 
Society of America in Ottawa on October 11, 2003.
probably used to carry out numerical games (Heinzelin 1962). But are 
puzzles just playful texts or objects, intended merely to train the mind 
or to entertain? Or are they products of something more fundamental 
in the human species? Do they reveal, in fact, something about a truly 
enigmatic interplay between fantasia and discovery in mathematics, 
given that many classic mathematical puzzles have led to subsequent 
discoveries in mathematics opening up new fields of inquiry?
One puzzle that stands out in this regard is Fibonacci’s famous 
Rabbit Puzzle, which the medieval mathematician created primarily to 
illustrate the practicality of using the decimal number system to his 
fellow Italians (on this point see, for example, Ouaknin 2004: 133— 
140). As it turns out, no other puzzle has had as many implications for 
the study of mathematical pattern; and no other puzzle has had as 
many “reifications” in the study of nature. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Fibonacci himself was aware of the implications and 
applications that the solution to his puzzle would turn out to have. It 
was the French mathematician F rancis Edouard Anatole Lucas 
(1842-1891) who noticed some of these in the nineteenth century. 
Since Lucas’s observations, the amount of mathematical properties 
that the FS has been found to conceal and the number of reifications 
that it has been found to have in nature and human life have been 
absolutely astounding. The question that the FS begs is an obvious 
one: How could such a simple puzzle, designed originally to show the 
efficiency of decimal numerals over Roman ones, contain so many 
“secrets of the universe,” so to speak?
As Umberto Eco (1998) has cogently argued in regard to discovery 
in general, the crystallization of the FS from a simple puzzle is one of 
those episodes in human history which show how serendipity and 
discovery are intertwined. It is an episode with enormous implications 
for the study of creative semiosis, since it suggests that symbols are 
hardly arbitrary products of human reason, but rather unconscious 
probes of reality. Was this, in fact, the “secret” that got the Pythago­
reans into trouble in the ancient world, leading to their systematic 
killing by those who may have feared what they knew? As is well 
known, Pythagoras (c. 582-500 BCE) and his followers taught that 
number was the essence of all things. They associated numbers with 
virtues, colors, and many other ideas. To study the relation between 
number and reality Pythagoras founded a school called the “Brother­
hood” among the aristocrats of the city of Crotona. As history records,
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the people of that city became suspicious of the Brotherhood —  a 
suspicion that led eventually to an uprising and an extermination of its 
members.
Discovery in Mathematics
In his monumental history of semiotics, John Deely (2001) argues 
essentially that we can only understand the history of knowledge by 
mapping it against the development of sign theory. His discussion of 
the relation between signs and knowledge, especially as to how we 
attain it and how it is symbolized, is based on the premise that signs 
give shape to formless ideas, not in an arbitrary fashion, but in 
response to inferential processes that are tied to our experience of 
reality.
Knowledge systems vary throughout the world. But such variation 
is, upon closer scrutiny, superficial. Below the surface of these 
systems are sign creation processes that reflect universals in how 
reality is perceived. The problem is that we never get the “whole 
picture” at once. This is why special theories of the physical universe 
are possible and highly useful, but general ones are not. In other 
words, our knowledge systems can only give us partial glimpses of 
reality. What is important to note is that the elements that constitute 
these systems are hardly the products of firm reasoning processes; 
rather they seem to come to consciousness as if by magic. Discovery, 
in other words, cannot be forced by logical analysis. It simply 
happens. But it is not totally random, as the Fibonacci Rabbit Puzzle 
episode shows. It is probably tied to unconscious modes of inter­
connecting experiences and their meanings. This is perhaps the reason 
why a sign (a word, text, formula, theory, puzzle, etc.) invented in one 
realm of representation leads, subsequently, to discovery in other 
realms. Signs are thus both encoders and guides of reality. St. Augus­
tine appropriately characterized this aspect of human semiosis as a 
blending of our experience of natural signs (signa naturalia) with con­
ventionalized knowledge (signa data). Another way to put it, using the 
ideas of the Tartu School, is to say that there is an interplay between 
our existence in the biosphere and our existence in the semiosphere 
(Lotman 1990). This interplay is what leads, arguably, to discoveries.
The word serendipity, incidentally, was coined by Horace Walpole 
in 1754, from the title of the Persian fairy tale The Three Princes o f  
Serendip, whose heroes make many fortunate discoveries accidentally 
(Merton, Barber 2003). The tale goes somewhat as follows. Three 
princes from Ceylon were journeying in a strange land when they 
came upon a man looking for his lost camel. The princes had never 
seen the animal, but they asked the owner a series of seemingly 
pertinent questions: Was it missing a tooth? Was it blind in one eye? 
Was it lame? Was it laden with butter on one side and honey on the 
other? Was it being ridden by a pregnant woman? Incredibly, the 
answer to all their questions was yes. The owner instantly accused the 
princes of having stolen the animal since, clearly, they could not have 
had such precise knowledge otherwise. But the princes merely pointed 
out that they had observed the road, noticing that the grass on either 
side was uneven and this was most likely the result of the camel eating 
the grass. They had also noticed parts of the grass that were chewed 
unevenly, suggesting a gap in the animal’s mouth. The uneven 
patterns of footprints indicated signs of awkward mounting and 
dismounting, which could be related to uneven weights on the camel. 
Given the society of the era, this suggested the possibility that the 
camel was ridden by a pregnant woman, creating a lack of equilibrium 
and thus an uneven pattern of footprints. Finally, in noticing differing 
accumulations of ants and flies they concluded that the camel was 
laden with butter and honey — the natural attractors of these insects. 
Their questions were, as it turns out, inferences based on astute 
observations, or to use Peircean terminology, “abductions” of a 
logico-inferential nature.
Ceylon’s ancient name was Serendip, and it was Walpole who, 
after having read the tale, decided to introduce the word serendipity 
into the English language. The princes made their discovery of the 
facts of the matter as a result of what Walpole called “accidental 
sagacity.” Serendipity characterizes the history of discovery in mathe­
matics and science — Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen (1845-1923) 
accidentally discovered X-rays by seeing their effects on photographic 
plates; Alexander Fleming (1881-1955) serendipitously discovered 
penicillin by noticing the effects of a mold on bacterial cultures; and 
the list could go on and on (e.g. Roberts 1989). Incidentally, Roentgen 
called his discovery “X-rays” because he simply didn’t know what to 
call the rays, so he resorted to the traditional use of “X” as an
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“unknown” in mathematics. The historical record suggests that 
discovery is hardly the product of a systematic search for truth, but 
rather a serendipitous consequence of using our fantasia. Perhaps the 
most famous of all serendipitous episodes in the history of science is 
Archimedes’ discovery of a law of hydrostatics (known as Archi­
medes’ Principle) as he was purportedly taking a bath. After 
visualizing the law in his mind through a flash of insight, he is said to 
have run out into the streets of Syracuse naked, crying “Eureka,” 
meaning “I have found it.” Since then, such flashes of insight have 
been called “Eureka moments.”
What is perhaps even more astounding is the fact that serendipity 
plays a role in reification —  the manifestation of a form in knowledge 
domains other than the original one in which it was forged. A perfect 
example of this are the reifications of я (pi) = 3.14 (Beckmann 1971; 
Blatner 1997; Eymard et al. 2004; Posamentier 2004). Pi is the ratio 
that results when the circumference of a circle is divided by its 
diameter. Although discovered in the ancient world, the Greek letter я 
was first used in 1706 by English mathematician William Jones 
(1675-1749) and adopted by Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler 
(1707-1783) in 1737. Serendipitously, л appears in a number of 
mathematical calculations and formulas, such as the one used to 
describe the motion of a pendulum or the vibration of a string. It also 
turns up in equations describing the DNA double helix, rainbows, 
ripples spreading from where a raindrop falls into water, all kinds of 
waves, navigation systems, and the list could go on and on. Does this 
mean that the circle form that produced л is implicit in these new 
domains? What is the connecting link between the circle form that 
produced the notion of я and other forms such as rainbows?
In a fascinating 1998 movie, titled n: Faith in Chaos, by American 
director Darren Aronofsky, a brilliant mathematician, Maximilian 
Cohen, teeters on the brink of insanity as he searches for an elusive 
numerical code hidden in л. For the previous ten years, Cohen was on 
the verge of his most important discovery, attempting to decode the 
numerical pattern beneath the ultimate system of ordered chaos — the 
stock market. As he verges on a solution, real chaos is swallowing the 
world in which he lives. Pursued by an aggressive Wall Street firm set 
on financial domination and a Kabbalah sect intent on unlocking the 
secrets hidden in their ancient holy texts, Cohen races to crack the
code, hoping to defy the madness that looms before him. Instead, he 
uncovers a secret for which everyone is willing to kill him.
As the movie’s subtext implies, the stream of digits of n seems to 
challenge us to try to find a pattern within them. The greatest chal­
lenge to date, however, has been the race to simply compute к farther 
than before. The further it has been computed, the more old theories 
about patterns within are dispelled and new ones created. So far, n has 
been computed to over 51 billion digits. What is our attraction to this 
number? Is it perhaps the fact that a circle is probably the most perfect 
and simple form known to human beings? And why does к appear in 
statistics, biology, and in many other domains of knowledge? It 
simply keeps cropping up, reminding us that it is there, and defying us 
to understand why. Very much like the universe itself, the more 
technologically advanced we become and as our picture of n grows 
ever more sophisticated, the more its mysteries grow. There is a 
beauty to я that keeps our interest in it. One can argue, as does Beck­
man (1971), that к is one of those products of human effort that is a 
mirror of human history — it starts out in one domain of activity (geo­
metry) and ends up in others and is probably everywhere (if we look 
for it).
Although the idea that signs are both reactions to experience and 
subsequent locators of new experiences is an extremely problematic 
one for many philosophers and mathematicians, it offers crucial 
insights in any attempt to approach (if not answer) one of the oldest 
questions in philosophy and mathematics: Is mathematics invented or 
discovered? Those supporting the view that mathematics as an 
invention or creation of the human mind include Augustus de Morgan, 
Janos Bolyai, David Hilbert, Albert Einstein, and George Polya 
(Dewdney 1999). Those supporting the view that mathematics is the 
means by which we consciously discover truths are Archimedes, Isaac 
Newton, Leonhard Euler, and G. H. Hardy (Dewdney 1999). Semioti- 
cally, however, it can be argued that both perspectives are accurate. 
As the Pythagoreans believed, numbers do indeed seem to hold the 
key to the universe at the same time that they emanate from human 
perspectives of that same universe. The Pythagoreans lasted a long 
time, from about 500 BC until well into the Islamic era. Common 
wisdom holds that theirs was a pre-scientific system of belief, a close 
cousin of astrology and numerology, rendered obsolete by the rise of 
rationalist science in the late Renaissance that provided more effective
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explanations of natural events. But science has now come virtually 
full circle, restoring mathematics to a throne not unlike that imagined 
by the ancient Pythagoreans. Whether we recognize it or not, the 
information age in which we live confronts us once again with the 
ancient mystery of why the universe is so mathematical: Does the 
cosmos make mathematics, or does mathematics make the cosmos?
Differences in numerical notation (Roman, decimal, etc.) are, of 
course, culture-based and invented; but the similarities captured by all 
such systems goes beyond culture. Numbers are thus both invented 
and discovered, giving them a unique status in the history of human 
ingenuity (Menninger 1969). The human mind creates numbers in the 
same sense that it creates colors. Yet the colors we perceive 
correspond to something real outside the mind. In this sense, we are 
discovering numbers all the time. Paradoxical as it may sound, only 
the possibility of being wrong will save mathematics from becoming a 
purely cultural exercise.
Mounting evidence in the neurosciences suggests that the rudi­
ments of arithmetic are anchored in our genes, that infants are bom 
with a capacity for recognizing and distinguishing among small nume­
rical referents, etc. If such research is indeed correct, then the disco­
very of mathematical patterns is something we are programmed to do 
from birth. Although the structures of the cosmos certainly predate the 
human mind, they are not understood or even existent outside of 
human minds. The human brain, equipped by evolution, seems to be 
inclined to translate these structures into mathematics.
The Fibonacci sequence
When all is said and done, the question of where invention ends and 
discovery begins seems to defy a satisfactory answer. The case of 
Fibonacci’s Rabbit Puzzle is a truly remarkable one in this regard, 
because it is, without question, a simple invention, and yet it contains 
within its solution so many discoveries that it tmly boggles the mind 
to come up with a rational explanation as to why this is so.
The puzzle is found Fibonacci’s Liber Abaci, published in 1202. 
Fibonacci designed his book as a practical introduction to the Hindu- 
Arabic number system, which he had learned to use during his 
extensive travels in the Middle East. His method of exposition was
based on the creation of puzzles that illustrated how easily the Hindu- 
Arabic system could be used to solve what would otherwise constitute 
intractable problems with the Roman numeral system. In the Liber 
Abaci he also introduced the word cephirum for “zero” as a figura 
nihili (“a sign of nothing”) in Latin. For historical accuracy it should 
be mentioned that the zero concept started out as sunya in sixth-eighth 
century Sanskrit, was then adapted as sift in ninth-century Arabic, 
introduced as cephirum through Fibonacci in thirteenth-century Latin 
(with variants cifa, zefirum, and zephirum), developing finally to zero 
in fourteenth-century Italian — a word adopted by English in the 
fifteenth century.
The puzzle is found in the third section of the Liber Abaci:
A certain man put a pair o f rabbits, male and female, in a very large cage. 
How many pairs o f rabbits can be produced in that cage in a year if every 
month each pair produces a new pair which, from the second month o f its 
existence on, also is productive?
There is 1 pair of rabbits in the cage at the start. At the end of the first 
month, there is still only 1 pair, for the puzzle states that a pair is 
productive only “from the second month of its existence on.” It is 
during the second month that the original pair will produce its first 
offspring pair. Thus, at the end of the second month, a total of 2 pairs, 
the original one and its first offspring pair, are in the cage. Now, 
during the third month, only the original pair generates another new 
pair. The first offspring pair must wait a month before it becomes 
productive. So, at the end of the third month, there are 3 pairs in total 
in the cage —  the initial pair, and the two offspring pairs that the 
original pair has thus far produced. If we keep tabs on the situation 
month by month, we can show the sequence of pairs that the cage 
successively contains as follows: 1, 1, 2, 3. The first digit represents 
the number of pairs in the cage at the start; the second, the number 
after one month; the third, the number after two months; and the 
fourth, the number after three months.
During the fourth month, the original pair produces yet another 
pair. At that point in time the first offspring pair produces its own 
offspring pair. The second pair produced by the original rabbits has 
not started producing yet. Therefore, during that month, a total of 2 
newborn pairs of rabbits are added to the cage. Altogether, at the end 
of the month there are the previous 3 pairs plus the 2 newborn ones,
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making a total of 5 pairs in the cage. This number can now be added 
to our sequence: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5. During the fifth month, the original pair 
produces yet another newborn pair; the first offspring pair (now fully 
productive) produces another pair of its own as well; and now the 
second offspring pair produces its own first pair. The other rabbit pairs 
in the cage have not started producing offspring yet. So, at the end of 
the fifth month, 3 newborn pairs have been added to the 5 pairs that 
were previously in the cage, making the total number of pairs in it: 5 + 
3 = 8. We can now add this number to our sequence: 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8. 
Continuing to reason in this way, it can be shown that after twelve 
months, there are 233 pairs in the cage. Now, the intriguing thing 
about this puzzle is the sequence of pairs itself, on a month-by-month 
basis:
1 ,1 ,2 ,  3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233
The salient characteristic of this sequence, as mentioned above, is that 
each number in it is the sum of the previous two: e.g. 2 (the third 
number) = 1  + 1 (the sum of the previous two); 3 (the fourth number) 
= 1 + 2  (the sum of the previous two); etc. This pattern can of course 
be extended ad infinitum, by applying the simple rule of continually 
adding the two previous numbers to generate the next:
1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233, 377, 610, 9 8 7 ,.. .
Little did Fibonacci know how significant his sequence would 
become. Over the years, the properties of the Fibonacci numbers have 
been extensively studied, resulting in a considerable literature. The 
basic pattern hidden in the FS was studied first by the French-born 
mathematician Albert Girard (15957-1632?) in 1632. It is expressed 
with the formula: Fn = Fn_2 + Fn_i where Fn stands for any number in 
the sequence and Fn_i the number before it and Fn_2 the second number 
before it. At about the same time, the astronomer Johannes Kepler 
(1571-1630) noticed that the FS converges to the golden ratio, whose 
value is .618... (Darling 2004: 116) — a finding confirmed in 1753 by 
the Scottish mathematician Robert Simson (1687-1768). As is well 
known, the ratio results from two divisions of a line such that the 
smaller is to the larger as the larger is to the sum of the two, a ratio of 
roughly three to five. If we take the stretch of numbers in the FS
starting with 5 and ending with 34, and take successive ratios they 
approach the golden ratio:
3/5 = .6 
5/8 = .625 
8/13 = .615  
13/21 = .6 1 9  
21/34 = .6 1 7
The golden ratio has been found to produce aesthetic effects and has 
itself been found to have an astounding number of reifications in 
nature (Livio 2002). This adds even more a sense of Pythagorean 
mystery to the FS: Why would there be a connection between a 
sequence of numbers produced by a puzzle about copulating rabbits 
and one of the most enigmatic ratios in the history of human 
civilization? The plot thickens, so to speak. In the nineteenth century 
the term Fibonacci Sequence was coined by the French mathematician 
Edouard Lucas, as mentioned, and mathematicians from many 
domains of inquiry began to discover myriads of numerical patterns 
hidden within in it (e.g. Ogilvy, Anderson 1966: 133-144; Stewart 
2004: 87-93). Not only, but stretches of the sequence started cropping 
up in nature — in the spirals of sunflower heads, in pine cones, in the 
regular descent (genealogy) of the male bee, in the logarithmic 
(equiangular) spiral in snail shells, in the arrangement of leaf buds on 
a stem, in animal horns, in the botanical phenomenon known as 
phyllotaxis whereby the arrangement of the whorls on a pinecone or 
pineapple, in the petals on a sunflower, in the branches of some stems, 
and so on and so forth. In most flowers, for example, the number of 
petals is one of: 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, or 89 (lilies have 3 petals, 
buttercups 5, delphiniums 8, marigolds 13, asters 21, daisies 34 or 55 
or 89). In sunflowers, the little florets that become seeds in the head of 
the sunflower are arranged in two sets of spirals: one winding in a 
clockwise direction, the other counterclockwise. The number in the 
clockwise is often 21, 34 and counterclockwise 34, 55, sometimes 55 
and 89, and sometimes 89 and 144 in the spirals of sunflower heads, 
in pine cones (examples cited in Stewart 1995 and Devlin 2004).
The list of such reifications is truly startling — so much so that a 
journal, called The Fibonacci Quarterly, was established in 1963 to 
publish findings related to the FS. Why would the solution to a simple 
puzzle produce numbers that are interconnected with patterns in nature
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and human life? There is, to the best of my knowledge, no definitive 
answer to this question. Maybe the puzzle instinct itself is at the root 
of such serendipities. As mathematician Ian Stewart puts it (2001: v), 
“simple puzzles could open up the hidden depths of the universe.” As 
a “serendipitous sign” the FS seems to have led to an incredible 
discovery —  namely that a simple recursive pattern constitutes the 
fabric of a large slice of nature. Devlin (2005: 105) sees the FS as 
essentially a descriptive statement —  a model — of a growth process: 
“The Fibonacci sequence is one of a number of very simple mathe­
matical models of growth processes that happens to fit a large variety 
of real-life growth processes.” While this turns out to be true, what 
still remains perplexing is that Fibonacci hardly devised the FS to 
describe nature. He did not come up with it from studying plants. 
Rather, the FS is the outcome of a puzzle about rabbits.
Incidentally, Lucas came up with his own sequence of numbers, 
now called the Lucas numbers, which he started with 1 and 3:
1 ,3 ,4 , 7, 11, 18, 29 ,47 , 76, 123, 1 9 9 ,...
As in the case of the Fibonacci Sequence, any number in the Lucas 
Sequence is obtained by summing the previous two. As it turns out, 
the Lucas numbers also have surprising properties and reifications 
(Ball 2003). The question now becomes, does any recursive sequence 
produce serendipitous reifications? If so, what is reality? Were the 
Pythagoreans correct after all in saying that, fundamentally, there is 
continuity between the human mind and nature and that the language 
of this continuity is that of number?
As Devlin suggests, the predictive power of signs lies, arguably, in 
the fact that they are models of things (Sebeok, Danesi 2000). Model- 
making constitutes a truly astonishing evolutionary attainment, with­
out which it would be virtually impossible for humans to carry out 
their daily life routines. I would like to suggest that numerical sequen­
ces, such as the Fibonacci one, are models of intrinsic pattern — 
whether the pattern is felt unconsciously or expressed overtly. In 
previous work, I have labeled such models metaforms (e.g. Danesi 
2003; 2004), since they tend to result from creative associations (infe­
rences, abductions, etc.) that are expressed as metaphors in language 
and as related symbols in nonverbal domains. Metaforms are common 
in scientific theory formulation. By making new connections and
relating concepts, scientists seek to give structure to the world of 
matter. Science involves things we cannot see, hear, touch, etc. — 
atoms, waves, gravitational forces, magnetic fields, etc. So, scientists 
use their imagination and their capacity to metaphorize in order to get 
a look, so to speak, at this hidden matter. Waves are said to undulate 
through empty space like water waves rippling through a still pond; 
atoms are conceived as little balls leaping from one quantum state to 
another; electrons are portrayed as traveling in circles around an 
atomic nucleus; and so on. This form of reasoning is extremely 
powerful. It is a product of innate feeling structures, as Langer (1948) 
called them, that result from our interactions with the world.
The following question can now be asked: Is the FS a metaform? If 
it is, then it suggests that metaforms are slices of truth, constituting 
powerful evidence that discovery lies in the ability of the human mind 
to visualize the universe as interacting with itself. The FS is a classic, 
albeit mind-boggling, exemplar of the verum-factum principle in 
philosophy. Although there are precedents for it, no one was able to 
discuss it as insightfully as Vico did. This principle can be explained 
as the ability of the human imagination to discover patterns in the 
world because the human mind already has such patterns built into it. 
As Bergin and Fisch (1984: xlv) have perceptively pointed out, in 
being makers of things, Vico believed that human beings were 
themselves made to do just that: “Men have themselves made this 
world of nations, but it was not without drafting, it was even without 
seeing the plan that they did just what the plan called for.” As Peirce 
similarly put it, the mind has “a natural bent in accordance with 
nature” (CP 6.478). This blending of mind and nature becomes 
perception, which Peirce called the “outward clash” of the physical 
world on the senses (see also Fann 1970; Eco, Sebeok 1983; Merrell, 
Quieroz 2005).
In effect, there are two parts to the human mind, expressed in most 
traditions of the world in various ways. The Greeks used the terms 
mythos and logos, with the former being the intuitive sense for pattern 
and the latter the ability to reflect upon it and give it a form. Form and 
content (the real world) are thus inextricable — products of two 
interacting parts of the brain. Signs give expression to this 
inextricability and, thus, invariably shed light on snippets of reality. 
The problem has always been devising an overall picture of that 
reality. Signs are metaforms leading to discovery not because they
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were designed as “knowledge-productive” but because they are 
imaginative artifacts.
This interplay between mythos and logos would explain why the 
early histories of mathematics, magic, and puzzle-making overlap 
considerably. The ancient magicians, mathematicians, and puzzlists 
(mainly makers of riddles and anagrams, Danesi 2002) were con­
cerned with basically the same thing — unraveling hidden patterns. 
Indeed, no distinction was made between numeration and numerology. 
Numerologists translated an individual’s name and birth date into 
numbers which, in turn, were believed to reveal the individual’s basic 
character and destiny. Numerology started with the Pythagoreans, who 
taught that all things were numbers, and that all relationships could be 
expressed numerically. In Hebrew the same symbols are used for 
digits as for letters, and the ancient art of gematria, or “divination,” 
claimed that the letters of any word or name found in sacred scripture 
could be interpreted as digits and rearranged to form a number that 
contained secret messages encoded in it. The earliest recorded use of 
gematria was by the Babylonian king Sargon II in the eighth century 
BC, who built the wall of the city of Khorsbad exactly 16,283 cubits 
long because this was the numerical value of his name.
A thick volume could be written about the many meanings 
ascribed to specific numbers across the world and across history. 
Take, for example, the number 7. It is found, for instance, in the Old 
Testament where, as part of God’s instructions to Moses for priests 
making a blood offering we find the following statement: “And the 
priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven 
times before the Lord, before the veil of the sanctuary” (Leviticus 
4:6). It is also noteworthy that God took six days to make the world 
and then rested on the seventh. The number 13, too, has a long history 
associated with mysticism. So widespread is the “fear of the number 
13” that it has even been assigned a name: triskaidekaphobia. In 
Christianity, 13 is linked with the Last Supper of Jesus and his twelve 
disciples and the fact that the thirteenth person, Judas, betrayed Jesus. 
Other similarly “unlucky numbers” exist in different parts of the 
world. And across cultures, people tend to think of certain things such 
as dates, street addresses, or certain numbers as having great signi­
ficance. Human beings seem to possess the basic notion that the world 
is itself a magical pattern of small numbers arranged in patterns.
It was only after the Renaissance that numerology was relegated to 
the status of a pseudoscience. Paradoxically, the Renaissance at first 
encouraged interest in the ancient magical arts and in their relation to 
philosophical inquiry. Intellectuals such as Italian philosopher Gio­
vanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) rediscovered the occult roots 
of classical philosophy, and protoscientists such as Swiss physician 
Philippus Aureolus Paracelsus (1493-1541) affirmed these practices, 
partly in defiance of medieval religiosity. Both the Roman Catholic 
Church and the new Protestantism, however, turned sharply against 
magic and the occult arts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Mathematics was subsequently completely liberated from the occult 
mysticism in which it was shrouded in the ancient world.
But the connection between mysticism and mathematics has hardly 
been lost. Solving puzzles, proving a difficult theorem, or observing a 
mysterious manifestation of Fibonacci numbers in nature continues to 
cast a “magical spell” over us. In fact, to this day, the boundaries 
between mathematics and magic are rarely clear-cut. Every mathe­
matical idea is caught up in a system of references to other ideas, 
patterns, and designs that humans are inclined to dream up. And this 
imparts an aura of Pythagorean mysticism to that very system.
The production of metaforms suggests that we are “programmed” 
to discover things serendipitously, just as Vico claimed. In observing 
the facts of existence, we constantly stumble across hidden patterns. 
The FS brings this out perfectly. It emphasizes rather dramatically that 
the line between myth and logic is a very fine one indeed. In the 
original tale, from which the concept of serendipity is derived, the 
three princes made their deductions by noticing anomalies that 
suggested explanations. These spurred their insights. Maybe Fibonacci 
saw something in a rabbit pen that tickled his fancy and spurred his 
insight, leading to his puzzle, and to the hidden reifications that it 
contains.
Whatever the truth, Fibonacci’s Rabbit Puzzle continues to 
reverberate with implications in all kinds of knowledge domains. This 
paper has only skimmed the surface of these implications. A similar 
argument could be made for as whole host of mathematical meta­
forms, such as e, e n + 1 =0, among many others (e.g. Maor 1994), 
which have turned out to have a wide variety of serendipitous appli­
cations. The number e was discovered by Leonhard Euler in 1727 as 
the limit of the expression (1 + l / n f  as n becomes large without
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bound. Its limiting value is approximately 2.7182818285. Unlike 7t, e 
has no simple geometric interpretation. Yet it forms the base of natural 
logarithms; it appears in the fundamental function for equations 
describing growth and many other processes of change; it surfaces 
serendipitously as well in the formulas for many curves; it crops up 
frequently in the theory of probability and in formulas for calculating 
compound interest; and the list could go on ad infinitum. Now, why 
Euler devised that formula in the first place is not clear. He certainly 
could not have known the kinds of ideas and applications it would 
have led to, since these came after its formulation. The number e is a 
perfect example of a metaform.
Euler is also responsible for the extraordinary equation, e* + 1 =0, 
also written as eu = -1 ,  in which i is the square root o f-1 . In addition 
to its many practical applications — it has wide application, for 
instance, in understanding the motion of any type of wave, including 
light — this formula is unique in that it combines five fundamental 
numbers in mathematical discovery — 0, 1, л, z, and e. Now, it is clear 
that what distinguishes metaforms such as the FS and e from so-called 
“universal laws’" in science is that they are not devised to reveal a deep 
principle about how the world as ordered; rather they issue forth from 
flights of fancy.
Concluding remarks
From the Pythagorean practice of giving sacrifice to the gods for 
mathematical discoveries to the seventeenth century practice on the 
part of the Japanese of giving sangaku (the Japanese word for “mathe­
matical tablet”) to the spirits for discovering mathematical proofs, 
there seems to be a universal feeling across the world that discoveries 
reveal the world to us in bits and pieces. This is why the ancients 
thought that a causal connection existed between earthly matters and 
the stars. Those wrho could use numbers to calculate forthcoming 
events, such as the next planting season, garnered great power unto 
themselves, becoming wizards, mathematicians, and astronomers. The 
concept of metaforms provides a framework for understanding why 
discoveries are made. As products of our innate capacity to model the 
world, they are products of the most creative modeling system that
nature has thus far produced —  the human mind (Cassirer 1944; 
Bonner 1980; Adam 2004).
But even the notion of metaform really does not penetrate the sub­
stance of the enigma at hand. Nor does it really answer the two 
questions enunciated above. Semiotics is a descriptive science, after 
all, not an explanatory one. So we are left with the same kinds of 
questions with which I started off this paper: Why does mathematics 
work as a model to explain the physical world? Why is the Pythago­
rean Theorem, for instance, real, explaining a whole range of pheno­
mena? This is a true mystery. As Jacob Bronowski has aptly put it:
To this day, the theorem of Pythagoras remains the most important single 
theorem in the whole o f mathematics. That seems a bold and extraordinary 
thing to say, yet it is not extravagant; because what Pythagoras established is a 
fundamental characterization o f the space in which we move, and it is the first 
time that it is translated into numbers. And the exact fit o f the numbers 
describes the exact laws that bind the universe. If space had a different 
symmetry the theorem would not be true. (Bronowski 1973: 168)
And as Clawson (1999: 284) has suggested, mathematics might even 
explain the laws of unknown universes: “Certain mathematical truths 
are the same beyond this particular universe and work for all potential 
universes.”
But again: Why should this be so? Why does there seem to be 
continuity between mind matter and physical matter? Is it possible to 
discover the larger pattern from which the fabric of metaforms of 
reality have been cut to produce a “broader picture” of the universe? It 
is, after all, this desire to see the broader picture that the reifications of 
the FS stimulate in us. But it is an elusive picture, and we seem 
destined never to get a total look at it, just tantalizing serendipitous 
glimpses of it here and there. All that can be said is the Pythagorean 
view that numbers and symbols were mirrors of nature is not just 
rhetorical flourish. As Ghyka (1997), Schneider (1994), Adam (2004), 
and many others have abundantly illustrated mathematical principles 
are mysterious because they manifest themselves serendipitously in 
flowers, shells, crystals, plants, and the human body, as well as in the 
symbolic language of folk sayings, fairy tales, myths, religions, art 
forms, and architecture. But why this is so remains one of the greatest 
puzzles of all times.
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Последовательность чисел Фибоначчи и сущность 
математического открытия
В статье рассматривается связь между математическим открытием и 
знаковым процессом на примере последовательности чисел Фибо­
наччи. Случайное открытие этой последовательности как ответ на 
задачу, сформулированную знаменитым итальянским математиком 
Леонардо Фибоначчи для иллюстрации эффективности десятерич­
ной системы, является одним из тех случаев в истории человечества, 
где явственно сплетаются случай, семиозис и открытие. Последова­
тельность Фибоначии позволяет изучить созидающий семиозис и 
дает понять, что символы не являются арбитрарными продуктами 
человеческого сознания, а подсознательными “зондами” реальности.
Fibonacci rida ja matemaatilise avastuse loomus: 
Semiootiline vaade
Artikkel vaatleb suhet matemaatilise avastuse ja märgiprotsessi vahel, 
kuulsa Fibonacci rea näitel. Selle rea juhuslik avastamine kui vastus itaa­
lia matemaatiku Leonardo Fibonacci poolt sõnastatud ülesandele illust­
reerida kümnendsüsteemi efektiivsust, on üks neid juhtumeid inimajaloos, 
mis näitab, kuidas juhus, semioos ja avastus on põimunud. Sellisena on 
Fibonacci rida oluliste tulemitega loova semioosi uurimiseks, kuivõrd ta 
viitab, et sümbolid pole inimmõistuse arbitraarsed produktid, vaid ala­
teadvuslikud reaalsuse sondid.
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The semiotics of sexuality:
The choice becomes the association of habits 
becomes the desire becomes the need
Stephen Jarosek
PO Box 124, Armadale WA 6992, Australia 
e-mail: stejaros@iinet.net.au
Abstract. Pragmatism is the idea that we attribute meaning to things that 
matter to us. Ultimately, the things that matter are intercepted by our 
bodies —  our eyes, ears, nose, hands, feet, skin —  right down to our sex 
differences. Our bodies are the tools with which we interface with the 
world —  the cultural world. Sex differences provide major insights into how 
the body impacts on experience and thus, personality and ultimately culture’s 
gender roles. In my earlier paper, I discuss what Peirce identified as 
fundamental aspects o f cognition —  habits and associative learning —  and I 
place them in the context o f  Heidegger’s Dasein. In this current paper, I 
develop on these ideas in order to apply them to understand gender roles. 
From the inextricable connection between habits, associative learning and 
Dasein, we can infer the following: (1) Gender roles are habits; (2) Gender 
roles are chosen; (3) Men and women “like” the roles to which they have been 
assigned (this is a fundamental expression o f Dasein). That is to say —  the 
choice becomes the association o f habits becomes the desire becomes the 
need. Hence arise the needs by which gender roles are identified.
1.0. Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein had famously observed that even if a lion could 
speak, we would never be able to understand it. A semiotician would 
justifiably ponder whether such a creature could still be considered to 
be a lion.
At one time or another, most of us have probably toyed with the 
notion of meeting an alien who could speak our language. What 
insights would such a being impart? Would we be able to understand 
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him or her? Such naive fantasies generally fail to demonstrate any 
awareness of the simple truth that even two humans from different 
cultures often fail to understand one another — and so how could any 
human possibly hope to understand an alien?
The unspoken assumption of any naive dreamer is, of course, that 
an alien is “like me”, in that there is an “objective” world “out there” 
that has only one “correct” way of being interpreted, a way that one 
would expect to be shared by all other “intelligent” organisms. The 
SETI program itself is predicated on this unspoken assumption, with 
little thought being given to the possible reasons why advanced 
civilizations may not want to communicate with us. This problem has 
its origins in the reductionism (determinism1) that has dominated most 
of modern science. Accordingly, a deterministic perspective invariably 
assumes that an autistic or schizophrenic or homosexual person, for 
example, has a “problem” in need of treatment (instead of choices to 
be reconciled), because they do not share our “correct” interpretation 
of the world.
Ln this light, can we expect a mere mortal to gain any insights from 
a brief encounter with an alien? Probably not. Indeed, humans often 
fail to understand each other, even when they come from within the 
same culture, share the same work environment and are of the same 
gender. They don’t get to realize that all they ever have are assump­
tions, not truths.
The vast majority of us aren’t even aware that in the course of our 
daily lives, we are interacting with aliens more incomprehensible to us 
than any conceptualization that we might entertain as to what an alien 
is supposed to be. We don’t realize that our opposite sex inhabits a 
world that is entirely different to our own.
1 I prefer to use the word “determinism” (in the sense o f  “genetic determinism”) 
in preference to “reductionism” to describe narrow, “linear” thinking. Ultimately, 
good, competent synthesis is a form o f reduction to fundamental principles (as per 
“the law of association o f  habits”), which is quite different to “linear” and 
“deterministic” thinking.
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2.0. Back to basics
In my paper (2001) titled “The law of association of habits”, I explore 
Peirce’s “Law of association of ideas”, in order to derive some general 
principles of cognition. Now, in this paper, I apply these general 
principles in order to explore the nature of human sexuality.
2.1. The desire to be
In my previous paper (2001) I introduce the notion of “the desire to 
be”. The closest analogue to this concept is Heidegger’s (1978) 
Dasein. Both the desire to be (in the context that I use it) and Dasein 
are concerned with being and they are essentially the same thing2. 
However the interpretation introduced in my previous paper (2001), is 
a slightly different slant on the most commonly accepted interpreta­
tion of Dasein particularly as it relates to desire. In this context, the 
desire to be is the central aspect of Dasein. An organism’s every desire 
is a manifestation of its desire to be. Being is the desire to be. 
Suspended within its ecology, an organism makes choices and those 
choices have to be consistent with what that organism is. Choice 
implies motivation. An organism “likes” being what it is, and its 
Dasein motivates it to make those choices that are consistent with its 
condition.
Dasein is the assumption I apply to infer and predict a great many 
things about behavior. Essentially, Dasein tells us that the circums­
tances within which an organism finds itself become part of that 
organism’s context (world view — “Umwelt”) that it “desires”. When 
it adapts in order to accommodate the circumstances within which it 
finds itself, it makes choices from its ecology. Its complicity is a 
statement that it “likes” its interpretation of the world.
As far as humans are concerned, we can now infer, from our 
understanding of Dasein, that men and women “like” the roles to 
which they have been assigned. And we need no further proof than 
their complicity.
2 Heidegger also refers to the desire to be, but in an entirely different context, as 
but one aspect o f Dasein.
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We also know, from Peirce’s (1966) Great Law of Association of 
Ideas, that gender roles are habitual and associative:
There is a law in this succession o f ideas. We may roughly say it is the law of 
habit. It is the great “Law o f  the Association o f Ideas”, —  the one law of all 
psychical action. (CP 7.388)
By incorporating the semiotic view of habit, association and logic, we 
can better begin to understand how the gender that habituates the 
sustaining of the known (e.g., nurturing) is going to have different pre­
dispositions and responsibilities to the gender that habituates 
exploring the unknown (e.g., finding solutions to problems).
In Dasein and the law of association of habits, we have a basic 
framework from which to infer and predict the logics by which 
humans interpret their worlds as men and women (and from which we 
might extrapolate to infer some things about the logics of non-human 
organisms).
2.3. The basic model
Let us integrate the above points, within the context of the law of 
association of habits, to arrive at a synthesis for modeling human 
sexuality:
(1) Gender roles are habits, ipso facto;
(2) Gender roles are chosen, ipso facto;
(3) Men and women “like” the gender roles to which they have 
been assigned.
Also from my paper (2001), we will recall the important relationship 
that exists between the tools at our disposal (our bodies) and the 
choices we make. We recall Mark Twain’s famous aphorism:
A man whose only tool is a hammer will perceive the world in terms o f nails.
Because this paper is about human sexuality, we will need to interpret 
the significance of this aphorism with respect to gender roles:
2.2. The law of association of habits
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A human whose only tool is a man’s body will perceive the world in terms 
that are different to a human whose only tool is a woman’s body.
This presents us with a theory that unifies the associative/habitual 
aspects of cognition with physiology — the inextricable connection 
between mind and body. This fundamental set of principles will enable 
us to understand how the psychological differences between men and 
women emerge within Culture. Within the context of the mind-body 
unity, our fundamental model can be summarized succinctly:
The choice becomes the association o f habits becomes the desire becomes the 
need.
And within the context of autopoiesis theory, self-referencing is 
related to the bi-directional nature of cognitive processes. That is, 
there is not just one direction of cause and effect. The above principle 
can be expressed in reverse order:
The need is the desire is the habituation o f  associations that predisposes us to 
the types o f  choices we make.
3.0. It’s all about choice
Our basic model provides us with the foundations for understanding 
the importance of choice. Human and non-human organisms change 
with the choices they make. Our brains self-organize in order to 
accommodate and make sense of our experiences.
3.1. Choices for courses
Children raised by wolves. John McCrone (1993) observes that the 
behavior of feral children has much in common with the behavior of 
the wild animals that raised them — for example, their lack of 
memory and self awareness. Even the voices of people are, like 
background noises such as the rumbling of distant traffic, without 
meaning to them. The genetic-deterministic position is likely to 
account for their extraordinary behavior in terms of brain damage, 
perhaps from the stress of survival. But what if this assumption is
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wrong? Feral children make choices from the options presented to 
them by their animal environments. Are feral children, in a very real 
sense, animals? Do their brains (and bodies) self-organize — in 
response to the choices they make — in order to accommodate a way 
of perceiving their worlds that is real and legitimate, as wild animals 
do all the time?
Domestic animals. We know that a twist to the phenomenon of feral 
children is perfectly common. We domesticate animals all the time. 
They lose their feral natures to become “civilized”, insofar as their 
bodies allow them to. A domesticated cat behaves very differently to a 
feral one. The genetic-deterministic position is likely to account for 
the domestication of animals in terms of the expression of genes. The 
semiotic position accounts for domestication in the context of the 
choices that the pet is presented with, within its domestic environ­
ment.
Career choice. Choice of career is more than a lifestyle choice. It is a 
personality choice. Artists are different to accountants, who are 
different to physicists who are different to musicians and architects, 
plumbers and chefs. The choices we make shape what we become.
Gender roles. Gender roles are choices. A human whose only tool is a 
man’s body will perceive the world in the competitive terms that only 
a man can understand. A human whose only tool is a woman’s body 
will perceive the world in the gatekeeper terms that only a woman can 
understand.
3.2. Gender roles, initial conditions and matriarchal power
An important aspect of matriarchal power is based on the female role 
across almost all cultures as primary nurturer. The importance of the 
role of the primary nurturer can be appreciated from the perspective of 
“initial conditions” — the hothouse in which an infant’s initial choices 
are first made.
In my paper (2001) I explore the metaphor that compares a brain of 
neurons to a city of people. The infant’s brain, like a city, self- 
organizes into its functional specializations, as it makes choices from 
the options that are presented to it.
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The “initial conditions” of a living system play a crucial role in the 
developmental trajectory that emerges over time. An infant’s brain is a 
living system that is similarly subject to “initial conditions”. Maternal 
influence and guidance provides an important “initial condition” 
impacting on the development of personality.
The first choices that an infant makes are influenced first and 
foremost by the primary nurturer. More often than not, that primary 
nurturer will be the female of the species. In most cultures, Mother is 
the primary nurturer. Mother provides the greatest influence upon the 
initial conditions to which a child is subjected — the initial conditions 
that have the greatest influence on how a young, malleable brain 
develops in the formative years.
And children grow up to become men and women.
In some rare instances, however, the “initial conditions” to which 
an infant is subjected might be provided by a wild animal — perhaps a 
wolf. Infants forced to make choices from this kind of maternal 
“initial condition” develop personalities that are distinctly feral. They 
never quite outgrow their beastly origins.
4.0. Gender roles
4.1. Initial conditions
Cultural logics are inextricably bound up with the bodies of men and 
women. Our physiologies are different in such a way that they provide 
complementarity in the logics that comprise culture. That is, culture 
culminates in a mutually agreeable division of labor between men and 
women, and the initial conditions for that division are provided by 
physiological sex differences. Woman is sexy and desirable. Man is 
sexy and desires. Desire and desirable are logically complementary. 
So far, so good.
But sexy in men is not the same as sexy in women. In fact, sexy in 
men describes something altogether different — something related to 
experience, courage, wisdom, savoir-faire. Sexy in women, on the 
other hand, alludes to vulnerability (the vulnerability of the known), 
nurturing, innocence and their relationship to the forbidden.
Of course it should be noted that the emphasis here is on western 
cultures, and for the purpose of simplifying our analysis, precludes
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those possibilities that might bear no resemblance to what we have 
come to know. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
success or otherwise of the past half-century of liberalism and 
feminism to change this model3.
To clear up this anomaly with the definition of “sexy”, simple 
observation will enable us to determine basic facts that we should 
regard as a given. Here is a pair of phenomena that are so pervasive 
and self-evident in our modem, western cultures that they need no 
further introduction:
(1) Irrespective of how uninspiring a woman might be from the 
perspective of her character or “intelligence”, if she looks 
sexy, she will always be receiving overtures from men;
(2) Irrespective of how handsome, sexy or successful a man 
might be, irrespective of the extent to which women might 
strive to encourage him, to set the scene, to make themselves 
available, or to make things easy for him, if he does not 
initiate, he does not win any hearts.
4.2. Predictable roles
There’s the old joke that in order to impress a woman, a man has to 
woo her, empathize with her, buy her flowers, make her laugh, 
entertain her, be her lover, be her friend, and the list goes on. Whereas 
all a woman has to do to impress a man is turn up naked with a beer. 
Joke as we might, there is a fundamental truth in this, at least in 
English-speaking cultures.
We should stress that this more sexist approach is a distinctly 
western phenomenon that is especially characteristic of the English- 
speaking world, where a more extreme form of sexism invariably 
accompanies a more extreme form of materialism (as a product of the 
Industrial Revolution). It is observed that in European and Asian 
cultures, for example, considerably more is expected of women by 
men, and it is common for women to express a subtler form of
3 In passing, however, some o f  us may have observed that old adage —  “the 
more things change, the more they stay the same”. Have we not noticed how what 
started out as a genuine movement to establish independence and basic rights for 
women has begun to transform itself into a modem form o f chivalry/sexism that 
rivals what went before?
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“initiating” (in response to which the man “counter-initiates” —  the 
woman’s cue is interpreted as an invitation to initiate).
The two very different gender dynamics provide a kind of cultural 
“initial condition” that, as in chaos theory, set the foundations for 
divergent gender roles (memetic/semiotic attractors).
The cultural “initial condition” is related to the mind-body “initial 
condition” where, for example, the relatively spontaneous erections in 
men predispose them to initiating, in contrast to the evolving contexts 
that shape women’s desires.
These very different gender perspectives provide the basis for 
interactions between men and women that are the expression of a very 
simple law of evolution. Darwin held that any ecology has to consist 
of producers of variety and filters of variety. Thus, the human ecology 
(culture) has men as its producers of variety and women as its filters 
of variety. What is more, these different roles are not merely 
“activities” that one can choose arbitrarily at will, but rather, they are 
manifestations of personality, habit and choice, and are inextricably 
interconnected with how reality is perceived.
As can be seen in these two dynamics (i.e., producing and filtering 
variety), women’s power is the power of veto. Women are the 
gatekeepers of cultural norms, and they wield enormous influence in 
determining which elements of the unknown make it into the cultural 
known. As the filters of variety, women are predisposed to rejecting 
those aspects of appearance, behavior, belief, attitude, etc. that depart 
too far from what they regard as acceptably normal. As the producers 
of variety, however, men provide the stereotypes that are passed or 
vetoed by the female gatekeepers. Femininity seeks continuity and 
conformity, and nurturing, diplomacy and manipulation are consistent 
with such a priority. Masculinity seeks variety and novelty, and 
discovery, innovation and competition are the priorities of men.
We now have a basis on which to infer how the responsibilities of 
men and women emerge:
(1) The gender that has permission from Culture to be provided 
for, is the gender that prioritizes the known. The cultural 
known is Woman’s primal “responsibility”, and she senses 
what her obligations are with respect to networking, 
nurturing, culture and tradition. The choices that Woman 
makes, with her power of veto, provide a window to her soul. 
It is a sign of what she is;
l l i l l
(2) The gender that provides is the gender that must compete for 
survival. The cultural unknown is Man’s primal “respon­
sibility”, and he senses what his obligations are with respect 
to surviving, protecting, competition and pushing the boun­
daries. The choices that Man makes, when he must compete 
at the interface between being and not being, determine what 
he becomes.
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4.3. Sex roles and Culture
The sex act itself has very different consequences for men and 
women, especially with regard to procreation, and so in itself provides 
the logical basis for the differing responsibilities of men and women.
To summarize from the perspective of chaos theory, sex roles as 
defined by the body can be interpreted as providing the initial 
conditions for the gender roles that precipitate throughout a culture. 
And gender roles provide the mechanism by which cultural habits are 
modulated — with masculinity being the agent of change, and 
femininity providing the resistance to change. That is, the priority of 
Woman is the cultural known, while that of Man is the interface 
between the cultural known and the unknown.
5.0. The cultural known versus the unknown
5.1. Culture as a collective learning machine
Howard Bloom (2000) identified five essential elements of a 
“collective learning machine” (in the case that we are interested in, 
human culture):
(1) conformity enforcers;
(2) diversity generators;
(3) inner judges;
(4) resource shifters;
(5) intergroup tournaments.
The first three elements are of particular interest in our analysis. The 
remaining two (resource shifters and intergroup tournaments) describe 
dynamics within a living system that I regard more as inevitable by­
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products of the fundamental principles that we’ve introduced (as per 
the law of association of habits).
5.2. Conformity enforcers and diversity generators
As far as gender roles are concerned, we are interested in conformity 
enforcers and diversity generators — that is, the female and the male 
roles respectively. Indeed, I would suggest that these first two of 
Bloom’s elements are central to understanding gender roles, because 
they establish the two principle logical states of consciousness — the 
duality that makes cultures sustainable.
The feminine role, sustaining the known, is “static” because it is 
resistant to change. The masculine role, exploring at the interface 
between the cultural known and the unknown, is “dynamic”, because 
it is concerned with survival, evolution and change. We might obtain a 
better understanding by imagining what existence would be like in the 
absence of one side of the equation:
(a) Without masculinity, the static in femininity would collapse 
into the void. Singularity going backwards, retreating from 
the ether — not a Big Bang, but a whimpering fizzle.
(b) Without femininity, the dynamic in masculinity would 
explode outwards to create chaos and disintegration.
That is, female and male, as filters of variety and producers of variety, 
are indispensable manifestations of being. Neither can exist without 
the other.
5.3. Inner judges
Bloom (2000: 43) describes inner judges as “biological built-ins 
which continually take our measure, rewarding us when our contri­
bution seems to be of value and punishing us when our guesswork 
proves unwelcome or way off the mark”.
Bloom’s concept is important, because it coincides perfectly with 
what I call “the desire to be”. While Bloom attributes inner judging to 
mechanisms based in mainstream interpretations of biology, though, I 
attribute inner judging to the semiotic dynamics of choice-making, 
that incorporate values (e.g., desires and fears) as the primal source.
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We are now in a position to explore in more detail, the mindset of 
the conformity enforcers.
6.0. Matriarchal authority and relational aggression
6.1. Matriarchal Oppressors — 
enforcing conformity and the cultural known
To provide some basic insights as to how women sustain the known, 
let us take a look at recent research on the nature of aggression in 
school children, and how it differs between boys and girls.
Lagerspetz, Bjorqvist and Peltonen (1988) showed that girls are 
much more likely than boys to use indirect (nonverbal, behavioral/ 
relational) forms of aggression against their peers.
Crick and Grotpeter (1995) introduce the idea that inflicting harm 
on others is done according to a shared understanding among peers of 
the things that matter, and that these issues of importance are different 
for boys and girls. For boys, the things that matter are “themes of 
instrumentality and physical dominance”, and the strategy of physical 
and verbal aggression is consistent within such a context.
For girls, the things that matter most are relational issues during 
social interaction (e.g., establishing close, intimate connections with 
others), and Crick and Grotpeter (1995) discuss how girls’ strategies 
are consistent with these different priorities. Hence, girls’ attempts at 
harming others are more likely to be directed at relational themes, 
such as damaging or manipulating peer relationships, ostracizing 
others, spreading rumors, etc.
In a similar vein, Lagerspetz, Bjorqvist and Peltonen (1988) note 
that “the social structure of peer groups was found to be tighter among 
girls, making it easier for them to exploit relationships and harm their 
victims by indirect, manipulative aggression”.
Consistent with the study of Lagerspetz, Bjorqvist and Peltonen 
(1988), the study by Crick and Grotpeter arrived at the following 
conclusions:
(1) Results provide evidence for the existence of relational 
aggression as a category that is separate and distinct from 
overt aggression;
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(2) Girls were significantly more relationally aggressive than 
were boys.
There are two other aspects of relational aggression are worth 
commenting on:
(1) Bjorqvist (1994) notes that indirect methods employed by 
girls are “socially sophisticated strategies of aggression 
whereby the perpetrator can inflict harm on a target without 
being identified”.
(2) Crick (1995) shows that girls are more distressed by relational 
aggression than boys.
These gender differences in aggression are, more generally, part and 
parcel of gender differences in behavior. That is, how girls aggress has 
to be consistent with the greater whole that is the feminine psyche. 
Within this basic framework, we can explore the manner in which 
women oppress women, and we can infer a few things.
Whilst the known is often associated with “tolerance”, it should be 
emphasized that such tolerance is strictly conditional, for it will not 
tolerate dissent. For the truth is that, for all their bonhomie, women 
the assumers are the enforcers of proper behavior. As sustainers of the 
known, women are calculating observers, always taking notes. As 
clingers to the known, women sum people up on their ability to 
conform to the known, and ruthlessly defend and assert what they 
believe the known should be. Femininity is the oppressive force of 
conformity. Women inhabit a world of shoulds and should-nots. The 
logic by which women oppress is based in assuming — in particular, 
assuming the known to be a given that is not to be challenged. You 
don’t challenge the known — you negotiate with it, you comply with 
it, and you manipulate it to suit your own ends. Hence the role of 
“relational” aggression among girls.
Women are trapped in their world of assumptions. Rosalind 
Wiseman applies the compelling metaphor of a life-raft to shed light 
on the importance of peer pressure, and the dilemma that school-girls 
find themselves trapped in:
Once in the life raft she may ask herself, how did I get here? Why did I go? 
But when she looks around, sees that the ship [parents] is impossibly far 
away, the waves are too big, and there are a limited number o f supplies, she 
quickly realizes that her survival depends on bonding with the other girls in 
that life raft. But your daughter isn’t stupid. This realization is quickly 
followed by another one. She’s trapped. (Wiseman 2002: 38)
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It rarely occurs to girls to leap out of the life raft and swim, or to push 
others off, or to assert their own rules. As Wiseman observes, it is 
particularly important to girls to be accepted by their peers — “There 
really is no choice. You stay, hope things get better, and try to survive 
until you’re rescued. To girls, the life raft of the clique can truly feel 
like a matter of life and death”.
Rescued by who? Boys? Marriage, perhaps?
This life raft metaphor sheds light on another interesting aspect of 
the female gender — fear. Rachel Simmons (2002) writes that girls 
are terrified of solitude, and her book explores the ways that they 
maintain the status quo, for fear of exclusion. That is to say, the 
compulsion to sustain the known is based in fear, and it impacts on 
other dimensions of femininity, such as fear of sex. But we’ll come to 
that later.
Precisely as with Howard Bloom’s (1995: 58) portrayal of amoeba 
complying during times of adversity to build themselves into a plant­
like form (we will discuss this in more detail below), so too, women’s 
fear of the unknown provides a sense of shared adversity that drives 
them to the conformity required to sustain the known.
Feminine oppression is relentless, and it oppresses both genders — 
especially women. Do we not now understand why women often look 
to men as saviors? What is it that a woman might want to be saved 
from? Is it not... other women? The liberation a woman might seek 
from an oppressive, repetitive and demanding known is the liberation 
she seeks from women. For the truth is that women oppress women. 
Women as mothers, women as girl-friends and women as role-models 
create the norms against which women compare themselves and each 
other, judge each other, and exclude those women that dare to be 
different.
Women are predisposed to relying on rules. Rules provide women 
with some measure of control over their lives. Rules for the known are 
an inevitable reaction to fear of the unknown. Rules and knowing 
them are the key to women’s survival within the life raft of culture. 
Hence the well-known guide for women, “The Rules”, by Ellen Fein 
and Sherrie Schneider (1995).
Throughout her book, Simmons writes about some of the ways that 
girls employ rules in order to police the behaviour of girls. For 
example:
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There are rules, and the girl who thinks she’s all that4 breaks them. They are 
the rules o f  femininity: girls must be modest, self-abnegating, and demure; 
girls must be nice and put others before themselves; girls get power by who 
likes them, who approves, who they know, but not by their own hand. Break 
these rules, and ‘all that’ looms on the horizon. (Simmons 2002: 115)
6.2. Masculine and feminine as different logical realms
Men inhabit the interface between the cultural known and the 
unknown.
When I describe the primary characteristic of femininity as 
sustaining the cultural known, I’m saying that women feel the 
constraints of culture much more strongly and they are much more 
committed to its ways. It goes beyond a matter of degree, because 
men, living at the interface between the cultural known and unknown, 
are provided with this something “extra” that makes their worlds very 
different.
An integral part of this relationship that men have with the 
unknown is that men are expendable. This expendability pits man 
against man in competition for survival. Men find themselves in more 
of a “do or die” situation than women, particularly in cultures that do 
not provide a welfare safety net for their unemployed, disabled or 
destitute. Women, on the other hand, while competing with other 
women, do so in full compliance with the cultural rules. Theirs is not a 
competition for survival, but for popularity. In their competition for 
popularity, they must assume that the opinions of other women matter, 
and so they must assume the known to be a given. They compete for 
their position on the totem pole, and in this competition, it never 
occurs to them to bum the totem pole.
Burning of the totem pole is the role that belongs to men. It is men 
who challenge the status quo, introducing new definitions and new 
ways of doing things.
Thus, male and female gender roles constitute different logic 
states, different logical understandings of the way the world is. As 
Simmons (2002: 126) writes, “American culture is built on dual pillars 
of independence and competition, values that run directly counter to 
the passionate intimacy, care and friendship between girls”. That is,
4 “All that” is girl-speak for confidence, independence, assertiveness.
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the visible, masculine priorities of the “independence and competi­
tion” we see is runs counter to the subtle, hidden, relational priorities 
of Woman that grants her the power of veto.
The clash in logics between male and female create a tension that 
is difficult to reconcile. Indeed, there is no reconciliation, for that is 
why male and female exist, and why Man and Woman inhabit such 
different worlds. Simmons understands something of this logical 
contradiction:
When competition and desire cannot be enacted in healthy ways and when 
girls are expected to give priority to care and relationship, resentment, 
confusion and retribution follow shortly behind.
[ ...]  Our culture stigmatizes assertive, professional women, casting them as 
cold, frigid bitches doomed to failure in their personal lives. I want to 
emphasize how this particular stereotype communicates to girls their worst 
fear: that to become assertive in any way will terminate their relationships and 
disqualify them from the primary social currency in their lives, tenderness and 
nurturing. (Simmons 2002: 127)
Here, Simmons uses the word “culture”, though she does understand 
that this is girls (and women) doing it to girls and women — 
“Girlhood’s stigma against competition and desire can never allow 
girls a healthy outlet for their feelings or the kind of straightforward 
truth-telling to which every human being is entitled”.
The implication throughout Simmons’ book is that “Patriarchy” is 
somehow responsible for forcing women to implement relational 
aggression as a strategy (this is a bias that crops up frequently in other 
works on relational aggression). This is consistent with the feminist 
philosophy that disempowers women, and it stands in direct contrast 
to our semiotic perspective. Our semiotic interpretation provides a 
sound, theoretical base that empowers women, and makes them 
formidable agents in realizing Culture’s essence.
Throughout her book, Simmons paints a picture of Woman’s world 
where the priority for tenderness and nurturing must necessarily be 
accompanied by distrust, jealousy and envy and where manipulation, 
gossip and exclusion are the modus operandi of Woman. This is a 
world that is logically consistent with the priority to sustain the cultu­
ral known. Woman’s world is one of hidden agendas and unspoken 
resentments. “Silence is deeply woven into the fabric of the female 
experience”, writes Simmons (2002: 3), “ ...During times of conflict, 
girls will turn on one another with a language and justice only they
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can understand. Behind a fa9ade of female intimacy lies a terrain 
traveled in secret, marked with anguish, and nourished by silence”.
Woman’s world is necessarily secret because expressions of 
individuality can threaten the existence of the cultural known. Female 
behaviour that “sustains the known” is the cultural “glue”, without 
which there can be no cultural unity, and no single cultural identity. 
Where men often group-bond within the context of a single unity of 
purpose in order to achieve a pragmatic outcome, women bond within 
the context of a single unity of (cultural) being, beyond which 
existence is unimaginable. Hence, Simmons writes that, “As we have 
seen, girls experience isolation as especially terrifying. Since girls 
earn social capital by their relationships with others, isolation cuts to 
the core of their identities. For most girls there is little more painful 
than to stand alone at recess or lunch”.
Woman’s fear is legitimate. Woman’s pain is legitimate. Men’s 
expendability is a demonstration that the unknown is a dangerous 
place. So even though women are exempt from having to confront the 
dynamism of the unknown, they are right to still fear it — indeed, they 
should fear it all the more, because they never get to embrace it. 
Women are right to feel the terror of exclusion and solitude.
Human females bond by sharing intimacies and secrets — 
interpersonal transactions that have the effect of enforcing conformity 
and unity. Parallels with these dynamics exist in the animal kingdom. 
I am reminded of a David Attenborough documentary on a colony 
meerkats. This was a viciously matriarchal colony. The intimate 
bonding between all the female meerkats within this colony was 
captured in a scene of a matriarchal group embrace so tight that they 
coalesced into a loving, hugging, cohesive clump of faces with eyes 
staring out. But not the entire colony — one of the females was 
excluded. She was hounded and marginalized by the entire group. 
Viciously picked on and pushed to the margins, her very survival was 
at stake.
Unlike meerkats, human girls would not be caught treating an “odd 
girl out” in this overt manner, primarily because it is not what “nice” 
girls do (“niceness” is a measure of popularity, which is the yardstick 
of relational success). They would prefer, instead, to strangle her soul 
so that no-one might see the blood on their hands. The analogy is 
complete. The meerkat expelled, brutalized and left trembling in the 
fetal position at the margins of the colony is the same as the “odd girl
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out”, devoid of self-esteem, not knowing where to turn, not knowing 
who might save her.
Within meerkat culture, females tend to stay within their colonies, 
whereas males can roam to new territory. If a male is accepted by a 
female within the new colony, he can call the new colony home. The 
female meerkat that is hounded to the margins, on the other hand, has 
no such freedom. The female condition, in being “safe” and “provided 
for” within the meerkat matriarchy, is hell when excluded by the 
matriarchy. The terror in the eyes of the victimized female meerkat is 
the same terror of solitude that is Woman’s.
What a compelling metaphor that Meerkat Matriarchy provides for 
Girl World as painted by Simmons and Wiseman. Some of the case 
studies of exclusion and “clique expulsion” that Simmons relates are 
analogous to what happened to the excluded, terror-struck meerkat. 
For example, Simmons relates the story of Erin, who began at a new 
school as a confident and effusive girl who easily made friends, only 
to suffer an unrelenting “clique expulsion” that saw her becoming 
withdrawn and suicidal. Her transgression? Confidence. What the 
other girls defined as “all that”. It was other girls, not boys, who 
utterly destroyed her self-esteem.
Where the meerkat females cling to one another in tight, physical 
embrace, “girls cling tightly to one another to know, as one told me, 
‘that we’re not crazy’”, writes Simmons (2002: 101).
This then, explains something of the role of Woman and her trials 
and tribulations. Sustaining the known and its accompanying fear of 
the unknown pull inwards, to predispose Culture to the static, brutal 
conformity of a beehive. Masculinity provides the key to Culture s 
liberation from stultifying, beehive conformity. Men are more often 
the liberators of women, not their oppressors.
We can now understand something of the instinct that has, 
throughout history, compelled men to “save” women. It is the 
subconscious awareness — a “sense” that men often have — that a 
woman cast adrift is exposed to a terrifying world. Within marriage, a 
woman need never again concern herself with clique expulsion. Not 
only does marriage provide her with the status of normality, but it 
provides a life-rafit should she ever experience a falling-out with her 
peer group. Marriage liberates a woman from the be-all and end-all 
that the clique has played throughout her life.
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And we obtain a clearer sense of the nature of human sexuality, 
and how the two sexes interact with one another. Femininity gets its 
thrill from luring and teasing at the fringes of an urgent, throbbing and 
dangerous masculine unknown. Within the shadows that define the 
contours of the feminine psyche, a woman is drawn to the mysterious, 
unpredictable masculinity that can protect her or destroy her.
A woman’s fear of sex is inextricably connected with the thrill of 
the forbidden, of transgressing the rules of the cultural known. 
Woman’s fear of sex and her fear of breaking the cultural taboos are 
the reasons that most cultures default to the predisposition of Man as 
the pursuer, Woman as the pursued. This pair of dynamics provides 
the basis for Woman’s power of veto.
6.3. The power of veto, sexual selection and violence
In biological terms, Woman’s power of veto is expressed in terms of 
sexual selection. Bloom observes:
[...]  women are violent. In fact, females are as much a part o f  the apparatus 
that triggers male violence as the men themselves. Nobel Prize-winning 
ethologist Konrad Lorenz described a common behavior in several species o f  
ducks. The female runs out to the edge o f her husband’s territory and tries to 
provoke another duck, then runs back to her male, stands next to him, and 
looks behind her at the enraged rival in the hope that her mate will jump into 
the fray. Many are the human females who have tried to stir up a similar fight. 
(Bloom 1995: 33)
Bloom continues, “Women encourage killers. They do it by falling in 
love with warriors and heroes. Men know it and respond with 
enthusiasm”. Men perpetrate violent acts knowing full well “how the 
damsels back home would admire their bravery”.
So let us not be swayed by the “invisibility” and silence of the 
female role, which is an expression of their power of veto. For all the 
terrible things that men have done throughout history, we see that 
men’s deeds were also the dirty-work of women, who have always 
been too comfortable in the security provided by men, to be bothered 
to do it themselves.
In biological terms, the power of veto is expressed in terms of 
sexual selection. Bloom observes:
92 Stephen Jarosek
The females o f a species develop a craving for a certain kind o f guy, and all 
the males compete to live up to the female ideal. Lady peacocks adore hunks 
with towering blue tails, so peacock gentlemen sport foppish plumes. Lady 
bowerbirds swoon over bachelors with an architectural flair, so bowerbird 
males turn sticks and scraps into the Taj Mahal. And what have human 
females gone for in nearly every society and time? ‘Courage’ and ‘bravery’. 
In short, violence. (Bloom 1995: 33)
6.4. Gender roles among animals
The relationship between the known and the unknown can be ob­
served in non-humans. For example in David Attenborough’s docu­
mentary “Echo of the Elephants”, a female elephant in oestrus plays 
coy, running away from the advances of Dionysus, a magnificent 
beast to whom other male elephants respectfully defer. Dionysus had 
briefly emerged from the jungle’s unknown, to enter into the world of 
the matriarch-dominated tribe, before returning again as mysteriously 
as he had arrived. Apart from these occasional encounters, the male 
elephant is a solitary brute spending most of his time wandering the 
jungle alone. The females, on the other hand, travel together in a 
close-knit group, under the leadership and protection of a matriarch.
And the black-widow spider (female), in many respects seems to 
have evolved behavior that, in the context of the known and the 
unknown, is more male. And the supposed male black-widow, 
behaving more as a female in human terms, surrenders its very life to 
the thrill of being taken in the dangerous act of procreation.
And if, as feminists (such as Germaine Greer) mock, a traditional 
woman’s role is nothing more than that of “life-support system for a 
womb”, then perhaps they might spare a thought for the poor male 
anglerfish, who finds ultimate fulfillment in life as nothing more than 
a “homing device for testicles”. For once a tiny male locates a 
roaming female and attaches himself to her, he (along with several 
other males) is provided for for the rest of his life, through nourish­
ment provided from the giant host’s body. Thus, without ever having 
to fend for himself again, he atrophies to the point where only his 
testicles remain as viable organs. In being set up for life with an end­
less supply of nourishment, he has fulfilled his objective in sustaining 
his known world. And with her many parasitic, non-communicative
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partners, the female becomes, for all intents and purposes, a kind of 
hermaphrodite.
With these examples, we see that the male and female “roles” 
(whatever they are) can be reversed when we define things in terms of 
the known and the unknown. Is it more correct to think of the 
physiologically male black-widow spider and anglerfish as psycho­
logically female?
While we are on the topic of gender roles in animals, recent dis­
coveries in neuroscience — for example, Douglas Fields, R. (2004) — 
suggest that there are two poles of behaviour, analogous to sex roles, 
in the brain. Neurons seem to play the more active role, while glial 
cells seem to play the more mediatory, “facilitative” and nurturing role 
(sustaining the known).
6.5. Fear of sex
The females of such species of animals as elephants, badgers, me- 
erkats, dogs and cats... and humans, all appear to experience elements 
of both fear and excitement in sex. So do some male creatures such as 
black-widow spiders. Some female animals, such as bonobos, throw 
caution to the wind and eagerly submit to it in the course of social 
rituals.
6.6. The role of fear
Sustaining the known is associated with fear. Fear of the unknown. 
Fear predisposes to unity and cooperation. Courage predisposes to 
freedom and individualism. Bloom writes:
Superorganisms exist even on the very lowest rungs o f the evolutionary 
ladder. Slime mold are seemingly independent amoeba, microscopic living 
blobs who race about on the moist surface o f a decaying tree or rotting leaf 
cheerfully oblivious to each other when times are good. They feast gaily for 
days on bacteria and other delicacies, attending to nothing but their own 
selfish appetites. But when the food runs out, famine descends upon the slime 
mold world. Suddenly the formerly flippant amoeba lose their sense of 
boisterous individualism. They rush toward each other as if in a panic, 
sticking together for all they’re worth.
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Gradually, the clump of huddled microbeasts grows to something you 
can see quite clearly with the naked eye. It looks like a slimy plant. And that 
plant —  a tightly-packed mass o f former freedom-lovers —  executes an 
emergency public works project. Like half-time marchers forming a pattern, 
some o f  the amoeba line up to form a stalk that pokes itself high into the 
passing currents o f air. Then the creatures at the head cooperate to 
manufacture spores. And those seeds o f life drift off into the breeze.
If the spores land on a heap o f rotting grass or slab o f decomposing bark, 
they quickly multiply, filling the slippery refuge with a horde o f newly-birthed 
amoeba Like their parents, the little things race off to the far comers of their 
new home in a cheerful hunt for dinner. They never stop to think that they 
may be part o f a community whose corporate life is as critical as their own. 
They are unaware that someday they, like their parents, will have to cluster 
with their fellows in a desperate cooperative measure on which the future of 
their children will depend. (Bloom 1995: 58)
Clearly, amoebae are courageous, daring individuals when times are 
good, racing off to the far reaches of their immediate environment, 
exploring and feasting. When times are bad, they congregate into 
colonies of conforming, well-behaved individuals who cannot afford 
to rock the boat, because their survival depends on it.
This has its parallels with what humans do. But with a twist. While 
for amoebae, there exists a sharp delineation between good times and 
bad which predisposes them to individualism or group conformity, in 
humans, the cultural dynamics are based primarily on the delineation 
between the known and the unknown, with predispositions to one or 
the other based in gender roles.
Woman’s power of veto defends against whatever might threaten 
the order that makes cultural unity possible. And so “fear” is an 
inextricable aspect of the female condition. Fear of novelty, fear of 
change, fear of sex, fear of losing control and fear of losing her place 
on the life raft.
Fear of sex (e.g., sex as forbidden) has an important part to play in 
women’s enjoyment of sex in all its dimensions, in the thrill, the 
intimacy, the rituals and the fashions. Even though healthy women 
regard sex as enjoyable and necessary, men must still pay, in one form 
or another, because women have to be enticed beyond their fear that 
constrains them. Indeed, men paying for sex can itself constitute a part 
of the thrill.
WTiat is there to fear about sex? Do animals fear sex? On occasion, 
it would appear that elephants certainly do — refer to my preceding
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discussion about the female elephant playing coy and running away 
from the male elephant. Might this not suggest fear on the part of the 
female?
In another documentary by David Attenborough on meerkats, 
similar dynamics were evident. Meerkats comprise a tight-knit colony 
(mob) of five to thirty or forty members, headed by one alpha male 
and one alpha female. In small colonies, only the alpha female is 
allowed to mate with the alpha male. In larger colonies, subordinate 
females tend to initially repel approaches by males. Female meerkats 
are usually philopatric (tending to remain within the one territory), 
while males often leave the mob to join another. During Attenbo­
rough’s documentary, one such male had approached the territorial 
boundary of another mob of meerkats, and it was interesting to 
observe the female, who was behaving secretively — she seemed to 
be indecisive about whether or not she should take up this illicit affair.
And there is our example of the redback spider. Is the male spider 
aware of the risk it is taking? Is there something masochistic in its 
behaviour? Does it derive an ultimate thrill from the fear of submitting 
to the female that is somehow analogous to submission by women to 
men?
Not all animals appear to have “issues” with sex (on the surface). 
Bonobo monkeys for example. And female seals seem to be indif­
ferent to mating with the dominant male, though since nobody’s asked 
them, perhaps this is unfair. But among those animals where sexual 
“issues” are evident, such issues do seem to involve some kind of 
dynamic with fear and, perhaps, even some component of the 
forbidden. Which raises interesting questions about human notions of 
morality.
In having observed these parallels with the animal kingdom, we 
might now infer that resistance by female humans, implying fear, is 
part of something primal associated with being. We must surely ask 
ourselves, what is there to be afraid of?
6.7. The cultural known — why it is so important
So what’s the big deal with this known that men must contend with, 
and that women are reluctant to let go of?
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Before modern liberalism, the “known” in which a woman felt 
secure revolved around the parents that raised her. Furthermore, her 
parents never taught her to be independent and self-sufficient — not 
because they were selfish and thoughtless, but because independence 
and self-sufficiency requires a logical mindset that is contrary to the 
priorities of motherhood.
With the advent of sexual freedom, however, men have to contend 
with a new Woman’s known... the ever-present boyfriend/partner. In 
today’s loose morality of sexual freedom, women tend to transition 
across relationships rather than risk solitude for any length of time, 
and so they need an incentive to be lured away from an established 
and secure known. What women interpret as love on their part can 
often be nothing other than need motivated by fear — specifically, 
fear of solitude. Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t 
know. An established provider who has demonstrated his willingness 
to stick around is better than any untested temptations that might 
present themselves. Thus in today’s climate, women’s relationships 
can often be based less in love or moral obligation than in fear of 
solitude, manifesting most commonly in peer pressure. Where before, 
parents were the anchor that provided their daughter with the basis for 
resisting change, today it is the ever-present boyfriend whose commit­
ment she wears as a badge to assert her normality.
Yet other truths remain unmistakably in their original form. When 
a woman turns to a man to be saved by him, there is something in her 
nature as Woman that has legitimate reason to fear that which has her 
turn to him for protection. When she plays infuriatingly coy she’s not 
always pretending. She really does not want him to intrude into her 
current status quo and she does fear the change that he is threatening 
to bring to her life. When she says “no” she really might mean “no”... 
except that another part of her might mean “yes” — the part that wants 
change and wants him, but she fears surrender and losing control. If it 
is true that Man fears commitment, then it is equally true that Woman 
fears falling in love. Both are the same types of fear expressed from 
the perspective of the pursuer versus the pursued.
Of course there is nothing new in these observations in and of 
themselves. They have been observed and discussed since Homo 
sapiens first started etching on cave walls. What is new is our 
theoretical framework based in semiotics, shedding light on the 
powerful predispositions based in the mind-body relationship. These
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differences between men and women are neither coded in the genes 
(“Nature”) nor are they arbitrarily socialized (“Nurture”). These 
differences subscribe to some entirely different, basic and universal 
laws common to every living organism.
And so in spite of all our muddling around with the Nature/Nurture 
debate, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Women 
continue to prioritize the cultural known. They continue to resist and 
men continue to initiate. Women continue to be asked out and men 
continue to pick up the tab. Women continue to be provided for and 
men continue to pay.
Sexual freedom is not freedom at all, because we must all still contend 
with a cultural known that remains the principle domain of Woman. 
Moreover, sexual “freedom” has simply presented us with new 
constraints, limitations and yardsticks by which we judge each other. For 
example, while divorce has lost much of the stigma that existed before 
feminism, it has established new standards to force us to keep up with the 
Joneses. Whatever we make of divorce today, the simple fact is that 
divorced men have at least “arrived”. They have gone through a rite of 
passage that has confirmed their transition into manhood. Their 
complicity — the chumphood that characterizes Modem Manhood — has 
almost become mandatory as a rite of passage.
Before feminism and the accompanying sexual freedom, parents 
provided a source of comfort and guidance for their children. Today, as 
Judith Harris (1998) attests, peer pressure reigns supreme over parental 
influence. For the truth is that peer pressure provides an oppressive 
Zeitgeist with shoulds and should-nots that are often more puritanical and 
stultifying than anything dreamt up during the Victorian era.
6.8. Conferencing for consensus
As we’ve observed, Men and women are to Culture what neurons and 
glial cells are to Mind. And just as we are now beginning to realize the 
cmcial facilitative and networking roles that glial cells play in the 
emergence of Mind, so too, we need to realize the crucial facilitative 
and networking roles that women play in the emergence of Culture.
As we’ve established, women are, first and foremost, the assumers 
of cultural norms, while men derive their understanding of reality
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through making choices at the interface between the cultural known 
and the unknown.
The choices that men make are visible and the consequences are 
immediate and self-evident. Often, it is a potentially dangerous world 
where the choices that men make can kill them right where they stand 
(certainly in what Warren Farrell (1994) describes as the “death” 
professions, such as mining, construction, rescue, war, etc.).
Women, on the other hand, derive their understanding of reality 
through making choices from within the cultural known. They con­
ference, network, gossip, discuss, agonize, working themselves into a 
lather to construct edifices that owe their existence to consensus. 
Feminism is a product of just such a process. And the original 
feminists have recruited the agents of Woman’s bidding (i.e., men) in 
order to actualize the feminist reality by way of changing the various 
structures (e.g., political), in order to make real that which began as 
bubble and froth in the minds of a handful of women in conference.
Women must be seen to uphold the cultural known. Thus the 
methodology of Woman is stealth — flying beneath the radar in order 
to avoid detection. This is why manipulation, gossip, exclusion and all 
those other things that we’ve identified as relational aggression are so 
important to women. So successful is Woman’s methodology that the 
success of feminism itself can be attributed to it.
It is important to realize that conferencing for consensus is not a 
trivial role. It is the very glue that binds Culture together into a shared 
knowing, in exactly the same way that glial cells bind the brain 
together into a single consciousness.
Gossip is an important aspect of “conferencing for consensus”. 
Chesler (2001: 154) writes, “Thus gossip reinforces traditional mora­
lity, solidifies group identity, excludes ‘outsiders’, and serves as a 
warning that one may become the focus of gossip if one behaves anti- 
normatively. Gossip reinforces patriarchal ethnic and class solidarity”.
Chesler describes the way that women monitor the behaviour of 
women through gossip, and refers to the work of anthropologists Ilsa 
M. Glazer and Wahiba Abu Ras (on the relationship between “honor” 
killings and gossip), quoting their conclusion that: “Women’s gossip 
creates the climate in which the [honor killing] of a young woman is 
inevitable” (Chesler 2001: 161).
Gossip is one manifestation of a particular type of personality trait 
that is logically consistent with “sustaining the known” and con­
formity. Envy is another manifestation of that trait. Envy — you want 
what everyone else has. Women’s magazines appeal to women’s 
proclivity for gossip and envy. Women’s magazines intrude into the 
personal lives of celebrities, building them up or tearing them down. 
They feed women’s passions for knowing who’s going out with 
whom, who’s doing what to whom, who’s wearing what, who’s been 
caught without wearing makeup and a whole lot more. They provide 
fashion tips and advice on relationship and sex issues, thus tapping 
into the priority that women place on observing the shoulds and 
should-nots of proper social conduct. Women’s magazines provide an 
important means by which women conference for consensus.
So important is conferencing for consensus to women that even the 
men they choose are a product of it.
6.9. Relational aggression and the men that women choose
Women choose the types of men that they would like their sons to be. 
In this simple aphorism, we can obtain some sense of how far the 
tentacles of Woman’s power can reach. Women as the nurturers of 
little boys and the choosers of men possess power far more extensive 
than is suggested in the myth of disempowerment preferred by 
feminists. Much of this power is based in relational aggression — 
enforcement of the norms by which women judge women and the 
choices they make in men.
Wiseman points out that girls’ behaviors in peer groups are so 
completely proscribed that they define even their choice of boyfriends. 
They turn to their cliques not only to define the “right” boys, but also 
to decide on relationship issues, such as whether or not a boyfriend 
should be dropped.
Wiseman asked boys what they wanted to know about girls. 
Interestingly, she observes that the “right” boys are often assholes (her 
choice of word):
Why do girls like assholes [boys often ask]? Girls’ reason: Because he’s hot 
and they can be really cool when they’re alone. My [Wiseman’s] reason: The 
asshole fits in the “Act Like a Man” box. He’s the Misunderstood Guy who 
looks like he has things under control. Girls find it especially attractive if  the 
asshole shows them his sensitive side and only they can understand him 
(Wiseman 2002: 186)
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In these sorts of examples, we see an interesting pattern unfold. Not 
only do girls oppress girls in the norms that are embodied in their 
shoulds and should-nots, but they also identify the norms by which 
boys are judged, the norms that become women’s preferences.
From Wiseman’s work, we see that girls (and women) play an 
important role in actively nominating the male stereotypes that other 
girls (and women) should choose. If popularity is so important for 
girls within girls’ cliques, then it follows that popularity is also the 
yardstick with which girls assess boys. Popular girls identify the 
popular boys whom other girls should be seen with, if a girl is to have 
any hope of competing on girls’ totem poles. Why do girls choose 
bad-boys? Now we know the answer.
Many a man has experienced that peculiar tendency in women to 
be especially attracted to them if they were “spoken for” (married or 
in an established relationship). The tendency has been for men to 
dismiss this increase in female interest as a function of their increased 
self-confidence that makes them shine in the presence of their partner. 
In part at least, maybe that’s true. But a more compelling factor, in 
light of our discussion, is that women rely on the opinions of other 
women to define values, and a man that is spoken for must surely have 
something going for him. It sounds too simple and obvious. This 
perspective sheds light on the mysterious choices of many women 
throughout history, on their proclivity to choose married or attached 
men, and on their willingness to play second fiddle within poly­
gamous relationships and harems. What is it that can make a married 
man attractive to many women? The fact that he’s married, in and of 
itself, is oftentimes a sufficient enough condition. More generally, 
though, marriage is also a marker for success, and a successful man 
within a relationship will understandably be especially marketable.
All these observations have serious implications for feminism. The 
sexists and abusers that feminists complain about are the bad-boys and 
philanderers of women’s own choosing.
Women learn from other women (namely, their peers — but also, 
their mothers... and the fathers that their mothers choose) what the 
“right” types of men are. While we are in the spirit of thinking 
systemically, let us take this a step further. Women choose the types 
of men that they would like their sons to be. Can we now see the 
wider, systemic implications? Woman’s role is important not only in
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the types of men that are chosen in the here and now, but also in the 
types of men that make it into the next generation.
6.10. Summarizing the implications of relational aggression
(1) Women, not men, are responsible for women’s low self-esteem;
(2) Success in men is based on competition and control. Success in 
women is based on connectedness and popularity, and this 
provides the basis for the relational aggression that manifests 
itself as peer pressure among women;
(3) Relational aggression plays an important role in how women 
impact on the types of men that are chosen to become cultural 
stereotypes.
6.11. To conclude
Thus far, we’ve gone through the theory, to understand gender roles in 
terms of two types of habitual ways of looking at the world. That is, 
the known (femininity) and the unknown (masculinity). The “known” 
is a cultural attractor that predisposes to conformity, while the “un­
known” is a cultural attractor that predisposes to dynamism and 
variety. It makes good, common sense. There are many more “types” 
of men than there are “types” of women. The bell curve probability 
distribution for men’s behaviour is very much wider than that of 
women, and this is reflected in intelligence, crime and other 
behaviour/psychological characteristics.
Let us explore in further detail, what it is to “feel” the female type 
of knowing.
7.0. Getting inside the minds of women
7.1. The need to infer
This brings us to contentious, uncharted territory where the only mode 
of analysis available to us is inference, based on what we know about 
Dasein and the law of association of habits. Why must we rely on
inference? Couldn’t we simply ask women about their experiences? 
Weininger provides an idea of what we are up against. He begins his 
chapter “Male and Female Sexuality”:
‘Woman does not betray her secret’ (Kant). ‘From a woman you can learn 
nothing o f women’ (Nietzsche).
By psychology, as a whole, we generally understand the psychology of the 
psychologists, and these are exclusively men! Never since human history 
began have we heard o f a female psychology! None the less the psychology of 
woman constitutes a chapter as important with regard to general psychology 
as that o f the child. And inasmuch as the psychology o f man has always been 
written with unconscious but definite reference to man, general psychology 
has become simply the psychology o f men, and the problem o f the psychology 
o f the sexes will be raised as soon as the existence o f a separate psychology of 
women has been realised. Kant said that in anthropology the peculiarities of 
the female were more a study for the philosopher than those o f the male, and it 
may be that the psychology o f the sexes will disappear in a psychology of the 
female.
None the less the psychology o f women will have to be written by men. It 
is easy to suggest that such an attempt is foredoomed to failure, inasmuch as 
the conclusions must be drawn from an alien sex and cannot be verified by 
introspection. Granted the possibility that woman could describe herself with 
sufficient exactness, it by no means follows that she would be interested in the 
sides o f  her character that would interest us. Moreover, even if she could and 
would explore herself fully, it is doubtful if  she could bring herself to talk 
about herself. I shall show that these three improbabilities spring from the 
same source in the nature o f woman. (Weininger 1906: 85-86)
Any man who has sincerely questioned women directly or indirectly, 
in order to understand how they think, will realize the futility of such a 
task. As women speaking from a perspective that has women’s reality 
as a reference point, they can never present their answers from any 
other perspective that might otherwise bring their answers into sharp 
relief. What makes it even more difficult is that women don’t under­
stand women. They live in a world of assumptions, much more so than 
men, and what they know about other women they are more likely to 
have learned by following and imitating, rather than challenging or 
questioning.
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7.2. Sex and character — Otto Weininger as semiotician
What is this “science of character”, to which Otto Weininger refers as 
“characterology”, if not semiotics?
[...] Is there in a man a single and simple existence, and, if  so, in what relation 
does it stand to the complex psychical phenomena? Has man, indeed, a soul? 
It is easy to understand why there has never been a science o f character. The 
object o f such a science, the character itself, is problematical. The problem o f 
all metaphysics and theories o f knowledge, the fundamental problem o f 
psychology, is also the problem o f characterology. At the least, characterology 
will have to take into account the theory o f knowledge itself with regard to its 
postulates, claims, and objects, and will have to attempt to obtain information 
as to all the differences in the nature o f men. (Weininger 1906: 81)
7.3. The need for a female psychology
Otto Weininger (1906) had begun a fascinating and important (urgent) 
foray into the relationship between sex and psychology. Importantly, 
as he had identified, what we knew back then within the field of 
psychology was actually male psychology. Sadly, to this day, the 
situation has not been satisfactorily resolved. The field of psychology 
remains essentially from a male perspective. If we think that today the 
field of psychology has become more female, it is only because 
feminism has compelled women to become more male (women can do 
anything that a man can do) and the subsequent androgenization of 
society has resulted only in a perpetuation of the male perspective. We 
remain without insight into the nature of psychology and its relation to 
sex.
However, it is worth noting that recent books that have come onto 
the market on relational aggression (e.g. Chesler 2003; Simmons 
2002; Wiseman 2002) are beginning to probe the inner workings of 
the female mind, to the extent that it might herald the very female 
perspective that is needed.
Weininger proposed that women think in “henids”. According to 
his definition, a henid is an aspect of psychical data, perhaps best 
described in the context of “feelings” or emotions, before it becomes a 
fully fleshed out idea. While Weininger’s definition of henid is not as 
precise as it could be, it nonetheless points to key differences in the 
ways in which men and women think.
According to the law of association of habits, however, thoughts 
are habit-associations, and women’s henids must conform to this 
semiotic perspective. A more precise definition, therefore, is that 
henids are thought processes (habit-associations) that are more 
contextual than men’s thought processes — assimilating many cues 
(associations) to arrive at a “feeling” or sense as to what is going on, 
before understanding the specifics. Men’s thought processes, on the 
other hand, must apprehend and commit to facts with some element of 
immediacy and urgency, for example, in order to compete with an 
opponent or construct bridges that work. Accordingly, the contexts for 
men’s thought processes are based on the practical application of facts 
at hand, while the contexts for women’s thought processes are more 
“big picture”. What men gain in their apprehension and application of 
specifics they lose in the big picture, and what women gain in their 
apprehension of the context of things, they lose in practical applica­
tion.
Weininger described henids as follows:
Now what is the relation between the investigation I have been making and 
the psychology o f the sexes? What is the distinction between the male and the 
female (and to reach this has been the object o f my digression) in the process 
o f clarification?
Here is my answer:
The male has the same psychical data as the female, but in a more articulated 
form; where she thinks more or less in henids, he thinks in more or less clear 
and detailed presentations in which the elements are distinct from the tones of 
feeling. With the woman, thinking and feeling are identical, for man they are 
in opposition. The woman has many o f her mental experiences as henids, 
whilst in man these have passed through a process o f clarification. Woman is 
sentimental, and knows emotion but not mental excitement.
[...]  It is certainly the case that whilst we are still near the henid stage we 
know much more certainly what a thing is not than what it is. Instinctive 
experience depends on henids. Naturally that condition implies uncertainty and 
indecision in judgment. Judgment comes towards the end of the process of 
clarification; the act o f judgment is in itself a departure from the henid stage.
The most decisive proof for the correctness o f the view that attributes 
henids to woman and differentiated thoughts to man, and that sees in this a 
fundamental sexual distinction, lies in the fact that wherever a new judgment 
is to be made, (not merely something already settled to be put into proverbial 
form) it is always the case that the female expects from man the clarification 
o f her data, the interpretation o f her henids. It is almost a tertiary sexual 
character o f the male, and certainly it acts on the female as such, that she 
expects from him the interpretation and illumination o f her thoughts. It is from
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this reason that so many girls say that they could only marry, or, at least, only 
love a man who was cleverer than themselves; that they would be repelled by 
a man who said that all they thought was right, and did not know better than 
they did. In short, the woman makes it a criterion o f manliness that the man 
should be superior to herself mentally, that she should be influenced and 
dominated by the man; and this in itself is enough to ridicule all ideas of 
sexual equality.
The male lives consciously, the female lives unconsciously. This is 
certainly the necessary conclusion for the extreme cases. The woman receives 
her consciousness from the man; the function to bring into consciousness what 
was outside it is a sexual function o f  the typical man with regard to the typical 
woman, and is a necessary part o f his ideal completeness [ ...] . (Weininger 
1906: 100-102)
These are important ideas and within them, is the seed of an important 
realization. However, whilst Weininger is referenced throughout this 
paper, we need to qualify his notion of henids. That is, thinking in 
henids is not to be considered inferior to the more analytical, deduc­
tive reasoning that we are more likely to attribute to men. To begin 
with, thinking in terms of henids has more in common with lateral/ 
systemic thinking — leaving things undefined until a more complete 
context emerges, and upon which a different kind of important and 
informed decision can be made.
Weininger’s reference to henids is related to the choices that men 
and women make. The gender that is provided for will have different 
thought processes to the gender that provides (as a natural expression 
of the law of association of habits). Therefore it is only to be expected 
that the gender that does the providing will be able to conceptualize 
things more analytically, while the gender that is provided for will be 
exempt from the requirement to do so. The promise of motherhood 
grants women that privilege, because it provides them with an escape 
hatch that liberates them from the unconditional requirement to 
provide for and support anyone. That is, if women are more inclined 
to think in henids, it is because they can, not because henids constitute 
an integral aspect of the female condition that is supposedly set in the 
concrete of the genetic blueprint.
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7.4. Cultural constraints on thought
We are all constrained by the options provided to us from our cultures, 
and our desires that are shaped by these options. Whether male or female, 
we cannot go beyond those options, because our culture will exclude us 
and deny us the things (jobs, friends) that are essential to our survival. 
Whether male or female, complicity is essential, or we will die. But 
complicity comes in two forms — male and female. The gender that is 
provided for has different priorities, different ways of thinking. The 
gender that provides must apprehend more uncertainty and risk.
Yet, insofar as male and female constitute very different ways of 
thinking, we should regard them as different manifestations of the one 
entity — Culture. Inevitably, male and female have a shared cultural logic 
about the way things are. And so men and women must remain both 
divided in their sexual natures and united in their cultural assumptions.
We might now begin to see something of the basis for Weininger’s 
henid theory. Women are predisposed to desiring lifestyle choices 
(from Culture) that predispose them to thinking in terms of henids.
8.0. Defining and assuming
So far, we’ve covered the more self-evident and immediately visible 
aspects of how men and women differ in their thinking. But there is a 
deeper aspect that we need to look at, in order to account for why men 
are more likely to commit to an idea or cause, while women are less 
likely to.
Thinking in terms of henids is related to assuming and imitating. 
Women play a particularly important role in maintaining cultural 
memes (and hence, cultural values and traditions).
The main difference between the psychologies of men and women 
might be best explored in the context of defining versus assuming.
Assuming does not define anew, but rather, asserts the definitions 
that have been made, without necessarily possessing a comprehension 
of the manner in which the definitions were derived.
As men are thrust into having to deal with the unknown, they must 
learn to confront and apprehend problems they encounter. They must 
strive to understand the issues that impact on their survival, and they 
must define problems and their solutions. Women, whose priorities
The semiotics o f sexuality 107
are based in sustaining the known, do not experience the same level of 
compulsion to have to deal with such demands.
Men are more likely to understand, to some level, the workings of 
stereo systems, computers and technology. Women are much less 
likely to do so, and they are more content to regard the technologies 
they use as black boxes, the inner workings of which are irrelevant to 
their world view.
Even if a man is not “technologically aware”, he will nonetheless 
possess a way of looking at black boxes “rationally”, in the sense that 
implicit in his mind is a rational explanation for their inner workings. 
For women, the inner workings of black boxes remain mysteries that 
can be safely disregarded as irrelevant to their own priorities. For wo­
men, black boxes are a “given” that can be safely taken for granted — 
just as, for them, cultural reality is taken as a “given”, not to be 
questioned or challenged.
With rationality comes confidence, for the truths that are learnt by 
doing, questioning and confronting, will be more inviolable than the 
truths that are learnt by assuming. Women, however, as sustainers of the 
known, are precluded from exploring the possibilities that might other­
wise provide a fertile ground for confidence to grow. Content to be pro­
vided for, they cannot possibly get to discover the full range of their 
potentials, and what they sometimes might feign as confidence is 
quintessential^ a brittle, fragile arrogance — and every bit subject to 
the whims from outside influences. It is a woman’s prerogative to 
change her mind
Ultimately, when women enter politics, run businesses or fix stereo 
systems, they do so as assumers, not as problem solvers. Women can 
and do, for example, run businesses every bit as competently as men. 
But, consistent with their role as sustainers of the known, they will be 
most successful in established, stable businesses focusing on relation­
ships, rather than dynamic, risky businesses characterized by indivi­
dualistic leadership. Sustaining networks, procedures and protocols 
are most amenable to the ways of women.
In the context of the relationship between the known and the 
unknown, we can now understand why women are more likely to be 
interested in astrology, history and the arts (not “art” as creation but 
“arts” as appreciation o f  creation), while men are more likely to be 
interested in cars, philosophy and science.
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8.1. The motivation to define or to assume
What woman, inundated with offers to be taken care of, whether by 
parents, or men, or government (today, we have govemment-as- 
provider), would shun all possibilities in the pursuit of elusive and ill- 
defined higher ideals?
Men have no such luxury. They are forced into situations of com­
petition and confrontation, and defining for men is a matter of 
survival. Whilst Government provides also for men, such as the 
unemployed, such a lifestyle is generally not a sought out option. 
Unlike unemployable women on social security benefits, unemploy­
able men, without any cause to believe in or purpose to inspire them, 
are not even remotely viable propositions for marriage.
Women assume because they can. Men define because they must. 
Women think as women because they can. Men think as men because 
they have no choice.
How then, might a woman obtain the motivation to live the logics 
of defining? How difficult would it be for a woman to completely 
abandon any suggestion that she can, one way or another, rely on 
men? Would not a heroine along the lines of Joan of Arc, no matter 
how courageous and determined she might be, experience a world of 
vastly different options to that of men? Should we not admire such a 
heroine all the more for having chosen the difficult path, in the face of 
all the privileges that are her birthright that she has chosen to reject?
For a woman to deliberately choose the more difficult path and 
throw away all her feminine privileges would seem to be extra­
ordinarily foolhardy. Yet if she is to move in any way towards the 
disciplined rationality of men, then that is precisely her only option. 
The ever present, culturally sanctioned logic permitting women to be 
stay-at-home mothers liberates women fully from commitments to 
ideas, goals and careers as matters of life and death. Women have 
more freedom to pick and choose and in this light, it is almost 
impossible for a woman to take on the world in a can-do spirit of 
determination and courage.
For this freedom to pick and choose, women pay a price. The 
options that make life so easy for them become the needs by which 
they define their values. If a woman considers herself bored by her 
womanly privileges and being taken care of, we can predict with 
certainty her experience of the terror of solitude and the collapse of
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her world, were she suddenly deprived of the privilege of being 
provided for that she had become accustomed to.
The relationship between the unknown and the known, in terms of 
the defined and the assumed, is reflected in the manner in which a 
hero might emerge from a culture. Traditionally, the hero will not seek 
to accommodate women’s desires but rather, assert new standards.
And so in the context of modem feminism, women are constantly 
changing their definitions as to how they want their men to be, 
constantly perplexing the men that try to meet their demands. And yet 
the truth is that women don’t know what they want, and men are 
wasting their time in trying to accommodate their demands. With 
today’s feminism and the subsequent tendency to role reversal, neither 
men nor women understand that it is not the woman’s priority to 
define nor the man’s priority to accommodate.
8.2. Women’s ways of knowing
Here are a couple of famous quotes by Anai's Nin that capture the 
essence of feminine logic, in the context of the tension that exists 
between the known and the unknown.5
And the day came when the risk to remain tight in the bud was more painful 
than the risk it took to blossom.
And, from The Diaries of Anai’s Nin:
Throw your dreams into space like a kite, and you do not know what it will 
bring back, a new life, a new friend, a new love, a new country.
Do these quotes not embody the essence of the psychology of women? 
Do they not invite women, simply, to “turn up”? Don’t they suggest 
that it is a woman’s prerogative to rely on men? For a woman, there is 
no slaying of dragons, no overcoming of an adversary, no victory in 
the face of great odds. She simply has to be there. While this demands 
its own form of courage (after all, a woman can give birth to a bad
1 was unable to locate the original published sources of these quotations by 
Ana'is Nin.
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choice), the contraceptive pill has freed modem women from such 
immediate responsibilities.
Whilst Nin’s aphorisms might also be applicable to men in some 
contexts, they are inconsistent with the dominant masculine paradigm. 
It is not stereotypically masculine thinking to cling to the known for 
fear of the unknown. Nor is it stereotypically masculine thinking to 
surrender with abandon in the hope of being saved or stumbling upon 
good fortune.
And this brings us to the sexuality of men, and how it most 
perfectly complements the sexuality of women. For if, as Ana'is Nin 
insists, the longing to be violated is a secret, erotic need in a woman, 
so too, it should be understood that the urge to violate is a not-so- 
secret compulsion that must be curbed in men.
8.3. The phenomenology of the known and the unknown
Assuming and defining are related to the cultural known and un­
known. Here we deal with being, before any condition of being is 
defined. What I am alluding to here is a resolution of the conflict 
between nothingness and being. The natural state of “being” is, of 
course, not being... and this is reflected in the remark, commonly 
made by philosophers and scientists alike, “why must there exist 
anything at all?” Surely the most basic state of existence, is non­
existence, and so why should all this complexity emerge at all? Is not 
the simplest, least energetic, most stable existence an empty universe, 
a black void, non-existence? We shan’t venture into the phenome­
nology of quantum physics. However, it is important to consider what 
phenomenology might imply for gender roles.
The moment that a state of being is defined, a state of non-being is 
also defined. A state of being must contend with the events that 
threaten it. But a condition of stability, on its own, will drift towards 
stagnation and collapse as it seeks the easiest, least energetic path 
(that’s why the male anglerfish’s ultimate tendency, as discussed 
earlier, is to become a pair of testicles). The only way that a state of 
being can evolve to anything more complex, is to factor into its 
existence the dynamics of change. But here, we have a dilemma, for 
the dynamics of change are logically inconsistent with the dynamics 
of sameness and stability. Human and animal existence resolves the
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dilemma through gender roles. Any state of being must desire to be, 
and the state of being that emerges will need to be consistent with the 
ecology within which it finds itself. Thus, the gender that has it so 
easy will automatically be predisposed to one type of logic based in 
sustaining the known, while the gender that has it so hard will be 
predisposed to logics based in exploring the unknown. And within 
their shared ecologies, male and female co-exist with their logically 
contradictory predispositions.
Clearly, what this implies is a process view of life and being. And 
so what we have come to is a phenomenological account of gender 
roles expressed in the context of being and non-being, where gender 
roles can be understood from the following perspective:
(1) Masculinity, on its own, leads to chaos and disintegration;
(2) Femininity, on its own, leads to stagnation and collapse.
Thus we have the mechanism by which cultural habits are modulated — 
with masculinity being the agent of change, and femininity providing 
the resistance to change.
8.4. Psychology as Men’s Psychology
Our preceding analysis suggests a new kind of psychology that factors 
in both male and female. This contrasts with the psychology that has 
dominated the mainstream.
As Weininger (1906) pointed out, frequently men pioneer a field 
such as psychology, in the belief that they have hit on general, human 
principles that apply to both men and women. But typically, the reality 
is that they’ve developed a male perspective that is ignorant of the 
very different ways of women. Freudian psychology is essentially a 
male psychology framed from a male perspective.
In a similar vein, Nietzsche believed in a fundamental ordering 
principle of the universe, which he called the “will to power”. But this 
is imprecise. His “will to power” is actually, a will to masculine 
power. In his psychology, there is no place for the feminine law. His 
idea of the whole universe as a battleground of contending wills and 
the fight for supremacy visible in every manifestation of life, is 
preeminently the masculine side of being. Nietzsche failed to 
recognize the feminine side as a valid logical reality. For ultimately,
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the will to power must contend with the will for continuity. The will 
for more of the same acts in direct contradiction to the will for change.
Of course, the dominance of men’s perspectives in psychology and 
science has nothing to do with the oppression of women by men, and 
everything to do with women’s disinterest in analytical pursuits. That 
women are not adequately accounted for in the exploration of 
perspectives has everything to do with women being content to leave 
the exploration of the unknown to men.
9.0. Woman’s secret
From Nietzsche (Thus spoke Zarathustra), “On little old and young 
women”:
“Then the little old woman answered me: ‘Many fine things has Zarathustra 
said, especially for those who are young enough for them. It is strange: 
Zarathustra knows women little, and yet he is right about them. Is this because 
nothing is impossible with woman? And now, as a token of gratitude, accept a 
little truth. After all, I am old enough for it. Wrap it up and hold your hand 
over its mouth: else it will cry overloudly, this little truth.”
“Then I said: ‘Woman, give me your little truth.”
And thus spoke the little old woman:
‘“You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!’”
Thus spoke Zarathustra. (Nietzsche 1954: 67)
9.1. The provider
An important distinction between the sexuality of men and that of 
women is that men desire, women long to be desired. Women do not 
find men attractive, so much as they find themselves attractive, within 
the contexts provided by successful, powerful men. That’s why 
women use cosmetics and men do not. That’s why women dress to 
lure, while men dress to work. Popular women at the top of the food 
chain prefer rich men, successful men, assertive men. Less demanding 
women will be content with men who are reliable, “safe” providers, 
who are “financially secure”. Some of the men that women choose 
will happen to be ugly, with all the charisma of a bag of cement. Some 
of them will happen to be handsome, with the ability to charm birds 
out of trees. Some of these men will happen to be geriatrics (but rich).
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Some of them might even appear to have nothing going for them 
whatsoever. But the one thing that all these men have in common is 
that they conform to women’s priorities to be provided for, to be 
desired.
A good provider is motivated and passionate. He desires, and he 
desires to win. A good provider is a successful provider. Men’s lives 
are prescribed within the context of success and their provider role — 
both by women and by men.
A woman is unlikely to pay for sex because being desired is central 
to her sexuality. A woman paying for sex does not make sense 
because it is an affirmation that she is not desirable. Being desired  is 
the source of her arousal. A woman paying for sex stands in direct 
contradiction to the feminine desirability that demands payment. It 
cannot be any other way. Being paid for sex is the only monetary 
transaction that is capable of arousing a woman, whether or not she is 
a gold-digger, for there can be no stronger message that a man finds 
her attractive. And feeling sexy, vulnerable and attractive is a 
woman’s thrill.
Which pretty well casts Man’s role as provider in stone. Being a 
provider is as integral to manhood as having testicles. It is the un­
spoken “given” that defines Man’s purpose. If, at one level, women’s 
choices can appear to be arbitrary or indiscriminate, at another level 
they are very specific. If a man does not, in some way, conform to the 
promise of his destiny as provider, he does not get air-time.
(For the sake of simplicity, we confine our discussion here to 
Western cultures characterized by dominant materialism — where we 
will find that sexism and materialism go hand-in-hand. On the other 
hand, men’s and women’s motivations can become considerably more 
varied in more urbane societies characterized by respect for historical 
tradition, such as we might expect in some European countries, for 
example — but further discussion is beyond the scope of this article).
Man’s provider role generates the variety — the “types” of men — 
from which women choose, the types of men that become the cultural 
norms.
Because women can never understand men, the provider criterion 
provides a ready-reckoner that enables women to identify men who 
are “normal” and “reliable”. Ultimately, a good provider can be 
assumed to be reasonably “well-behaved”, because his livelihood will 
depend on it.
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The priority of men is success. Success in what a man does, 
defines his identity. It is a measure of his ability to take on whatever 
the unknown dishes out. It defines his character. But success, on its 
own, provides no guarantee of a woman’s love. It must be success that 
is immediately tangible and recognizable. Artists and poets, successful 
as they often are in apprehending the unknown and bringing its secrets 
to light, fair much better with women once they have been identified 
as conspicuous successes — or even better, once they become 
celebrities.
Conspicuous success is a real crowd-pleaser, and irrespective of 
whether a man is a corporate executive, published author, criminal 
thug or just a humble leader of a pack, there will be no shortage of 
women willing to submit themselves to his charms.
9.2. The provided for
Woman’s priority of sustaining the known implies the need for safety, 
and it prioritizes security. But it must also contend with its opposites 
and its excesses. With logic being what it is, security is one half of 
Woman’s duality, where the other half is vulnerability. Thus the 
longing to be desired must invariably accompany the longing to be 
violated. Where a man might be more inclined to get his adrenaline 
rush jumping out of an aircraft with a parachute, a woman might be 
more inclined to get hers from putting herself in sexually risky 
situations — the thrill of feeling vulnerable and attractive at the same 
time. This sheds light on the rape fantasies of many women. It is also 
consistent with the observation that some women delight in their part 
in the sex industry (contrary to popular feminist dogma). In her 
narcissistic self-indulgence in her own beauty a woman sustains the 
known, and her thrill of being violated portends its destruction.
Dasein tells us that there is something that women “like” about 
their condition. There is something they “like” about dressing to be 
undressed. There is something they “like” about falling out of a 
backless, strapless, dress slit up to the hips to reveal long legs and a 
plunging neckline to emphasize full breasts. There is something they 
“like” about being beautiful and vulnerable and about surrendering to 
the thrill of the forbidden. There is something they “like” about being 
constrained in high-heeled shoes and concealed under make-up. There
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is something they “like” about being chained with jewelry around 
their necks and wrists and on their skin and about feeling like a 
valuable possession. By realizing the connection between mind and 
body, we know that there is something that women “like” about 
submission, being led, being taken, and being provided for. There is 
something that women “like” about intimacy and touch and breast­
feeding their infants.
We know these things because we understand Dasein. Women dress 
to emphasize female vulnerability. Women dress to be undressed.
Feminists can often provide interesting perspectives on the longing 
to be violated. Published author and feminist Catharine MacKinnon 
observes:
I think that sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially 
constructed as that by which we come to want our own self-annihilation. That 
is, our subordination is eroticized in and as female; in fact, we get o ff on it to 
a degree, if nowhere near as much as men do. This is our stake in this system 
that is not in our interest, our stake in this system that is killing us. 
(MacKinnon 1987: 54)
Alysabeth’s feminist stripper site6 sheds further light on the expe­
riences of women — though consistent with what we’ve already 
discussed, it is difficult to extract the deeper truths, and we still need 
to resort to inference. Nonetheless, we can obtain a sense of her 
experiences, for example, where she writes, “It’s scary the first time 
you take off all of your clothes in front of a roomful of people. I 
imagine it’s a little like skydiving (and am absolutely unwilling to find 
out for sure), with the adrenaline and the exhilaration”.
It is clear that Alysabeth and the other strippers that she has 
included on her website, all enjoy their work. Moreover, Alysabeth 
describes a threshold that needs to be crossed. She remembers being 
warned by other dancers that “this was not to be entered into lightly or 
unadvisedly, that I was about to change my life”. She describes an 
entry into a new kind of world that changes her. “I crossed the line. I 
realized that I loved it.”
This brings us to an interesting and important question. What is it 
that happens to a person when they make such a transition? Is there 
something important that is changed forever, once someone makes a
6 Alysabeth’s stripper site —  http://www.alysabeth.com/ —  as on 27 January 
2001
choice and enters a new doorway? Alysabeth tells us that, “They were 
right. It did change my life”.
Is there something to fear in such a transformation?
Revisiting everything that we’ve explored on the topics of desire, 
choice, habit and association... has something “happened” to Alysa­
beth that is perhaps not as benign as our secular cultures would like to 
believe?
Alysabeth is obviously delighted and relieved that she had not 
turned into a 6-legged, 4-eyed monster, and she was unable to identify 
any disincentive to continue. But has she transformed into something 
different, on that day that she walked through the doorway into the 
forbidden?
I am reminded of a young woman who used to work as a prostitute. 
She had explained to me that she had reached a point during her brief 
“career” where the only times she climaxed were when clients were 
particularly abusive and vulgar. Her feminine beauty and vulnerability 
juxtaposed against obese, sweaty, and gross masculine ugliness — 
what manner of Dasein is this? What starker example of violation, in 
its most primal essence, can I provide? WЪat state of being does her 
desire to be allude to? The most civilized and well-presented among 
her clients left her cold. To most men this would seem inconceivable — 
how could a man possibly be aroused by the sight of an ugly woman? 
And m this, we see that men and women really do inhabit vastly 
different worlds. Does it really make sense to infer that an attractive 
woman, who can have anyone she desires, can be aroused by ugly, 
vulgar men —  the uglier the better? Yes, it can. This is explicable by 
understanding female sexuality from the perspective of the longing to 
be violated. Violation taken to its limits exposes a woman to a strange, 
surreal condition that disengages her from the real world. Vulnerable 
and exposed, she experiences life at the limits. The very outrage of a 
beautiful woman choosing and being violated by a vulgar boor has its 
ovra kind of thrill. The risk that her parents might find out, what her 
friends might think, all these things come together in a context that 
heightens the surreal elements of her experience. Such thrills are not 
always without consequence, for the self-loathing, the neuroses and 
the mood-swings often characteristic of some of these women is 
logically consistent with the contexts that they have chosen to enter 
into.
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We know that women who have been sexually abused, or women 
who have experienced the sex industry, are often “drawn” to further 
violation long after they have left their experience behind. A secret 
longing often compels them to covertly indulge in more of the same — 
even though they might be able to recognize it as violation and even 
though they might want out. Where did this come from?
We might now better understand Alysabeth, when she describes 
her experience in terms of exhilaration not unlike that which might be 
had skydiving. The expression of female sexuality, like skydiving, is 
accompanied with inherent risks that add to the thrill. Entered into 
without caution, there exists the possibility of real and long-term 
psychical harm. More importantly, her desires will change in order to 
accommodate her choices, and it is in this that the greatest psychical 
harm is done. As she attests on her website, Alysabeth has come to 
enjoy all the other contexts that accompany her dancing — the 
glamour, the camaraderie, the lit-up stage, the dark comers, the smoky 
atmosphere — she has immersed herself into her contexts and all this 
is a manifestation of her Dasein, her desire to be. Alysabeth likes her 
Umwelt. It will continue to draw her in. Should this be such a 
problem?
For how many more years can a stripper continue dancing? 
Perhaps the man she is currently with loves her for what she is. Then 
again, maybe his life contexts, as a man who dates women who get 
paid on these terms preclude her from his life’s agenda. Or maybe she 
doesn’t need a man. Does it matter? Does she care? Dasein. The 
contexts she revels in today won’t always be so kind to her in the 
future:
The choice becomes the association o f habits becomes the desire becomes the
need.
Can a sex-worker believe in a life hereafter? If so, how might she 
think that the contexts she immerses herself in today will manifest 
themselves in her hereafter? Whether or not she believes in any such 
thing, perhaps we need to be concerned. How do the options we 
permit today, impact on what our cultures become tomorrow? What is 
the connection between the debauchery of today and the criminality of 
tomorrow? If not criminality — then how might the debauchery of 
today relate to the pmdishness, the uptightness and the hangups that 
might manifest themselves anew to extricate this vims from the
cultural body? How might the power of an authoritarian tyrant tomor­
row relate to today’s permissiveness that corrodes the will to stand up 
for one’s rights? More generally — how is the present semiotically 
and logically connected with the future? With what sort of cultural 
dynamics is the longing to be violated logically consistent?
Prior to modem feminism, it has commonly been accepted that 
many “traditional” women wanted to be “dominated”. But this 
wanting to be dominated suggests a comparatively innocent, inno­
cuous desire assumed by genetic determinists to be genetically 
programmed into women to select for successful, virile men. And to 
further confuse matters, feminists reacting to what they’ve perceived 
as a patriarchal conspiracy, have simplistically blamed “traditional” 
men for indoctrinating women into submissiveness. Both inter­
pretations are wrong and a more sophisticated analysis is required.
Domination was something that characterized successful men. 
Successful men (and by implication, dominating men) were respected 
by both men and women alike. It was a cultural “tradition” — an 
expectation by men and women — that a woman should be financially 
dependent upon a successful provider. A successful man (and 
therefore a dominating one) was sought out by an image-conscious 
woman. From a semiotic perspective, a woman’s desire for a 
successful man was a desire for a dominating one and therefore, an act 
of complicity in which she expected to be dominated.
A woman’s desire to be dominated is not part of a brain module 
designed to select for superior men but rather, her desire to be 
dominated manifests in her sexuality as the longing to be violated in a 
more materialistic form. At its core is the urge to submit to and be 
consumed by forces beyond one’s control, to be swept away to 
become part of something new.
So let’s distill this wanting to be dominated to its essence, and call 
it for what it really is — the longing to be violated. And in this 
context, we realize that it does not always select for superior men.
O f course, most women do not, in reality, want to be violated. And 
among any that might, if they could understand what is meant by 
“violation”, they would probably deny it. Most often, the longing to be 
violated remains just that — a longing hopefully confined to the realm 
of fantasy, and not to be actualized in real life. But it is a longing that 
establishes predispositions to the types of choices that are made. The 
risk of violation constitutes part of the logic by which a woman
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experiences her feminine beauty. To define what is beautiful is to 
define what is not beautiful. If “innocence” is the essence of feminine 
beauty, then the destruction of innocence is violation.
The primary responsibility of innocence is to sustain the known — 
for ultimately, the desire to be and to continue being is the most 
elemental desire. Only the experienced might seek to do away with 
themselves, to try to find a way out of being. Sustaining the known is 
accompanied with the risk of its destruction. And accompanying that 
risk is a thrill, not unlike jumping out of an aircraft with a parachute. 
Femininity and feeling sexy, beautiful and vulnerable accompanies as 
part of its logic, an awareness of the risk of violation that every 
woman must, subconsciously at least, sense. This awareness comes 
from within. The fear that is often associated with femininity is neither 
neurotic, nor can it be blamed entirely on men. A woman’s fearfulness 
is a part of the thrill by which the known interacts with the unknown. 
The interaction carries with it real risks, and her fear is justified. Thus, 
while men are often violators, such aggression does not magically 
appear in a vacuum, but constitutes a part of the shared cultural logic 
that women also indulge in.
The longing to be violated sheds light on the choices that some 
women make. For surely, does not the longing to be violated 
require... a violator?
A woman’s longing to be violated requires a formidable, dynamic 
force if it is to be awakened. Neither chivalrous men who are well- 
behaved, nor sensitive dishwashers too afraid to try, will ever rouse 
the beast that sleeps within her. No woman can long to be violated by 
just anyone. The dumbing down of men that is required to accommo­
date the demands of political correctness is the last thing that women 
really long for. Sensitive dishwashers have no part to play in women’s 
rape fantasies — though as predictable, safe providers who make 
minimal demands, they can make excellent marriage partners;
The longing to be violated, in the subtle context of the logics by 
which beauty and innocence are defined, is a woman’s secret that she 
keeps not only from men and other women, but also from herself. To 
conceal her desires, she will practice deceit and self-deceit. Sustaining 
the known is her responsibility, and she must be seen to uphold 
standards. Yet her exposure and her vulnerability, the tension between 
her beauty and the danger that surrounds her, reflected in the clothes 
she wears, is her private thrill. And the secrecy is itself a part of the
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thnll, because it is a reminder of her responsibility as mother and 
sustainer of the known. There can be no greater forbidden than the 
desire that must be kept secret, no greater thrill than to submit to the 
longing for forbidden fruit.
From our foregoing semiotic analysis coupled with wider obser­
vation, it might be inferred that for many women, the longing to be 
violated is not realized until it is “awakened” in them through 
circumstance (for example, through marriage or introduction to sex 
work). But once awakened, a woman must keep her secret well 
hidden, for she will know that most women will not only not under­
stand, but they will actively deny this side of their nature that is 
hidden from them. Quite apart from the fact that she won’t even know 
how to put it into words, for that which is secret is that which fails to 
make it into language.
And so there exists a powerful conspiracy of silence among women 
where a host of contradictory interpretations, from wanton debauchery to 
prudish conservatism, has everyone — men and women — trying to 
guess what women really want. But the one real truth — Woman’s secret 
longing to be violated — remains obscured by all the chatter and noise.
9.3. The longing to be violated and the power of veto
Female is the gender predisposed to experiencing first-hand the con­
sequences of violation. Therefore Woman is predisposed to the reali­
zation, at least at some primal level, that her choices have con­
sequences. Woman is predisposed, at one level, to being able to 
control her sex drive, because she perceives her choice to be between 
being accepted into the future or cast into oblivion. And control of her 
libido is logically consistent with the fear of losing control. This is 
why Woman’s power is the power of veto. She needs to be sold. She 
needs to be swayed, wooed and convinced that her choice is the right 
one. If, at one level, Woman is predisposed to making a moral 
decision or an immoral one, at another level, she is not predisposed to 
analyzing that decision. She is not predisposed to understanding her 
options, because reality is far too complex. The cultural known simpli­
fies reality. Making assumptions about the way the world is is the only 
way to cope with all this complexity. This is why women are the 
assumers of the cultural known. This is why they think in “henids”.
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And so Woman is faced with two important dimensions to her 
existence that are often contradictory:
(1) An intimate connection with the consequences of violation;
(2) The cultural known.
When culture becomes immoral, Woman turns to peer pressure to 
define how she is to behave. Peer pressure can blind her to the 
consequences of violation. If, from one perspective, violation can be 
perceived to cast her into oblivion, from another perspective, not 
being accepted by her peers can be perceived with an even greater 
urgency. The consequences of sexual “freedom” —  within the context 
of its inextricable connection with peer pressure — can be disastrous. 
Within this logical realm, women’s choices can seem utterly in­
comprehensible to men.
By contrast, men are removed from the immediate consequences of 
violation. Men are more concerned with the immediacy of survival 
and utilizing the options that are presented to them, whether or not 
those options conform to the cultural norms. It is women that enjoy 
the power of veto — they set the limits of sexual morality. And it is 
men that operate within those bounds, testing the limits and learning 
what they can get away with.
9.4. The writings of Anais Nin
In her Diary, Nin wrote, “to be violated is perhaps a need in a woman, 
a secret erotic need”. Her stories focus on man as possessor and 
woman as possessed, of man as violator and woman as violated. 
Whilst these are themes common to “mainstream” pornography, what 
makes Nin’s work particularly important is that they are presented 
from a woman’s perspective, and in an entirely different language. 
More importantly — and in contrast to pornography for mainstream 
consumption — they shed light on the motivations of women.
Conventional pornography (assumedly written from man’s per­
spective) presents sexuality largely in adolescent terms. We imagine 
that a typical consumer of pornography, today, probably spent the 
high points of his childhood pulling wings off flies. Blind to the more 
formidable dynamics of sexuality — for example, that which exists 
between the sanctioned and the forbidden, the known and the 
unknown — the sex drive is reduced to nothing more than an itch,
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with relief provided only in orgasm. Similarly, it is common to portray 
women as being devoid of any sex drive — the truth behind this over- 
generalization being that women can be so materialistic that they 
rarely get to discover their “dark” sides. Such women typically pos­
sess a kind of sterile innocence, with their lives being dominated by an 
agenda that fmds its greatest fulfillment in being provided for. And 
herein lies the unity of culturally shared logic. Bored women and 
desperate men are an inevitable outcome of the mutually consistent 
logic that must accompany today’s sexual “freedom” (obsession). We 
have the paradox of women-as-sexuality leading non-sexual lives. 
Their sexualities are every bit as consuming as men’s, yet it is men, 
consumed by their itch, who must pay for sex.
But Nin’s writings provide a more authentic depiction of sexuality. 
Not only do they make sense in terms of the mmd-body unity (men’s 
and women's bodies as tools) that I introduced in my paper (2001), 
but they capture the essence of that interface between the known and 
the unknown, between the fear and danger and the tension that lie at 
the core of primal sexuality. For example, in “The woman on the 
dunes”, Nin (1979) has the heroin of the story relate to her lover, an 
account of sex with an anonymous stranger during an execution:
Her eyes remained fixed on the man who was mounting the scaffold, and with 
each beat o f her heart the penis gained headway. It had traversed the skirt and 
parted the slit in her panties. How warm and firm and hard it was against her 
flesh. The condemned man stood on the scaffold now and the noose was put 
around his neck. The pain o f watching him was so great that it made this touch 
o f flesh a relief, a human, warm, consoling thing. It seemed to her then that 
this penis quivering between her buttocks was something wonderful to hold 
on to, life, life to hold while death was passing...
Without saving a word, the Russian bowed his head in the noose. Her 
body trembled. The penis advanced between the soft folds of her buttocks, 
pushed its way inexorably into her flesh.
She was palpitating with fear, and it was like the palpitation of desire. As 
the condemned man was flung into space and death, the penis gave a great 
leap inside o f her, gushing out its warm life.
The crowd crushed the man against her. She almost ceased breathing, and 
as her fear became pleasure, wild pleasure at feeling life while a man was 
dying, she fainted. (Nin 1979: 18-19)
In “A model”, Nin (1979) provides an abundance of insights. She 
eloquently explores that boundary between the sanctioned known and
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the forbidden unknown — and provides interesting perspectives on how 
intruding strangers can penetrate that boundary and into women’s lives.
But the overwhelming theme emerging from Nin’s writings is her 
belief that a woman can only obtain proper sexual fulfillment with a 
man who overpowers her. Accordingly, a woman might resist a man’s 
advances. She might even scream and hit out, in her efforts to escape. 
But Nin’s typical romantic adventure has the woman being over­
powered — and along the way, she discovers her secret that she 
actually enjoyed the experience.
A woman does not seek out experiences, because she does not 
have to. Rather, she has them happen to her, and in this way, she 
discovers what she desires. That is her role as sustainer of the known. 
A woman will not seek out to be violated, but in the right contexts, 
can actually enjoy it when it happens to her. Exploring the unknown 
(seeking out violation) is not her territory. To men who habituate 
working and competing for anything of value, this sounds un­
believably easy... and indeed, it is. But as discussed above, such 
freedoms are also chains, for the habit of being provided for is 
logically consistent with the habit of dependency. In a very real sense, 
it is because women have it so easy that they have it so hard. And in 
these contexts, we can begin to make inferences about women’s logic, 
to help us understand all the complexities of women’s behavior. We 
can now begin to understand the contexts in which a woman might 
secretly enjoy being raped.
Nin (1979) begins “Hilda and Rango”:
Hilda was a beautiful Parisian model who fell deeply in love with an 
American writer, whose work was so violent and sensual that it attracted 
women to him immediately. (Nin 1979: 101)
But her writer lover was not the virile stud his writings seemed to 
suggest:
They lived together for several years, deeply attached to each other. She 
became accustomed to his sexual rhythm. He lay back waiting and enjoying 
himself. She learned to be active, bold, but she suffered, because she was by 
nature extraordinarily feminine. Deep down she had the belief that woman 
could easily control her desire, but that man could not, that it was even 
harmful for him to try. She felt that woman was meant to respond to man’s 
desire. She had always dreamed o f having a man who would force her will, 
rule her sexually, lead. (Nin 1979: 102)
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Then one night at a party, Hilda met a Mexican painter (Rango), who 
was almost always drunk:
But the sight o f her gave him a profound shock. He pulled himself up from his 
faltering, tottering posture and faced her as if he were a big lion facing a 
tamer. Something about her made him stand still and try to become sober 
again, to rise from the fog and fumes in which he lived continuously. 
Something about her face made him stand ashamed o f his unkempt clothes, 
the paint under his nails, the uncombed black hair. She, on the other hand, was 
struck by this image o f a demon, the demon she had imagined to exist behind 
the work o f the American writer.
He was huge, restless, destructive and loved no one, was attached to 
nothing, a tramp and an adventurer. (Nin 1979: 102-103)
At one stage in her encounter with Rango, Hilda transgressed a sacred 
taboo by initiating sex but was harshly rebuffed with the charge that 
she “made the gesture of a whore”. Hilda regarded the passive, gentle, 
unmanly behavior of her previous, long-time lover (the writer) as the 
source of her problem:
A deep shame, a sense o f great injury overwhelmed her. The woman in her 
that had suffered from being forced to act as she did with other lover, the 
woman who had been made to betray her real [feminine] nature so often that it 
had become a habit, this woman wept now, uncontrollably [...] (Nin 1979: 
105)
and
She dropped exhausted on her bed and fell asleep weeping, not only for the 
loss o f Rango but for the loss o f that part of herself she had deformed, 
changed for the love o f a man. (Nin 1979: 105-106)
Hilda regarded her proactive, initiating nature as a perversion of her 
true, feminine form. She felt that Rango was withholding sex as a 
consequence. Writes Nin:
Had he understood that it was involuntary, not truly in her? (Nin 1979: 107)
Hilda had numerous encounters with Rango, but without having had 
their relationship consummated:
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Over and over again she lay passive, showing no desire, no impatience, which 
exacerbated her sensibilities. It was as if  she had taken new drugs that made 
the entire body more alive to caresses, to a touch, to the very air. She felt her 
dress on her skin like a hand. It seemed to her that everything was touching 
her like a hand, teasing her breasts, her thighs continuously. She had 
discovered a new realm, a realm o f  suspense and watchfulness, o f erotic 
wakefulness such as she had never known. (Nin 1979: 107-108)
And after Hilda rediscovered her true, feminine nature, she was 
rewarded:
One day when she was walking with him, she lost the heel o f  one shoe. He 
had to carry her. That night he took her, in the candlelight. He was like a 
demon crouching over her, his hair wild, his charcoal-black eyes burning into 
hers, his strong penis pounding into her, into the woman whose submission he 
first demanded, submission to his desire, his hour. (Nin 1979: 108)
In romance, the man is obliged to initiate, to lead and ultimately to 
take, with the woman following in submission. This is an expectation 
not only of men but also of women. In rape, the successful rapist 
takes. He demands submission and gets it. And if the contexts are 
right — that is, if the rapist is “sexy” (successful, confident) — there 
can be, for many a woman, perhaps no greater thrill.
In Hinz (1975: 45), Nin was asked the question, “Do you still 
believe that “to be violated is perhaps a need in woman, a secret erotic 
need,” as you wrote in Diary II?” Nin replied:
This may be part of the primitive programming o f woman, which psychology 
has analyzed in various ways: one, as a test o f the man’s strength; the other as 
a way of eluding the burden o f sexual guilt. If someone with a will stronger 
than hers “rapes” a woman, she is not responsible for the sexual act. These 
dreams may disappear when woman is freed o f guilt for her sexual desires. 
Hinz(1975: 45)
9.5. Feminine sexual perversion
Predictably, within the context of today’s pop psychology, Nin’s 
perspective is often interpreted as indicative of some sort of 
pathology. Her incestuous relationship with her father has often been 
sited as the source of her problems with sexuality. Conceivably, this 
relationship may have set her on the path that she had taken. But was
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the manner in which she adapted to her relationship with her father, 
“wrong ? That is to say, was hers an “incorrect”, “perverted” inter­
pretation of reality? Or was her interpretation, in fact, the essence of 
feminine sexuality precipitated by a dangerous unknown, as provided 
by the erratic, irresponsible behavior of her father?
Thus we come to a very important point about female sexuality. 
For women, it is “discovered”. Sex is an essentially passive activity 
that happens to them. At its core, at the very essence of female 
sexuality is the longing to be violated. Violation is an essential feature 
of the sex act, and provides the basis for intimacy in a loving 
relationship — there are many women who do not want to be violated 
by “just" anyone. And with all the implications that are possible with 
the longing to be violated, many women do not get to “discover” their 
sexuality. For all their sexual activity, many women can remain 
sexless and barren, consumed solely by the priority to be materially 
provided for.
Thus we can infer that Anai's Nin’s sexuality was not a perversion. 
That is to say, it was not a diversion away from femininity but rather, 
a primal expression of it. Her sexuality was an essential manifestation 
of the feminine longing to be violated. And while her writings reflect 
a sensuality and honesty that might be healthier than the sterile 
conformity of many of her more materialistic sisters, we should be 
mindful of the implications of being violated. For how does violation 
impact on a person’s psyche? How does female sexuality impact on 
cultural evolution? For does not sexual “freedom” imply the 
emergence of violators? Is there a healthier way in which female and 
male sexuality might be expressed, beyond the extremes provided by 
yesterday’s conservatism and today’s liberalism?
9.6. The relationship betw een promiscuity and criminality
We are now in a better position to consider what might be wrong with 
sexual “freedom”.
Women’s priority to sustain the known implies assuming rather than 
understanding. The simple truth is that women do not understand 
women. They are even less likely to understand men. Assuming bears 
no relationship to understanding. In fact, their failure to understand men 
provides the key to what they experience as an exciting fear of the
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dangerous, unpredictable unknown that belongs to men. Their failure to 
understand men is what can make the unknown so exciting to them 
(beyond the banal pretensions of modem liberalism). And it would 
seem to suggest a connection between promiscuity and the types of men 
that are chosen. The gender enjoying the culturally sanctioned privilege 
of being provided for is the gender least likely to understand the choices 
that are being made. For women, sexual freedom might be wonderful 
and empowering, but in terms of evolution, it is problematic because the 
choices they make will be confined to a particular spectrum of male 
stereotypes. Moreover, women learn what men are supposed to be like 
from the types of men to whom they give air time — which in the 
modem climate of liberal social values, happens to be the types of men 
that are more likely to intmde without sensitivity to cues. The type of 
man most likely to initiate, in the modem context of sexual “freedom”, 
is the type least likely to respect personal space. The type of man most 
likely to initiate is the type most likely to get in women’s faces and ipso 
facto, the law of averages suggests that he will be selected. Such a man 
will understand only the law that guarantees his success with women: 
No initiate, no sex.
Bad-boys get in women’s faces. In a sexually permissive society, 
women give them air-time. And so it is clear that, from the perspective 
of the numbers game, bad-boys will get lucky. “No initiate no pussy” 
is the simple, universal and natural law that states that if you’re not in 
it, you can’t win it. As Sanchez (aka Greg Entner of Bangbus Videos7 
fame) illuminates on his website, in his list of FAQs:
Q: How are you guys able to pick up girls off the street and fuck them?
A: Because we ask them.8
Sexual “freedom” invariably implies sexual randomness and the 
lowering of standards. It appeals to the fears of women (especially 
fear of solitude) and the baser instincts of men.
Weininger (1906) wrote on the implications of female promiscuity 
taken to its limits. He explored the connection between prostitution
1 am not going to promote their website —  I will, however, refer to it as a part 
of my analysis.
Irrespective of the extent to which “reality pom” is staged (choreographed), 
this dynamic is consistent with the reality of modem youth culture as suggested in 
Ariel Levy’s book, Female Chauvinist Pigs.
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and criminality (he used the word “prostitute” in a general sense, to 
identify women that are promiscuous or of “loose” morals). The 
following excerpt summarizes his perspective:
Very deep-seated differences are linked with what I have been describing. The 
mother-woman craves for respectability in the man, not because she grasps its 
value as an idea, but because it is the supporter o f the life of the world. She 
herself works, and is not idle like the prostitute; she is filled with care for the 
future, and so requires from the man a corresponding practical responsibility, 
and will not seduce him to pleasure. The prostitute, on the other hand, is most 
attracted by a careless, idle, dissipated man. A man that has lost self- restraint 
repels the mother-woman, is attractive to the prostitute. There are women who 
are dissatisfied with a son that is idle at school; there are others who 
encourage him. The diligent boy pleases the mother-woman, the idle and 
careless boy wins approval from the prostitute type. This distinction reaches 
high up amongst the respectable classes o f society, but a salient example of it 
is seen in the fact that the “bullies” loved by women o f the streets are usually 
criminals. The souteneur is always a criminal, a thief, a fraudulent person, or 
sometimes even a murderer.
I am almost on the point o f saying that, however little woman is to be 
regarded as immoral (she is only non-moral), prostitution stands in some deep 
relation with crime, whilst motherhood is equally bound with the opposite 
tendency. We must avoid regarding the prostitute as the female analogue of 
the criminal; women, as I have already pointed out, are not criminals; they are 
too low in the moral scale for that designation. None the less, there is a 
constant connection between the prostitute type and crime. The great 
courtesan is comparable with that great criminal, the conqueror, and readily 
enters into actual relations with him; the petty courtesan entertains the thief 
and the pickpocket. The mother type is in fact the guardian o f the life of the 
world, the prostitute type is its enemy. But just as the mother is in harmony, 
not with the soul but with the body, so the prostitute is no diabolic destroyer 
o f the idea, but only a corrupter o f empirical phenomena. Physical life and 
physical death, both o f which are in intimate connection with the sexual act, 
are displayed by the woman in her two capacities o f mother and prostitute. 
(Weiningerl906: 233-234)
Another way of interpreting this problem with sexual freedom is the 
relationship between innocence and power.
When a man feels the urge to violate, what is it that he wants to 
take?
Innocence.
When a woman longs to be violated, what is it that she longs to 
submit herself to?
Power.
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In a sexually permissive society, intruding initiators indulge them­
selves in the fantasy of innocence violated, and submitting exhibi­
tionists indulge themselves in the fantasy of power violating. A 
culture so predisposed entertains the false, exaggerated illusions of 
women as virtuous, sweet innocents and of men as immoral, brutish 
thugs. If taken to its logical conclusion, unrestrained permissiveness 
turns women into imbeciles and men into criminals. And in keeping 
with the dualistic nature of logic, women become harder, more cynical 
and bored, while men become softer, more docile and desperate. The 
dynamics between innocence and power — whether exaggerated or 
subdued, real or imagined, sanctioned or denied — lie at the heart of 
every sex act and for this reason, there is no such thing as trivial sex, 
no such thing as sex without consequence.
9.7. The perspectives of other established works
We have covered a lot of ground from a semiotic perspective. Before 
closing off our analysis, let us briefly examine how these ideas relate 
to the work of other more academically conventional writers, such as 
Seymour Fisher, William Masters & Virginia Johnson and Alfred 
Kinsey.
Fisher (1973: 53) suggests something of the mind-body unity (the 
relevance of the body-as-tool in shaping personality) when he refers to 
“body-image parameters”. He refers to a sizeable scientific literature 
(Fisher, Cleveland 1968; Fisher 1970; Shontz 1969) demonstrating 
that body attitudes do affect behaviour:
Clear evidence has accumulated that persons vary in the ways in 
which they integrate and interpret their body experiences and that, in 
turn, these adaptations affect their personality style.
Expressing these ideas in Academese in this way denies the reader the 
sort of clarity that would otherwise be made possible from a semiotic 
perspective. However, within the context of the fundamental semiotic 
principles that were introduced at the start of our paper, we can 
nonetheless confirm that we share common ground with Fisher’s 
analysis. Referring to writers such as Fried (1960) and Masters and 
Johnson (1966), Fisher notes the importance of the involvement of the
17
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whole body in sexual experience — for example, breathing perspira­
tion, vocalization, as well as changes in sensory acuity, throbbing of 
body parts, temperature changes, muscle tensions, etc. He observes 
that:
[ . . .]  A number o f writers converge in emphasizing that fear o f intrusive body 
penetration and o f losing body boundaries is a prime cause of disturbed 
response to sexual stimulation. They suggest, each with his own phraseology, 
that a woman’s conviction that her body is too “open”, insufficiently 
protected, and incapable o f resisting invasion can make her interpret sexual 
sensory experiences, with their accompanying expectations o f being entered 
by the penis, as destructive.... It is the threat to the fundamental boundary that 
is confronted in sexual interaction that is said to be so disturbing to many 
women. (Fisher 1973: 53)
In other words, fear plays some important, inextricable part in 
Woman’s experience of sexuality.
Fisher (1973) discusses the notion that the excitement that builds 
up during sexual arousal is often associated with a woman’s sense that 
she is losing control. From our semiotic perspective, this continues to 
fit with Woman’s logical world. The sustainer of the known, 
consolidating her known world “in here”, is likely to fear the loss of 
control that is implied in submission and abandonment. And indeed, 
Fisher does make the connection between fear and loss of control, 
citing psychoanalytic observers who have reported from their patients 
that fear of loss of control and madness is associated with orgiastic 
arousal. Fisher observes:
Although the foreboding implications o f “losing control” have been pointed to 
by some, others (for example, Fried 1960) consider that the sensation of 
potential loss o f control is for many women a piquant enrichment of the 
sexual arousal experience. It is the opening o f self to a sense of undisciplined 
excitement that presumably makes sexual interaction especially enjoyable. 
Paradoxically, some (Feldman 1951) even suggest that fear which is set off by 
sexual arousal may itself further energize, rather than inhibit, the arousal 
process. A variety o f examples are cited by Feldman o f instances in which 
orgasm seemed to be produced by fear and anticipation o f danger. It is 
explicitly assumed that fear can be “sexually exciting”. (Fisher 1973: 59)
Fisher includes excerpts from interviews he’s had with women on 
their descriptions of their experiences of sexual arousal (Fisher 1973: 
203-209). As we read through these excerpts, we might be reminded
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of Otto Weininger’s thesis that Woman is sexuality (contrasting with 
Weininger’s notion that Man’s sexuality is functionally separate to his 
identity). On the sorts of fantasies that women had during intercourse, 
Fisher reported that more than 75 percent of the women indicated that 
they had at least one fantasy or image that recurred occasionally (but 
not infrequently). O f these, “about 40 percent involved scenes in 
which the woman was having a sexual contact or interchange with 
someone other than her husband”. And of these, “more than half of the 
instances revolved about themes in which the woman perceived 
herself as being raped, sexually humiliated, or somehow sexually 
wicked”. These included fantasies relating to bondage, brutal rape and 
humiliation, with masochistic and exhibitionistic elements strongly 
represented. Thus we observe, as a rough, back-of-hand guesstimate, 
that at least about 15% of Fisher’s respondents admitted to having 
fantasies of rape, humiliation and violation.
Let’s follow this through in another part of the book (Fisher 1973: 
89), where Fisher refers to a study by Barclay and Harber (1965). 
Here, a male experimenter frustrated and angered male and female 
subjects, and then analyzed their reactions to test for the role of anger 
in sexual imagery. It was found that the experimentally induced anger 
resulted in increased sexual imagery for males and females. Impor­
tantly, as Barclay and Harber (1965) observe, “Women responded to 
aggressive arousal by a male with an increase in sexual imagery, not a 
reduction of it [...]. Thus, from the female’s point of view, aggression 
is an important aspect of a male’s sexual appeal”.
The researchers were able to detect that anger increased the sexual 
imagery in both men and women. However, were the researchers able 
to discern the content of their respective imageries? From the genetic- 
determinist perspective, we might expect that the reactions of men and 
women were “equivalent” in logic and content. However, from a 
semiotic perspective, we would expect the male and female reactions 
to be complementary. That is, both sexes will react with an increase in 
sexual imagery, but women will do so with a feminine logic (for 
example, from the perspective of being desired or being violated) that 
bears no resemblance to the men’s (desiring/violating).
Elaborating on the implications of anger in arousing women 
sexually, Fisher refers to further studies exploring a variety of themes 
(e.g., death material was said by female subjects to be sexually 
stimulating). He infers that “a rather esoteric range of stimuli has
psychosexual meaning to women”. In at least two studies, Fisher 
notes, “an extreme group of women has been found to be more 
sexually aroused by ‘psychosexual’ stimuli than any of the male
subjects”.
Fisher (1973: 393-394) raises an extremely important point with 
respect to the work of Kinsey et al. (1953) and Masters and Johnson 
(1966), who limit their analyses to women’s experiences of orgasm. 
Fisher alludes to the need to address female sexuality from a more 
contextual perspective that embraces the entire experience of sex. It is 
understandable that writers grounded in what amounts to a Male 
Psychology, will tend to write about female sexuality from a male 
perspective that attributes greatest meaning to the build-up and release 
in orgasm. If many of Fisher's subjects recount experiencing orgasm, 
what do they really mean? Can a self-reported orgasm by a woman 
resemble in any way a man’s orgasm? Does it make sense at all to 
discuss female sexuality in these terms? Is it more true to say that 
gender roles exist because o f the fundamental subjectivity of existence 
that can never breach the confines of the mind-body unity? That is, are 
male and female experiences destined to remain forever unfathomable 
from the perspective of the opposite sex?
How do those of us who do not inhabit female bodies plumb these 
inner depths of women's sexual experiences? If Weininger is correct 
in his view that WToman is sexuality, is this also what we might infer 
from Fisher's observation of the breadth of stimuli to which women 
attribute psychosexual meaning?
10.0. Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we have provided a theoretical basis for 
understanding the differences in the psychologies of men and women:
(1) We have applied Peirce's Great “Law of Association of Habits’ to 
understand that gender roles are habitual and associative — and 
thus, inextricably related to choice. Men and women make 
choices from their ecologies (cultures) and in their complicity, 
choose the gender roles they habituate. These gender-specific 
habits become the cultural norms that are the expectations of how 
we should be;
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(2) From Heidegger’s Dasein, we know that men and women “like” 
the roles to which they have been assigned, and we need no 
further proof than their complicity. Dasein — the desire to be — 
ensures every person’s complicity and thus, their culture’s 
survival across the generations;
(3) Men and women inhabit different logical realms (the known 
versus the unknown) that can be best understood by regarding 
men’s and women’s bodies as tools, designed specifically to deal 
with their specialized realms.
With this theoretical foundation, we have been able to infer how the 
opposite sex experiences their worlds. But the implications are far 
wider than this humble conclusion would seem to suggest. To begin 
with, we are applying Peirce’s general theories of cognition (for 
example, in the field of biosemiotics), that might be more broadly 
extended beyond the opposite sex, to infer how other organisms might 
interpret their worlds. And in doing so, we are opening up a Pandora’s 
box of interpretations. Where Copernicus showed us that our planet 
was not the center of the universe, semiotics would show us that the 
human condition is not that special, sanctified, purified and homo­
genized center of existence that we have deluded ourselves into 
believing. We are going to have to climb down from our pedestals, for 
we are truly one with the beasts.
Indeed, if we were to probe deeper, we might find that the whole 
basis upon which we judge character and human worth is more than 
suspect. For if one half of the population is judged in terms of courage 
and the other half in terms of the opposite to courage (which is 
innocence), does this not throw into disrepute everything that we have 
come to know about the human condition? For how has it come to 
pass, that a man with a woman’s personality should be deemed a loser, 
and a woman with a man’s personality should be deemed repulsive? 
Can’t we just as easily deem all men to be repulsive, for without 
women, would not the vast majority of men have dubious toilet 
manners, and be without any motive for politeness and diplomacy? 
And can’t we just as easily deem all women to be losers, for without 
men, would not the vast majority of women be scavenging from bins 
and sleeping on pavements in dark alley-ways? Whilst the vast 
majority of destitutes are men, the vast majority of women are exempt 
from this status only because it is culturally sanctioned that they be
provided for — a woman need only marry a politician, lawyer or 
doctor to be afforded the same high social status as that of her partner. 
Yet, a man with the same character traits as a kept woman would be 
treated only with contempt.
In our semiotic exploration of the psychological differences 
between men and women, what should become clear is the subjective 
nature of existence. Our bodies provide the interface between our 
thoughts and the outside world, and there is no way of circumventing 
this subjectivity — as surely as there is no way of circumventing the 
physical laws of motion or the law of conservation of energy. We 
remain trapped in our bodies. Inasmuch as this article represents about 
as good a job as can possibly be done in inferring how women 
experience their worlds, there remains that chasm that can never be 
crossed. Human men and women must remain forever logically 
distinct, as a fundamental law of reality. I must become Woman, 
completely and absolutely, in order to truly understand her innermost 
thoughts. I must forget all my prior experiences and I must forget that 
I ever was a man, in order to truly understand the feminine condition, 
in all its subjectivity and vulnerability. And in this, I will lose forever, 
the ability to achieve what I have done in this article.
We remain aliens to each other’s worlds, but forever united in our 
subjectivity and the law of association of habits. And in understanding 
this much, perhaps we might feel a closer bond of understanding with 
an alien, should we ever chance upon a visitation from outer space.
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Семиотика сексуальности: 
выбор становится привычкой, желанием, потребностью
Прагматизм означает, что мы придаем значение тем вещам, которые для 
нас существенны. Самым существенным является все, что связано с 
нашим телом: глаза, уши, нос, руки-ноги, кожа, — вплоть до наших 
половых различий. Наши тела — эта средства, которые соединяют нас с 
миром, с пространством культуры. Половые различия позволяют 
бросить взгляд на то, как тело вбирает в себя опыт, создает свою “иден­
тичность” и приобретает гендерные роли культуры. В своей ранней 
работе я рассматривал привычки и ассоциативное обучение (именно их 
Пирс считает фундаментальными свойствами познания) в контексте 
Dasein Хайдеггера. В настоящей работе я развиваю эти идеи с целью их 
применения в понимании гендерных ролей. Из неразрывной связи 
между привычкой, ассоциативным обучением и Dasein мы можем 
вывести, что 1) гендерные роли являются привычкой, 2) гендерные роли 
являются выбором, 3) женщинам и мужчинам нравятся те роли, на 
которые они определены (это фундаментальное проявление Dasein). Та­
ким образом, выбор становится привычкой, затем желанием и наконец 
потребностью. Так возникают потребности, по которым идентифици­
руют гендерные роли.
Soolisuse semiootika:
Valikust saab harjumusseos, saab soov, saab vajadus
Pragmatism on vaade, mille kohaselt me omistame tähendusi neile asja­
dele, mis on meile olulised. Kõige olulisemad on asjad, mis on suletud me 
kehasse — silmad, kõrvad, nina, käed, jalad, nahk — kuni me sooise- 
äradeni. Me kehad on vahendid mis ühendavad meid maailmaga — 
kultuuriilmaga. Sooiseärad võimaldavad heita pilku, kuidas keha vastab 
kogemusele, isiksusele ja lõpuks kultuuri soorollidele. Oma varasemas 
töös uurisin harjumusi ja assotsiatiivset õppimist (neid peab Peirce 
tunnetuse fundamentaalsetes omadusteks), Heideggeri ‘olemasolemise’ 
kontekstis. Käesolevas töös arendan ja rakendan seda vaadet soorollidele. 
Lahutamatust seosest haijumuste, assotsiatiivse õppimise ja olemas- 
olemise vahel saame tuletada, et (1) soorollid on haijumused; (2) soo­
rollid on valitud; (3) meestele ja naistele “meeldivad” need rollid millesse 
nad on määratud (see on olemasolemise fundamentaalne avaldumine). 
Seega — valikust saab harjumuste seos, saab soov, saab vajadus. Nii 
tekivad vajadused, mille järgi soorolle identifitseeritakse.
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Abstract. Visual culture can be considered from semiotic point o f view as a 
system of visual codes. Several o f them have natural routs. So the perceptual 
code is formed already on biological level mediating translation o f sensory 
data into perceptual images o f the spatial world. The means o f natural per­
ceptual code are transformed in culture, where they are involved in communi­
cation by depictions. The depiction on the flat performs the function o f a 
“perceptogram'’, which, on one hand, is an external record o f an internal 
perceptual image or an idea, and, on the other hand, serves as a program for a 
spectator’s visual perception. The means of this “perceptography” form an 
artificial code, which is, on the contrary to the perceptual code, communica­
tive, deliberately used and transformed in various ways at different periods o f  
time in diverse kinds o f practical and artistic activity. Not all perceptograms 
become pieces of art, but all history o f pictorial arts can be considered as a 
process of development and mastering with the different versions o f this 
perceptographic code. The changes o f this code in visual culture are connected 
with the intrinsic development o f “vision forms” as well with invention of  
external means of communication.
1. Visual culture and perceptual code
Human, unlike other animals, can not only receive optical data, but 
also deliberately produce them, creating depictions. The ability to pro­
duce and reproduce depictions is conditioned, besides natural system 
of eyesight, by culturally elaborated skills, and it depends on both
1 This paper is based on the report presented at VIII Congress of IASS in Lyon, 
France (2004). Its draft has been published in Amsterdam International Electronic 
Journal for Cultural Narratology (http://cf.hum.uva.nl/narratology/tchertov.htm). 
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external technical means known in definite culture and internal ways 
of operating visual images. There is a connection between technical 
and psychical means of treating optical data, in particular, some 
internal “forms of vision” depend on external “forms of commu­
nication” of visual messages, which are at disposal of interacting 
subjects.
A system of technical and mental means, worked out historically 
for creating, transmission and receiving of optical information and 
cultivated by an individual or a collective, can be defined as visual 
culture of these subjects. Like any other culture, the visual one can be 
considered from semiotic point of view — as a system of both parti­
cular visual codes intended mostly for spatial channel of information 
connection, and optically presented texts, created and interpreted by 
these codes.
The visual codes include sign and signal systems with diverse 
psychological and semiotic mechanisms and to different extent depend 
on natural and cultural factors. The visual culture not only develops a 
number of artificially created sign systems, but also transforms several 
codes, which have natural routes and are formed on biological level as 
means of adaptation to the changes of surroundings.
It is possible to consider the perceptual code as one of these 
natural index-signal systems, regulating translation of optical data 
from visual field into a perceptive image of things unfolding in visible 
world (using the terms suggested in Gibson 1950: Ch. III). By means 
of this code, a mosaic of light and dark spots, which is formed on the 
sensory level, transforms on the perceptual level into stereometric 
picture of spatial situation.
These two levels of vision differ from each other by their structural 
qualities. The structure of visual field is correlated with the body 
scheme by relations “left-right”, “high-low”, “centre-periphery”, etc. 
These relations form a stabile “framework” of visual field — in 
contrast to its unstable “filling” with changeable configurations of 
light and colour spots. Unlike this sensory level, the level of “visible 
world” contains the perceptive images of spatial forms, presented as 
opposed to the body of the seeing subject and separated from each 
other by “empty” inter-objective space. These images have a quality 
of constancy — being independent of unimportant variations of 
distance, visual angle, lighting, colour tints and other features of the
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perceived object, which remains an invariant of variable conditions of 
seeing and “filling” of visual field.
Both sensory and perceptual (in the narrow sense) levels of vision 
are not reflected in common perception. The last is the perception in 
the broad sense, which includes as an obligatory component one more 
level of vision, connected with recognition of objects of the visible 
world as representatives of some class or cognitive category (as it is 
treated, for example in Bmner 1973: 7ff.). These categories are 
invariants already in relation to variations of object forms and their 
perceptive images, which can be identified with the same visual 
scheme. On this “apperceptual” level of vision these objects are 
identified by a subject as something or somebody meaningful —  as a 
useful tool, as a civil servant, etc.
The perception of the “pure world of volumetric forms” and even 
more the reception of the “pure world of light and colour spots” are 
abstractions from the “world of meaningful objects”. They are not 
typical for everyday vision and need a skill of “analytical intro­
spection”, getting by special education and being always incomplete. 
In the “natural” process of seeing transits from sensory to the per­
ceptual and then — to the apperceptual levels of vision occur un­
consciously and are the parts of the whole cognitive action. But in 
theoretical analysis these levels must be distinguished, — as well as 
the visual codes serving for the translation and transformation of 
optical data between them. There are, particularly, the codes o f  
recognition, which mediate the processes of visual categorization of 
recognizable things and as semiotic systems are very different from 
the perceptual code.
Unlike them the perceptual code mediates the transit from the field 
of light and colour spots grasped on sensory level to the world of 
volumetric forms and their spatial relations developing in a perceptive 
image of visible space. In its system the difference between these two 
levels of vision reveals as the difference between the plane o f ex­
pression and the plane o f contents’, the first is formed by relations 
between the parts of visual field with different light and colour 
qualities, and the second is constructed as a result of their unconscious 
interpretation on perceptual level as images of some external objects.
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2. Perceptography as a communicative version 
of the perceptual code
This naturally formed perceptual code is converted by human activity 
in its cultural versions, which can mediate not only the subject-object 
information connections but also inter-subject communication as well. 
Cultural modifications of the perceptual code give the possibility of 
creating and perceiving depictions as such artificial means of objects 
representation and communication between subjects, which stimulate 
visual perception of things absent in front of the spectator. The 
elements and structures of natural perceptual code are transformed in 
creating of depictions as communicative means. They are reflected 
and exteriorized, taken out and replaced by some visible substitutes. 
Psychical means of seeing are substituted by some physical elements, 
which are visible themselves. These visible spots and lines are created 
as if they were a projection on a plane of heterogeneous structure of 
colour feelings formed (or as if they were formed) in a visual field of a 
painter. Unlike volumetric sculpture, painted surface does not directly 
fix a constant perceptive image of objects independent of the point of 
view, the lightness, etc., but definite conditions of their appearance 
and a particular spots configuration in visual field. In a similar way 
the constant “regular field” forming as a rule a rectangular frame of 
depiction (see Schapiro 1994) becomes a “projection” of this visual 
field itself with its stable structure of relations “top-bottom”, “left- 
right”, “centre-periphery”, etc. (cf. an idea of “organs projection”, 
enveloped in Kapp 1877).
The “picture plane” is interpreted usually not as this projection of 
internal visual feelings from subject’s mind onto an external surface, 
but as the projection of depicted spatial objects onto a plane (see, in 
particular Sedgwick 1980: 38-40). However, these objects can be 
received only because the flat of depiction serves as artificially created 
optical stimulus of their perception, and reproduces rather their “form 
of expression” on subject, than a “form of being” (according to 
Hildebrand's distinction of “Ausdrucksform" and “Daseinsform’ — 
see Hildebrand 1988: 133,212).
A picture is treated at least since the Renaissance Age (by Alberti, 
Leonardo, etc.) as a “transparent surface”, — not as a wall or a board, 
but as a window, which is looked through, and even lat. perspectiva 
was translated by Dürer as “seeing through” (“Durchsehen”) — (see
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Panofsky 1998: 664, 716-717). In a perspective depiction configu­
ration of spots and lines on a pictorial surface functions not as a 
“distant”, but as a “proximal” stimulus. They perform the function of 
sensory data that are not independent elements of the depicted picture, 
like colour feelings in visual field usually are not independent objects 
drawing attention. Both of them are something looked through in the 
acts of perception of the depicted world, but not something looked at. 
If the look is directed not through but at the pictorial surface itself, the 
picture “returns” in a row of other things coexisting with it in common 
space. Thereby, the picture can be perceived both - as a single object 
of perception and as a means of perception of something else. 
Therefore the picture on the flat surface is a “paradoxical” object with 
“double space”: it can be perceived, but can show something other 
instead of itself; it exists in the real space, but can open for sight 
another space filled with objects, which are absent in reality in front of 
the spectator (cf. Gibson 1979: Ch. 15; Gregory 1970: Ch. 2; Hart­
mann 1953: 98-99). These two spaces are со-related, correspondingly, 
as plane of expression and plane of contents in the sign constructions, 
and they are connected with each other even more, then two sides of a 
paper sheet, from famous comparison of bilateral signs suggested by 
F. de Saussure: they belong to one the same side only in different wais 
perceived.
From semiotic point of view a configuration of spots and lines 
stimulating perception of absent objects can be considered not as a 
single sign, but as a set of “sense-distinctive” relations forming to­
gether a visual-spatial text of particular kind. The word text originates 
from lat. textus as well as the word textile that allows to see its 
relationship to texture of a woven Gobelin and even of a painted 
canvas. However, neither natural texture nor created strokes them­
selves form the visual text of such type, but the relations of lines and 
colours, which are connected functionally with the processes of 
picture perception. Such visual-spatial text functions as a “percepto- 
gram”, which, on one hand is an external record of perception or 
“internal drawing” formed in artist’s mind, and on the other hand, is a 
program guiding the visual perception of a beholder. Correspondingly, 
it acts expressively regarding to the creator and impressively in 
relation to the spectator, and only by this condition it performs also a 
representative function relating perceptive image each of them to an
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external referent (cf. “Organon Modell” of semiotic functions 
suggested in Biihler 1934: 28).
As a spatial text of a particular type, the perceptogram has a space, 
which is “divided” into both the depicting and depicted ones. They 
form in the perceptographic text, correspondingly, the “plane of 
expression” constructed by a surface covered with some colour or 
black-and-white spots, and the “plane of contents”, where they are 
interpreted as a space of depicted objects. This double space of the 
picture supposes its double vision by “reading” as a text: its plane of 
expression is accepted on the sensory level of the “visual field”, 
whereas the plane of contents is built on the perceptual level of the 
“visible world”. So the developing of the plane of contents not on 
conceptual, but on the perceptual level is the other main peculiarity of 
perceptographic text.
Like any other text, the perceptogram can be replicated as far as its 
semiotic means are reproducible. These means are heterogeneous and 
belong to different types. There are certainly some structures in the 
pictures, which reveal an iconicity regarding to represented objects — 
rather the iconicity of their quantitative relations (proportionality of 
linear sets, colour relationships, etc.), than of their “qualities” fixed by 
words (a “green” grass can be painted without a green paint only by 
precisely selected set of colour relations —  as, especially, Camille 
Corot and Impressionists have shown). However, the painted surface 
as well as its meaningful parts cannot be reduced to “iconic signs” of 
depicted objects and often have few common with them in physical or 
geometrical qualities. Qualification of a picture as an “iconic sign” is 
based, as a rule, on the recognition of the depicted objects and on the 
establishing of their common features. In this case an iconicity of the 
picture can be not more, than that of the visual scheme used for the 
categorization of recognizable objects. Peircean concept of iconic sign 
allows to consider depictions as the means of representation and 
communication and thereby fix their semiotic functions. But it is not 
enough for distinction of various ways of depictions and their 
structural differentiation. If, for example, diverse photos, pictures, 
sculptures or roentgenograms of the same statesman are in equal way 
his “iconic signs”, this concept does not give much to differentiation 
of these types of depictions and to explanation of their influence the 
beholder. Moreover, application of this concept does not explain some 
specific features of graphic (creating on a flat) depictions. The
picture treated in the broad sense, as a surface, which is covered 
with some spots and which shows something other except itself (cf. 
Gibson 1979. Ch. 15, Gibson 1980: xi), — cannot in principle be 
limited with such “iconic signs”. Indeed, according to definition, the 
last represents their denotatum due to similarity or likeness with it, 
whereas the flat depiction, on the contrary, must be unlike the depicted 
volumetric object in order to look like it. Particularly, the rules of 
linear perspective prescribe deviation from geometric identity 
(congruence) between configuration of lines on the depicting plane 
and the depicted form of its spatial original. These rules demand, for 
example, to depict parallel lines as converged in a point, square —  as 
an irregular quadrangle, circle — as an oval, etc. Influence of 
depictions on subject’s perception becomes in these cases more 
important than their identity with a depicted object. The approach to 
the depiction as to an iconic sign does not clear these “deformations”, 
because they belong to semiotic means of other types. In regard to 
represented object these means are indexes, which differ from it, but 
allow subject, who “reads” them as a visual text, to grasp its form and 
spatial situation, whereas regarding to this subject they are signals 
stimulating, more or less forced, defined perceptive actions — 
construction in his mind a perceptive image of the depicted world. 
Thereby the perceptogram allows to represent something as if it would 
be presented to a subject, and it is possible due to the ability to create 
optical conditions of its perception, and to stimulate appearance of its 
spatial image in the mind of subject, rather than by similarity to 
something depicted.
Despite the index-signal means of such perceptography are 
derivative from perceptual code, they can be distinguished as an auto­
nomous group and considered as a special perceptographic code. As 
an external artificial modification of the perceptual code it mediates 
not intra-subjective processes of cognition, but inter-subjective 
processes of communication. Its semiotic means differ from the means 
of the naturally formed and unconsciously used perceptual code, 
because they are selected as results of reflection of some sensory 
structures in processes of inter-subjective communication by depic­
tions, and then transmitted in a cultural tradition.
For communication by means of depictions some features of 
individual images have to be translated into external means under­
standable for other subjects. Although lines and spots painted on the
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flat surface are based on the structure of the naturally formed sensory 
pattern, their selection is connected with culturally accepted norms 
and ways of depiction. These norms can prescribe to use, for example, 
definite “alphabet” of colours and several geometrical figures or more 
complex schemes as means of visual analysis.
This is the reason of such great difference between the ability of 
seeing a depicted in a depiction, and the reversal ability to translate 
percept into a depiction on a plane. The former can be based on 
natural system of perceptual code and is available in early childhood, 
whereas the skill of graphic depiction needs mastering of worked out 
culturally means of perceptography, and it requires long years of 
learning. It is an education rather of the eye and the mind than of the 
hand — the development of an ability to analyse visible form and 
select some linear and colour relations, which direct the formation of 
definite perceptive image. In other words learning to draw and getting 
a skill to create depictions is mastering index-signal means of 
perceptography.
The difference of this mastering between the creator and spectator 
does not mean that the last preserves a vision independent on any 
cultural influence. All people obtain in culture some ways of vision 
and interpretation, but these ways can be determinate by practical 
purposes and not connected with the depicting activity. However the 
qualified perception of depictions, created by different means of 
perceptography, demands to develop an ability to “read” them on the 
“visual language” used for their creation. But even without mastering 
the perceptographic code the spectator can as a rule see something 
depicted on a figurative picture using only “natural” perceptual code 
and the codes of recognition, whereas the creator of the depiction 
cannot in principle do without any means of perceptography.
Unlike naturally appeared perceptual code, the semiotic system of 
perceptographic code depends on definite visual culture much more. 
The means of perceptography are elaborated in different historical 
periods, different kinds of art or in various forms of everyday life, and 
they are coordinated with diverse cultural norms and ways of vision. 
Thereby diverse cultural versions of perceptographic code appear: in 
one case the role of main representative means is performed by linear 
contours, in other cases — by colour spots, etc. It is notable, that 
Heinrich Wolfflin, introducing the distinction between linear and 
painting “forms of vision” or “forms of representation”
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(“Anschauungsformen” or “Darstellungsformen”), spoke about them 
as about different languages” affording to express everything by their 
own means (see Wölfflin 1956: 22). Each of these “forms of vision” 
can be considered semiotically as a special way of creating and 
“reading” of visual image determined by the visual culture, 
particularly — as a special set of perceptographic means, used in this 
culture for constructing perceptive images of depicted objects.
At the same time dependence of these perceptographic means on 
culturally determined choice does not turn them into the fully con­
ventional signs (as it was supposed by Goodman 1968). This turning 
occurs only if the conventional interpretation fully displaces the 
perceptual one, as it is performed, for example, in ideographic or 
phonetic writing. But in case of perceptography its means preserve 
some iconic features and are motivated by possibilities of the natural 
perceptual code. The visual culture only picks out within its frame­
work some favorable elements and structures and develops by creators 
and spectators an ability to be limited by these means for building the 
perceptive image of the depicted object.
3. Specific features of perceptographic code
As a semiotic system the perceptographic code has specific features, 
which reveal themselves especially in comparison with the verbal 
language system. So, the syntax of perceptograms has the essential 
structural differences from sign constructions, like verbal texts. If the 
last ones are built as linearly ordered chains of discrete signs in 
irreversible succession, in case of perceptography the meaningful 
space cannot in principle be limited by the one-dimensional order of 
elements, and is always two-dimensional. Unlike the space of written 
text, the space of a perceptogram is reversible, because supposes in 
different dimensions both “direct” and “return” movements of the 
“reading” look. This space is often also continual as far as it does not 
demand abrupt jumps between meaningful or sense-distinctive 
units — in contrast to even continually written letters, which presume 
separation from each other. Like discreteness of writing, the con­
tinually of the perceptographic text is rather a characteristic of se­
miotic “form” than of “substance” of its expression plane, because the 
qualities of physical bearers in both cases are of no importance.
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If the discreteness of successive units in verbal language reveals 
itself in the “principle of alphabet”, the continual flowing of sense- 
distinctive shades of colours or tones corresponds to another principle, 
which can be called a “principle of palette”. Like the palette gives the 
field for mixing of a number of ready paints, the perceptographic code 
as a system of optical means gives a possibility to exceed the limits of 
several standard units but to use the whole three-dimensional and 
continual “space of colours” with the fluent transits between different 
nuances of the spectrum as well as between their more or less dark and 
more or less pure shades. The “principle of palette” is valid also for 
lineal configurations, which can continually vary in two-dimensional 
depicting space, preserving the representative function in each of its 
fragments.
These syntactic features are connected with the specific semantics 
of the perceptographic code. As it was already mentioned, its plane of 
contents develops on the perceptual level, which permits to construct 
an image of the three-dimensional and continual space; this continuity 
of the depicted space motivates the same quality of the depicting 
plane. The relations between the plane of expression and the plane of 
contents in the perceptographic code differ from semantic relations in 
verbal language and similar systems of conventional signs by their 
non-significative way of representation. Instead of signs “vocabulary” 
with fixed meanings this code disposes a set of linear and colour 
indexes of different types, which meaning is not fixed without any 
context, but is obtained in the system of relations with other indexes. 
So, a configuration of drawn lines forms a net of connections, which 
does not signify directly “what’ is depicted, but shows “where’' the 
borders of the depicted figures, their coverings and intersections, etc. 
are situated, and only the resulting shape can be recognized. In a 
similar way a pattern of colour spots painted on a flat, arranges a 
system of contrasts and nuances between dark and light, bright and 
dim, etc. These relations form a set of indexes of the depicted world 
and of signals directing movements of the look in perceptive acts.
Comparing such structure of perceptographic code with organi­
zation of linguistic systems, it is possible to say, that perceptography 
has some features not of “lexical”, but of “grammatical” type of 
languages, as they were distinguished by F. de Saussure (see Saussure 
1972: 183). In the languages of grammatical type the motivated rules 
of constructing prevail over a set of conventional signs. The same
regards to the perceptographic code, where, for example, the linear 
perspective serves as a system of grammatical rules regulating 
construction of linear relations, but not as a set of lines and outlines 
with a “ready” meaning, — as well as a set of relations between 
colour spots in the system of lights and shadows is more important for 
creating of a perceptive image of the depicted situation, than any of 
these spots separated from each other. (Structural point of view, 
according to which the whole system of representative means is more 
important, than single elements, is valid equally for pictorial repre­
sentation — as it has been shown theoretically by Gestalt psycho­
logists, and as always was known on the empirical level for artists).
There are also specific pragmatic features of perceptographic code, 
which are connected, first of all, with its intention to activate the 
perceptual level of viewing subject. The perceptography allows to 
show objects instead of describing them. In contrast to verbal texts, 
where the plane of contents is developed only on the levels of notions 
and conceptions, the “mental address” of perceptographic text is just 
the perceptual level, treated even in narrower sense, —  as an ability to 
construct images of presented forms without identifying and re­
cognizing them (cf. Rock 1985: 105). “Reading” the perceptographic 
texts supposes interpreter to have different abilities, than for reading 
the verbal texts — not an ability of pure imagination, but a capacity to 
construct a perceptive image in the “plane of contents” of lines and 
colour spots functioning as the “plane of expression”. Due to this 
ability a spectator can see “behind” the painted plane a space of the 
depicted world. For him the depicted space of the perceptogram can 
be more or less “transparent”. A degree of this “transparency” depends 
on many pragmatic factors — on a purpose of depiction, on the 
individual skills of the beholder, on the cultural tradition to use some 
definite means of perceptography, etc.
The perceptographic code differs not only from linguistic systems 
but also from other visual-spatial codes, which control the translation 
of optical information to other mental levels. Particularly, it differs 
from codes of recognition, which regulate acts of categorization of 
perceived objects, for instance, — from the object-functional code 
regulating interpretation of a visible spatial form as a thing with a 
definite instrumental function (as a hammer, as a pencil, etc.) or from 
the proxemic code permitting to categorize spatial relations between 
some people as “close” or “far”, “intimate” or “official”, etc. The
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codes of this type have features different than perceptual and per­
ceptographic ones do, and due to their structure they are closer to 
linguistic sign systems. In particular, unlike the perceptographic code, 
they have a sort of vocabulary — a set of stabile units (visual 
schemes) used as samples of recognizable forms with invariable 
meaning, and thereby they are the systems rather of “lexical” than 
“grammatical” type in the above mentioned sense.
Usage of the perceptographic code provides as a rule conditions for 
recognition of the depicted objects, as well as — for application of 
other visual-spatial codes. However the perceptographic code and the 
codes of recognition are relatively independent from each other. 
Although the categorization of the visible form can influence the 
perceptive image, the act of perception (in the narrow sense) is not 
identical to recognizing of a familiar object and does not need it. The 
means of perceptography make possible to depict any spatial form 
independent of its existence, as well as independent of is it 
recognizable or not. Moreover, even this recognizing does not add any 
visual details, which can be seen only in the developed perceptive 
image. On the other hand, as this recognizing is based on the invariant 
of many of such images, it does not require the development of any of 
them: the visual categorization of a spatial image is possible even if it 
is reduced to a simple scheme. For example, a laconic pictogram can 
be quite a recognizable depiction without forming a detailed picture of 
object, and at the same time without turning into fully arbitrary sign. 
So, the pictogram can be considered as a perceptogram, reduced to a 
minimum set of object’s indexes, permitting to use the code of 
recognition (in contrast to an ideogram, which needs to use this code 
only for recognizing of itself as a presented sign, but not of any 
represented object). Something similar one can see also in case of 
caricature concentrating several recognizable features of person's 
image without creating a naturalistic portrait.
4. Perceptography as art
It is not surprising, that various versions of the perceptographic code 
develop to the greatest extent in art sphere. Although this code 
belongs also to other spheres of culture as well, the visual arts involve 
it in the systems of their expressive and representational means,
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transforming them according to historically changeable norms of its 
different kinds.
The art at all can be considered as a product of a skilful work with 
means of some verbal or non-verbal codes, which are used outside of 
the art sphere too. These codes are not created, but arranged and 
rearranged in art, which becomes a “laboratory”, where the semiotic 
systems transform and develop most intensively. Diverse kinds of art 
distinguish between each other with those semiotic systems, which 
they cultivate, and with the artistic tasks which they put.
In particular, a mastering of different possibilities of percepto­
graphic code is a basis of development of figurative painting and 
drawing. However, like not all of the said belong to art of word and 
not all written texts are works of calligraphy, not all of the artificially 
created depictions are pieces of perceptography as an art. A visual text 
worked out by means of the perceptographic code gets the quality of 
art of depiction only if these means and skill of their usage become a 
subject for special artistic evaluation and satisfies the criteria worked 
out in an artistic culture.
The art o f depiction is not identical to figurative art in general, 
which uses diverse visual codes. Different kinds of figurative arts — 
painting, drawing or relief — can be considered as arts of depiction as 
far as they are just the skilful usage and development of various 
modifications of the perceptographic code. Each of these arts develops 
its own versions of perceptography for creating the artificial stimuli of 
perception of objects which are not presented actually. So the painting 
elaborates a complex of index means for representation of a deep 
space as, for example, “chiaroscuro” or “aerial perspective”. An art of 
relief uses some perceptographic indices, especially perspective 
contractions, for volumetric representations (as, for example, in relief 
of east doors of Baptistery in Florence by L. Ghiberty). A pictorial 
effect with means of perceptive code can be made even in architecture 
as for example, it is in the famous “Scala regia” in Vatican, where its 
creator L. Bernini added to the natural perspective shortening of 
columns the artificial lessening of distances between them.
The diverse means of perceptography differ also the various ways 
of depictions in frame one and the same kind of art. In particular, the 
lineal drawing (for example Villard d’Honnecourd’s designs) confines 
itself only to outlines, representing some borders between forms, and 
eliminates their tonal and colour “filling”. The means of the black-
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and-white graphics (for instance, by Aubrey Beardsley) includes the 
differences between two polar types of spots, whereas the tonal 
graphics (as, for example, Rembrandt’s engravings) adds more 
gradations between the dark and the light. The painting obviously uses 
also the colour diversity and does it in different manner, proceeding 
from flat “polychromic” to volumetric “colouristic” depictions in 
various styles and trends.
The treatment to the perceptographic code is of a special stylistic 
importance for the applied arts, which, on one hand, as a rule hold a 
task to decorate a surface of useful objects, and, on the other hand, 
sometimes approaches to the decoration as to a figurative picture. So 
the difference between two spaces — the depicting and the depicted 
ones can be in the applied arts more or less strong — from maximum 
coincidence, for example, in case of flat silhouettes of figures on the 
surface in classical Greek vase painting, to maximum conflict between 
them, for example, in the Baroque Age, which was ready “to repeat” 
the Rafael’s or Rubens’ pictures on a flat surface of carpet or even to 
build a depiction of deep and concave space on a convex surface of 
pottery and porcelain wares. It is a peculiarity of the post-Renaissance 
artistic and general visual culture —  to prefer even in applied and 
decorative art to look “through” the depicting surface, rather than to 
look directly at this surface itself.
From this point of view historical development of the arts of 
depiction, both fine and applied ones, can be treated as diachronic 
modifications of the perceptographic code: on one hand, — as exten­
sion of its means by using new “visual discoveries” (in terms of 
Gombrich 1960: Ch. IX), and, on the other hand, as more strict their 
selection. One can find the first step to artificial stimulation of per­
ception in appearance of contours as the means of depictions using in 
communicative acts already in Palaeolithic Period. The next steps in 
this direction had permit to depict some spatial relations between the 
figures due to their coverings and crossings (as in painting of ancient 
Egypt) or due to representation of depth-relations per height-relations 
(as in painting of Fern East). There is also the lineal perspective 
(opened in antiquity and developed by artists of Renaissance) in the 
same row of “visual discoveries”. One can see, how the dominating 
elements of the perceptographic code have changed from lineal to 
tonal and colour ones: the “graphic” outlines of depicted figures (in 
ancient and medieval painting) were changed by depictions of
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sculptural volumes due to using of light and shadow (in painting of 
the Renaissance), then — by “architectural” constmctions of complex 
built space by means of linear and aerial perspective (especially, in the 
Baroque paintings) and again — by painted “dissolution” of depicted 
forms and their local colours in a vague milieu of many divided 
chromatic elements (in the paintings of Impressionists).
The art of perceptography develops not only as a skill to create 
perceptive images of absent objects, but also as a skill to direct the 
process of perceiving. An artist constructs the relations of lines and 
colours in a depicting space in such way, that they visually unify 
something one and separate something other, singling out more 
important details and taking away secondary ones, etc. Skilful usage 
of perceptographic means by an artist can at first attract viewer’s 
attention to one part of a picture, lead his look in a definite direction, 
at the same time “hiding” some other details of the picture till the next 
stage of the process of perception. So, for example, the elders from 
Tintoretto’s “Susanna and the Elders” (Kunsthistorisches Museum, 
Vienna) are hidden in the bushes not only from Susanna, but also, till 
definite moment, from viewer’s look. This skill to lead a look in a 
definite succession can be considered semiotically as the know-how to 
arrange the visual signals controlling the process of looking into the 
picture.
Mastering the means of the perceptographic code leads to histo­
rical changes of “forms of vision” and relations between the percepto­
graphic and other visual-spatial codes. For example the percepto­
graphic code in icon painting had to perform rather secondary function 
and was of less importance for Medieval visual culture, than, let us 
say, iconographic code, which connects the perceived and recognized 
figures with some verbal interpretations, first of all from the Sacred 
Book. However the later cultural transformations and secularization of 
the European culture were revealed in the sphere of visual culture 
particularly through the change of relations between the 
perceptographic and iconographic codes. The Renaissance, Baroque 
and Impressionists’ paintings can be considered as the successive 
stages of increasing role of the perceptographic code in visual culture 
and its releasing from the subordination to the iconographic and other 
codes.
The perceptographic code was interesting for diverse epochs with 
its different possibilities. If mastering its means for the Renaissance
and Baroque artists was connected with the skill to make a depicting 
surface “hidden” from a spectator and “transparent” for the depicted 
world, the artists of the later epochs gave up the attempts to create an 
illusion of its absence, but, on the contrary, drew attention to the 
depicting plane. Particularly, in Impressionists’ and Post-impres- 
sionists’ paintings it became less “transparent”, delaying a “transit” of 
the look into a depicted space and attracting the sight to lineal and 
colour elements on the surface. In the Cubists’ paintings composition 
of these elements on the depicting plane becomes more important than 
the depicted objects. The Abstract art performs the next step: the lines 
and colour spots on the surface are independent of the function 
creating perceptive image of the depicted space. Thereby the percepto­
graphic code turns out beyond the artistic attention, making way for 
the synesthetic, architectonic and other visual codes, which do not 
need to use perceptography. In the same time this change has elimi­
nate from painting a complex of spatial codes, usage of which depends 
on creating depictions: body-language, mimic, proxemic, object- 
functional, social-symbolic, etc.
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5. Perceptography and external optical means
Transformations of the perceptographic code in culture are connected 
with the changes of the external technical means used for creation, 
transmission and reception of visual images of space. Each of them 
transmits and transforms these images in its own way and introduces a 
possibility of some new “forms of vision” in visual culture.
In particular, usage of lineal contours for representation of depicted 
objects indeed depends on possibilities, which the culture gives (as it 
was suggested by Eco 1976: 194). However the cultural “graphic 
conventions” do not create absolutely arbitrary signs, but representa­
tive means motivated by the ability to abstract and to exteriorize the 
borders between different patches in a visual field. This ability and 
corresponding “conventions” are connected with the development of 
ways of drawing and engraving of lines on a surface, which were 
known in culture since the Upper Palaeolithic Period. The develop­
ment of the “architecture with regular courses of jointed masonry”, as 
it was mentioned by Meyer Schapiro, prepared the appearance of the 
“regular field” of depiction (Schapiro 1994: 3). Modifications of
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“graphic forms of vision” can be correlated with such technical inven­
tions as fresco, mosaic, encaustic, glaze, etching, etc. Invention of the 
oil paints and the change of palette function (as a tool not only for a 
rubbing but also for mixing paints) promoted a development of the 
“painting way of vision” and created conditions for the establishment 
of the “principle of palette” for the perceptographic code of the New- 
European painting.
In a row of technical means elaborated in culture for operating 
optical processes, a painted picture can be understood as an instru­
ment, comparable with such technical inventions as mirrors, stained- 
glass or transparent windows, lenses, etc. Each of these technical 
means together with its possibilities of optical transformation gives 
opportunities of some own ways of vision. If, for instance, the me­
dieval stained-glass windows permitted to show the depicted figures 
as immaterial ideas ’’floating” in the rays of light, the transparent 
windows, on the contrary, help to see an earthly “picture” behind their 
frame. The development of transparent windows since the Renais­
sance Age, as well as of glass mirrors (often having a form of win­
dows) made a contribution to construction of linear perspective. 
Besides, a mirror allows the subject to see himself as an external 
object, and spreading of glass mirrors was a condition for the develop­
ment of self-portrait paintings and for reflections over the relations 
between the painter and the model (“The Amolfini Marriage” by Jan 
Van Eyck, “Las Meninas” by Velazquez, etc.). In a similar way the 
production of lenses and “magnifying glasses” influenced the wish to 
peer into small details, and it is notable, that Leeuwenhoek’s disco­
veries coincide with the “golden age” of still-life in Dutch paintings, 
where the optical instruments were used for creating the naturalistic 
illusion.
When photography, based on combining of lenses and light- 
sensitive materials, was developed, the ways of vision changed again. 
These technical means of optical representation changed a valuation of 
traditional means of depiction. The “depressing perfection” (as E. 
Delacroix said) of mechanical means of depiction deprived former 
ways of the artificial stimulating of perception its high cultural status 
and removed them from centre to periphery of art culture. The new 
means of depiction change ways of representation of space and time in 
the picture. Instead of the relatively complete and closed model of the 
world, which was created in classic picture and, especially, in
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medieval icon painting, photography due to its technology has to fix 
only single fragments of the spatial world. It does not “collect” the 
features of different things in one image — as painting do, but takes 
only something partial, concrete and individual. Therefore, it repro­
duces the space of the world not metaphorically, but metonymically. 
The change in the ways of vision after developing of photography 
influenced the painting itself, which began purposely “cut” a depicted 
space and represent it as a fragment of space exceeding the frames of a 
picture (for example, in Degas’ paintings).
Cinematography extends this depicted space even more, “linking” 
many photograms in time and synthesizing its single fragments in 
discrete or continual rows. Thereby a new “cinematographic” way of 
vision was developed and influenced new forms of perceptography in 
paintings. Painters began looking for the means of division of spatial 
movement into single stages and their “summarizing” in a united 
picture (especially this way of vision was developed by Futurists).
As a continuation of the row of technical means creating depictions 
like photography and cinematography a “computerography” can also 
be considered. It allows to combine depicted spaces of different kinds, 
to join and to separate them, change their metric and topologic pro­
perties, etc. Despite each of these technical opportunities are known 
long ago to artists separately, their combination by computer gives 
more freedom for visual thinking.
However, the “photograms” differ from “chirograms” (in Gibson’s 
terms) not only regarding to hand-created, but also to “mind-created” 
product of artist. They are not “perceptograms” in full sense, because 
they do not exteriorise a perceptive image of any subject more, but 
remake only optical conditions of its receiving. A “mechanical” 
reproduction of such conditions permits the spectator to master only 
the means of the natural (as far as it is possible for culturally educated 
mind) perceptual code, and not to develop special skills of 
perceptograms “reading”. Nevertheless an artistic application of 
perceptography in these “photograms” is possible in case the picture is 
specially constructed as if it was made by the hand and mind of an 
artist — as, for example, in case of Sergey Eisenstein, who drew the 
single frames of his future films as artistically ordered pictures.
So, the connection between the external optical technique and the 
“internal implements” mediating the “technique of vision” in the 
perceptographic and other visual codes is obvious. Both of them
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develop according to their own “logic” and are also determined by the 
conditions of the visual culture. If the last is not ready yet to accept 
some visual ideas, only technical possibilities for their realization are 
not enough. For example, despite the mosaic technique gives 
possibility for optical mixing of colours and for the “alphabetic” 
principle of their arrangement, only Pointilists, based on the 
“irrelevant” technique of oil paintings, treated to these means as to the 
subject of special artistic elaboration.
6. Some methodological remarks
Semiotics of visual-spatial codes and especially semiotics of percepto­
graphy is a sphere, where an application of traditional semiotic con­
ceptions comes across with a “resistance” of the researched material. 
It is not surprising, because the main versions of semiotics are based 
on generalizations of verbal and derived from them sign systems — in 
the spheres of logic (Peirce and others) or linguistics (Saussure and 
followers). Both of them deal with higher levels of mental activity 
operating more or less abstract conceptions and generalized ideas. 
Despite the visual-spatial means of representation afford to express 
such conceptual meanings as well, much of them are formed on lower 
levels of mind. It is true for the synesthetic codes, mediating con­
nections between feelings of diverse modalities on the sensory level, 
particularly — for the architectonic code, regulating relations between 
visual images and kinaesthetic feelings of mechanical forces, of 
weight relations, of balance, etc. It is true also for the perceptual and 
derivative perceptographic codes, which plane of contents is 
developed on the perceptual level. The codes mediating connections 
on these levels belong themselves to the index-signal type of 
information processes and are not sign-codes, if the concept of “sign” 
is accepted in enough narrow sense (see Tchertov 1999). These “non­
sign” means of communication can remain nevertheless in the sphere 
of semiotic, if the last is not limited by linguistic or logic projects and 
is extended to all code means of information generating in culture or 
in nature as well. Such broad treatment of “semiosphere” allows not 
only to include natural index-signal systems in the frame of semiotics, 
but also to consider in these frame some transformations, which are 
occurred with many of these codes in culture.
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The codes generating in the nature and transforming in a visual 
culture are a common subject matter, particularly, for psychology of 
human, where from time of G. Berkeley develops an idea of “visual 
language”. The great interest to semiotics of visual-spatial means has 
also aesthetics, which by its separation in Baumgarten’s work has 
already provided “Semiotica” as its necessary part (Baumgarten 1750: 
§ 13), and which is, following Croce, an “universal science of expres­
sion”. One can find many of “protosemiotic” ideas in art theory, 
which from L. Alberti till E. Gombrich researches the means of visual 
representation. It is naturally therefore that researches into sphere of 
art or into psychology of visual perception are included in context of 
the pictorial semiotics (as, particularly, in Sonesson 1992; 1995). In 
the same time it is also true, that semiotics of the visual-spatial codes 
in general, and semiotics of perceptography, specifically, is not 
identical to conceptions of psychologists, aesthetists or art theorists. 
Their fruitful ideas can be developed and get more exact explication 
within domain of these branches of semiotics. However it is possible 
only under the condition, that a pertinent set of concepts will be 
elaborated in the sphere of visual semiotics itself. The presented paper 
is an attempt to do some steps in this direction.
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Перцептографический код в визуальной культуре
Визуальная культура может рассматриваться с семиотической точки 
зрения как система визуальных кодов. Некоторые из них имеют еще 
естественные корни. Так, перцептивный код формируется уже на 
биологическом уровне, опосредуя превращение сенсорных данных в 
перцептивные образы пространственного мира. Средства естествен-
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ного перцептивного кода трансформируются в культуре, включаясь 
в процессы коммуникации с помощью изображений. Изображение 
на плоскости может рассматриваться как “перцептограмма”, которая 
представляет собой, с одной стороны, внешнюю запись какого-то 
внутреннего перцептивного образа или представления, а, с другой 
стороны, — программу, в соответствии с которой строится визуаль­
ное восприятие зрителя. Средства такой перцептографии образуют 
уже некий искусственный код, который, в отличие от естественного 
перцептуального кода, оказывается коммуникативным, произвольно 
используемым и изменяющимся различным образом в разные пе­
риоды времени, в разных видах практической и художественной 
деятельности. Не всякая перцептограмма становится произведением 
искусства, однако вся история искусств может быть рассмотрена как 
процесс овладения этими средствами и их развития. Этот процесс 
зависит как от внутреннего изменения “форм видения”, так и от 
создания новых внешних средств коммуникации.
Pertseptograaflline kood visuaalkultuuris
Visuaalkultuuri võib semiootiliselt vaatepunktilt vaadelda kui visuaalsete 
koodide süsteemi. Mõned neist lähtuvad veel loodusmaailmast. Nii 
näiteks formeerub pertseptiivne kood juba bioloogilisel tasandil, vahen­
dades sensoorsete andmete muutumist ruumilise maailma pertseptiiv- 
seteks kujunditeks. Loomuliku pertseptiivse koodi vahendid transfor­
meeruvad kultuuris, lülitudes kommunikatsiooniprotsessidesse kujutiste 
abil. Kahemõõtmelist kujutist võib vaadelda kui “pertseptogrammi”, mis 
kujutab endast, ühelt poolt, mingi sisemise pertseptiivse kujundi või ette­
kujutuse ülestähendust, teisalt — programmi, millele vastavalt ehitatakse 
üles vaataja visuaalne vastuvõtt. Taolise pertseptograafia vahendid moo­
dustavad juba teatud kunstliku koodi, mis, erinevalt loomulikust pertsep- 
tiivsest koodist, osutub kommunikatiivseks, mida vabalt kasutatakse ja 
muudetakse erinevatel aegadel, erinevates praktilise ja kunstilise tegevuse 
sfäärides. Mitte iga pertseptogramm ei saa kunstiteoseks, kuid kogu 
kunstiajalugu võib vaadelda kui nende vahendite omandamist ja arenda­
mist. See protsess sõltub nii “nägemise vormide” sisemisest arengust kui 
ka uute väliste kommunikatsioonivahendite loomisest.
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Abstract. Since 1984 when J. Lotman’s article “On semiosphere” was pub­
lished, this concept has been moving from one terminological field to another. 
In the disciplinary terminological field o f the Tartu-Moscow School semiotics 
of culture, ‘semiosphere’ is connected with terms ‘language —  secondary 
modelling system —  text —  culture’. From interdisciplinary terminological 
fields, the associations either with biosphere and noosphere, or with logo- 
sphere, are more important. As a metadisciplinary concept, semiosphere 
belongs to the methodology o f culture studies and is associated with the 
concepts o f holism and the part and the whole. In this context, semiosphere 
marks the complementarity o f disciplines studying culture, the movement 
towards the creation o f general culture studies and “understanding metho­
dology”. On the background o f the contemporary trends o f science it has to be 
remembered that semiosphere is simultaneously an object- and a meta­
concept. The dynamism o f culture as a research object forces science to search 
for new description languages but the new description languages in turn 
influence the cultural dynamics as they offer new possibilities for self­
description. Often, however, from a historical perspective, a new description 
language is nothing but a methodological translation. Thus also the term 
semiosphere joins together several concepts that are related to semiotics o f  
culture and that have gained new relevance on the background o f the culture’s 
developmental dynamics. The concept o f semiosphere brings semiotics o f  
culture again into contact with its history, as it also brings applicational 
cultural analysis into contact with the history o f culture and with the newest 
phenomena in culture. These contacts determine the place o f the semiotics o f  
culture among the sciences studying culture.1
1 The article is based on the presentation at the First International Meeting for  
the Study o f the Semiosphere, organized by Irene Machado and her colleagues in 
Säo Paulo, Brazil, August 22-27, 2005.
Disciplinary logic demands that culture be declared the research object 
of semiotics of culture. But only a few years ago, in the epilogue to his 
study “The outlines of the prehistory and history of semiotics*’, 
Vyatcheslav Vs. Ivanov, one of the founders of semiotics of culture 
and of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, wrote:
The task o f semiotics is to describe the semiosphere without which the 
noosphere is inconceivable. Semiotics has to help us in orienting in history. 
The joint effort o f all those who have been active in this science or the whole 
cycle o f sciences must contribute to the ultimate future establishment of 
semiotics. (Ivanov 1998: 792)
Ivanov’s statement relies already clearly on interdisciplinary logic as 
the term “semiosphere” is here placed between biosphere and 
noosphere. It follows from this logic that the description of semio­
sphere by semiotics helps us to orient in history. But the term 
“history” is a very complicated concept for the scientists of the Tartu- 
Moscow School.
In the context of semiosphere, the interest of Juri Lotman as a lite­
rary and cultural historian in unmaterialized possibilities of historical 
choices is important. He had an extraordinary interest in imagining the 
consequences to which a different choice of development strategies 
could have led during pivotal moments, in the situation of cultural 
explosion. He speaks about this in his last book Culture and Explosion 
(published in 1992). At the request of Spanish colleagues, I had a 
discussion with Juri Lotman in the same year as this book was pub­
lished. I will quote a passage from Lotman’s talk:
The fate o f people, history, accomplishments o f science is unpredictable. [...] 
A chance, an accident is not really so accidental, I would say. A chance is so 
diffused, leaves such a wide range o f choices that many things can find their 
place in there. But chance is not predictable. I think that if, among new ideas, 
there is something that we have now in reality, one o f  them —  and I think the 
most important o f them —  is the idea o f historical, scientific, and o f yet some 
other kind o f unpredictability. Unpredictability as the object o f science. By the 
way, unpredictability [...] whose mechanism is one o f  the most important 
objects o f science, introduces into science in a totally new manner the 
component o f art. [...] Art has always been oriented towards unpredictability. 
To my mind, at the moment something most interesting is happening: it is as 
if  science is becoming aesthetisized. [...] Art is a totally different way of 
thinking, a different system o f modelling the world. Essentially it is the 
creation o f a different world, a parallel world to our world. It is thought that
160 Peeter Torop
Semiosphere and/as the research object o f  semiotics o f  culture 161
we can live in a world that is based on the model o f science, or that we can 
live in a world that is based on the model o f art. In fact, however, we live ,n a 
world that is based on the conflictual unity o f these two models From here 
follow also the different levels o f  predictability and different meanings of  
unpredictability. (Lotman, in Torop 2000: 13-14)
The logic of this argument is close to our contemporary trans- 
disciplinary thinking. But at the end of discussion Lotman presented a 
rhetorical question:
What in fact is this enormous amount o f people who now live on this planet 
and will maybe live here also in the future? Is it a conglomeration o f  
individuals who live only in order to take over from each other territory and 
the right to live? Or is this conglomeration o f individuals one method of  
description and each individual by him self or herself another method o f  
description? Thus no method o f description rules out another method o f  
description. It is as if  in their reciprocal tension they create a third viewpoint. 
(Lotman, in Torop 2000: 14-15)
The formulation of this third viewpoint would in fact mean that se­
miotics is given the status of metadiscipline.
Since the year 1984 when J. Lotman’s article “On semiosphere” 
was published, this concept has been moving from one terminological 
field to another. In the disciplinary terminological field of the Tartu- 
Moscow School semiotics of culture, “semiosphere” is connected with 
terms “language — secondary modelling system — text — culture”. 
From interdisciplinary terminological fields, the association, on the 
one hand, with biosphere and noosphere, and on the other hand, with 
logosphere, is perhaps more important. As a metadisciplinary concept, 
semiosphere belongs to the methodology of culture studies and is 
associated with the concepts of holism and the part and the whole. 
And as a transdisciplinary concept, “semiosphere” is very close to the 
concept of symbol in symbolism: symbol as an indefinable term is 
suitable for conveying the cognition of the incognizable, and at the 
same time symbol can have an enormous semantic volume as a 
reduced myth. In this context, semiosphere marks the complemen­
tarity of disciplines studying culture, the movement towards the 
creation of general culture studies and “understanding methodology”.
For example, when we observe the scholarly reception of the 
concept of semiosphere, we can notice the emergence of some 
dominants. The first dominant is related to semiosphere as a universal
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research level. For instance, Irene Portis-Winner in her last book 
remarks that Lotman’s concept of semiosphere creates a perspective of 
holistic analysis: “Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere subsumes all 
aspects of the semiotics of culture, all the heterogeneous semiotic 
systems or “languages” that are constantly changing and that in an 
abstract sense, have some unifying qualities” (Portis-Winner 2002: 63; 
cf. also Portis-Winner 1999). Edna Andrews, again, argues that the 
concept of semiosphere is helpful in better understanding semiosis: 
“Lotman’s extensive work on the semiosphere and the semiotics of 
communication provide some invaluable concepts and categories that 
offer insights into the structural principles of semiosis” (Andrews 
1999: 8). And in Neil Cornwell’s opinion, the quality of the semio­
sphere to bind diachrony and synchrony, organize memory, transform 
systems turns it into a very functional mechanism that has been 
connected even with the Jungian term of collective unconscious 
(Cornwell 1992: 166).
From collective unconscious it is convenient to proceed to the next 
dominant, dynamism. Boguslaw Žylko stresses, from the perspective 
of Lotman’s evolution, that the concept of semiosphere signifies 
transfer from static to dynamic analysis, and the basis of this transfer 
is understanding the relationship between holism and heterogeneity:
The shift, from the conception o f culture as a bundle o f primary and secondary 
modelling systems to the notion o f semiosphere, is also a shift from static to 
dynamic thinking. If we took the former approach, culture would resemble a 
motionless unit made up o f semiotic systems; whereas if  we follow the 
semiospheric approach, culture takes the shape o f a heterogeneous whole 
bustling with multiple rhythms o f development and transient dominants. 
(Žylko 2001: 400)
Dynamism is stressed also by Floyd Merrell in his comparison of 
Peirce and Lotman and treatment of biosemiosphere: “Cultures are 
processes, never products [...]” (Merrell 2001: 400).
I brought out these two dominants in the reception of semiosphere 
in order to emphasize one of Lotman’s methodological principles, on 
which also his own treatment of semiosphere is based. This is the 
principle of dialogism. Usually the term “dialogue” is associated with 
the name of Mikhail Bakhtin, and Lotman’s treatment certainly has its 
connections to Bakhtin’s approach. The treatise published under the
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name of Valentin Voloshinov Marxism and the Philosophy o f Lan­
guage suggests that
any element o f an utterance that forwards a thought and is being fore­
grounded, or even a full utterance is translated by us into corresponding 
context that is different and active. Any understanding is dialogic. Under­
standing is contrasted to utterance as a speaker’s words are contrasted to those 
of another speaker in a dialogue. Understanding is looking for a counterword 
to the word o f a speaker. Only understanding o f a foreign word seeks for “a 
similar” word in the native language. (Bakhtin 2000: 436)
Several scholarly works have been dedicated to the comparison of M. 
Bakhtin’s and J. Lotman’s dialogisms (Shukman, Lachmann, Danow, 
Bonafin), but the simultaneity of the dual understanding has not been 
stressed much. In essence, this is a situation in which understanding is 
a process that on the one hand creates differences (word and the 
counterword), and, on the other hand, similarities (word and its 
translation). And if the dialogism of understanding is borne in mind, 
we can in principle talk about two types of dialogue (cf. also Torop 
2002: 599-602).
Furthermore, in Lotman’s opinion, in order to understand dialogue, 
it is not enough to understand the language that is used in the dia­
logue. In his article “On Semiosphere” he wrote:
Consciousness is impossible without communication. In this sense it can be 
said that dialogue precedes language and generates the language. The idea o f 
semiosphere is based exactly on this: the ensemble o f semiotic formations 
precedes (not heuristically, but functionally) a single isolated language and is 
a precondition for its existence. Without semiosphere a language not only 
does not work, but does not even exist. (Lotman 1984: 16)
In the next stage of discussion on semiosphere, in his book “Universe 
of the Mind” published in 1990, Lotman emphasized that the dialogic 
situation has to be understood before dialogue: “ ...the need for 
dialogue, the dialogic situation, precedes both real dialogue and even 
the existence of a language in which to conduct it: the semiotic 
situation precedes the instruments of semiosis” (Lotman 1990: 143— 
144). Thus dialogue becomes not only a term closely related to 
semiosphere, but it becomes one of its ontological characteristics. The 
concept of dialogical model of culture appeared in Lotman’s works in
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1983 and the discussion on semiosphere develops this model first of 
all on the level of dynamics between the part and the whole:
Since all the levels o f the semiosphere —  ranging from a human individual or 
an individual text to global semiotic unities —  are all like semiospheres 
inserted into each other, then each and one o f them is both a participant in the 
dialogue (a part o f the semiosphere) as well as the space o f the dialogue (an 
entire semiosphere). (Lotman 1984: 22)
The understanding of dialogue as an ontological characteristic of 
semiosphere in turn means that the outer and inner borders of 
semiosphere are seen as bilingual. Borders separate and thus create 
identities, but borders also connect and construe these identities by 
juxtaposing the own and the alien. Therefore for Lotman the most 
important feature of the borders of semiosphere is their role as 
translation mechanisms. But also human consciousness is related to 
the same mechanisms since in determining one’s identity, a person 
needs first to describe it to himself or herself. Translation mechanisms 
form the basis also for this thinking activity. And thus Lotman reaches 
the conclusion “that the elementary act of thinking is translation” and 
“the elementary mechanism of translation is dialogue”(Lotman 1990: 
143).
The dialogism of semiosphere lends the concept of semiosphere 
also an important dimension pertaining to the history of science. In 
1992 Lotman wrote in the foreword of Sign Systems Studies vol. 25 
that was the last appearing in his lifetime:
During the past decades semiotics has changed. One achievement on its hard 
path was unification with history. The cognition o f history became semiotic, 
but semiotic thinking obtained historic traits. [...] Semiotic approach tries to 
avoid the conditional stopping o f the historical process. (Lotman 1992: 3)
Lotman also concludes that “each generation has a language for 
describing yesterday and principally lacks a language for tomorrow” 
(Lotman 1992: 4).
Speaking about semiosphere on the background of the contem­
porary trends of science it has to be remembered that semiosphere is 
simultaneously an object- and a meta-concept. Semiosphere is what is 
being studied in or as culture, and semiosphere is the means that is 
used in studying culture. A phrase semiosphere is studied by means o f
semiosphere is not a paradox but points to the dialogue between the 
research object and its description language. The dynamism of culture 
as a research object forces science to search for new description 
languages but the new description languages in turn influence the 
cultural dynamics as they offer new possibilities for self-description. 
Often, however, from a historical perspective, a new description lan­
guage is nothing but a methodological translation. Thus also the term 
semiosphere joins together several concepts that are related to 
semiotics of culture and that have gained new relevance on the back­
ground of the culture’s developmental dynamics.
The first who deserves rereading is one of the leading figures of 
Russian Formalism Yurij Tynianov. In his article “Literary fact” of 
1924 he wrote: “Literary fact is heterogeneous, and in this sense 
literature is an incessantly evolutioning order” (Tynianov 1977: 270). 
The question of literary order or system is for Tynianov inseparable 
from the question of function:
A literary system is first o f all a system of the functions o f the literary order 
which are in continual interrelationship with other orders. Systems change in 
their composition, but the differentiation o f human activities remains. The 
evolution o f literature, as o f any other cultural system, does not coincide either 
in tempo or in character with the systems with which it is interrelated. This is 
owing to the specificity o f the material with which it is concerned. The 
evolution o f the structural function occurs rapidly; the evolution o f the literary 
function occurs over epochs; and the evolution o f the functions o f a whole 
literary system in relation to neighbouring systems occurs over centuries. 
(Tynianov 1977: 277)
In Tynianov’s system, we can observe the relatedness of literary order 
to other orders — with the order of everyday life, the order of culture, 
social order. Everyday life is correlated with literary order in its verbal 
aspect, and thus, literature has a verbal function in relation to everyday 
life. An author’s attitude towards the elements of his text expresses 
structural function, and the same text as a literary work has literary 
function in its relations to the literary order. The return influence of 
literature on everyday life, again, expresses social function. The study 
of literary evolution presupposes the investigation of connections first 
of all between the closest neighbouring orders or systems, and the 
logical path leads from the structural to the literary function, from the 
literary to the verbal function. This follows from the position that 
“evolution is the change in interrelationships between the elements of
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a system — between functions and formal elements” (Tynianov 1977: 
281; cf. also Torop 1995-1996; 2003: 328-330).
The next author belonging to the history of semiosphere is Roman 
Jakobson who in his article “Metalanguage as a linguistic problem” 
published in 1956 wrote: “Language must be investigated in all the 
variety of its functions” (Jakobson 1985: 113). With regard to the six 
factors of his communication model and their functions he wrote: 
“The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several 
functions but in their different hierarchical order” (Jakobson 1985: 
113).
With regard to the rapid development of the culture’s technological 
environment, I suggest that the hierarchical principle is the basis for 
Jakobson’s approach both to translation as well as perception pro­
cesses. His interlinguistic, intralinguistic and intersemiotic types of 
translation can be regarded individually but also as an inner dynamic 
hierarchy of a single translation process and, partly, of any commu­
nication process. The situation is the same when R. Jakobson stresses 
the semiotic value of all five senses in the human society: “All five 
external senses carry semiotic functions in human society” (Jakobson 
1971: 701). Foreseeing the increase in the varieties of textual onto­
logies and problems of understanding, R. Jakobson stresses the impor­
tance of distinguishing between homogeneous messages, i.e. those 
based on a single sign system, and syncretic messages, i.e. those based 
on the combination of several sign systems: “The study of commu­
nication must distinguish between homogeneous messages which use 
a single semiotic system and syncretic messages based on a combi­
nation or merger of different sign patterns” (Jakobson 1971: 705).
Another semiospheric scientist is Mikhail Bakhtin of whose works 
I would like to mention in the present context the theory of chronotope 
even though this work was left unfinished. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to reconstruct Bakhtin’s general understanding of a literary 
work as a chronotopical hierarchy (Bakhtin 1979: 338). On the hori­
zontal plane this refers to the levels of topographic chronotope or 
homophony, psychological chronotope or polyphony, and meta­
physical chronotope or heterophony. But on all these levels we can 
also speak of the binarity of the own and the alien (cf. Torop 1997), 
which is the basis for the so-called small chronotopes, such as road, 
bridge, stairs, and so forth. In Bakhtin’s view, without understanding
chronotopicality, it is impossible to understand artistic worlds 
(Bakhtin 1975: 406).
Thus there are three research strategies in front of us, which pre­
pare the ground for the emergence of the concept of semiosphere: 
Tynianov and the hierarchical treatment of the evolutionary process, 
Jakobson and the hierarchical treatment of communication process, 
and Bakhtin and the treatment of text as a chronotopical hierarchy.
Theses on the Semiotic Study o f Cultures [1973], the programmatic 
work of the Tartu-Moscow School, defines semiotics of culture as a 
science investigating the functional correlation of different sign 
systems. This approach entails also the recognition of the hierarchy of 
sign systems:
In defining culture as a certain secondary language, we introduce the concept 
o f a “culture text”, a text in this secondary language. So long as some natural 
language is a part of the language o f culture, there arises the question o f the 
relationship between the text in the natural language and the verbal text o f  
culture. (Theses 1998: 43)
We could add here another aspect related to the logic of possible 
worlds: “The place of the text in the textual space is defined as the 
sum total of potential texts” (Theses 1998: 45).
Until then, when speaking of text, Lotman had emphasized the 
importance of the beginning and the end, or the frame. Therefore for 
him, text was a delimited whole and the possibility of delimiting, 
either natural or artificial, made it possible to speak about levels of 
material, the coherence and hierarchy of levels. When the material 
was not natural language but film language, he tried to describe the 
system of distinctive features and to analyse the text on the basis of 
markedness-unmarkedness. A fundamental turn took place in 1981. In 
his article “Cultural Semiotics and the Notion of Text” Lotman 
replaces the notion of deciphering or decoding the text with the term 
of communication and creates, by describing circulation of texts in 
culture and relations between the text and the reader, a typology of 
different, although complementary processes: (1) communication of 
the addresser and the addressee, (2) communication between the 
audience and cultural tradition, (3) communication of the reader with 
him/ herself, (4) communication of the reader with the text, (5) 
communication between the text and cultural tradition (Lotman 2002: 
88). The usage of the term communication in textual analysis meant,
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in fact, a semiospherical turn already before the concept was bom. The 
same way as it is possible to understand texts in various ways, it is 
also possible to analyse this understanding in several ways.
When Lotman’s approach to text became parametric, combining 
different possibilities of analysis, there emerged a need for a unity of a 
higher order that would join together the individual and the general, 
the part and the whole, description and self-description. The juxta­
position, in textual analysis, of a delimited whole and a communi­
cating whole created the wish to keep system and process apart, 
similarly to what L. Hjelmslev did. In 1978 Lotman wrote an article, 
“The phenomenon of culture” where he created a typology distin­
guishing between statics and dynamics. The basis for the typology is 
the distinction of the static and dynamic aspects of cultural languages. 
From the static aspect cultural languages divide into the discrete and 
the continual (iconic-spatial), and for Juri Lotman this forms the 
semiotic primordial dualism. In discrete languages sign comes first 
and meanings are created through the meanings of signs. In continual 
languages text comes first and meaning emerges through holistic text 
that integrates even the most heterogeneous elements. These are the 
two languages between which it is difficult to create translatability.
In dynamism the simultaneity of the two processes in culture is 
important. On the one hand, in different fields of culture, speciali­
sation of cultural languages takes place as a result of autocommu­
nication and identity searches. On the other hand, on the level of 
culture as a whole there emerges integration of cultural languages as a 
possibility of self-communication and self-understanding. Yet the 
dynamism of integration is revealed in the simultaneity of the two 
processes. On the one hand, self-descriptions and alongside with them 
also meta-descriptions or descriptions from the position of culture as a 
whole are being created in different parts of culture. This is integration 
through autonomies. On the other hand, cultural languages diffuse and 
become creolised due to the communication between different parts of 
culture. Creolisation is a feature of dynamism and an intermediary 
stage at reaching a new autonomy or pure (self)description.
As a result of descriptive processes this allows us to talk about 
cultural self-models. Cultural self-description as a process can be 
viewed as proceeding in three directions. Culture’s self-model is the 
result of the first, and its goal is maximum similarity to the actually 
existing culture. As a second result there emerge cultural self-models
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that differ from ordinary cultural practice and have been designed for 
changing that practice. Thirdly, there are also self-models that exist as 
an ideal cultural self-consciousness separately from culture and are not 
oriented toward it (Lotman 2000: 568-580). By this Lotman does not 
exclude conflict between culture and its self-models. But the creation 
of self-models reflects the creativity of culture. In 1980s Juri Lotman 
described creativity, relying on Ilya Prigogine. The article “Culture as 
a subject and object for itself’ maintains that:
The main question o f semiotics o f culture is the problem o f meaning gene­
ration. What we shall call meaning generation is the ability both o f culture as 
a whole and o f its parts to put out, in the “output”, nontrivial new texts. New  
texts are the texts that emerge as results o f irreversible processes (in Ilya 
Prigogine’s sense), i.e. texts that are unpredictable to a certain degree. 
(Lotman 2000: 640)
Semiosphere is a concept that allows semiotics of culture to reach a new 
understanding of holism, a holistic analysis of dynamic processes. In 
semiotics of culture, the term semiosphere converges all that which 
recently in sciences studying culture converges into semiotics — a wish 
for finding a description language that could be translated into and 
that could unify different disciplinary and interdisciplinary languages. 
In elaborating general principles of cultural analysis in the interests of 
an understanding methodology, science needs to search for possibi­
lities to interpret as diverse and nontrivial cultural phenomena and 
texts as possible and to promote cultural self-descriptions. At the same 
time, from the historical perspective, the metalinguistic and con­
ceptual heterogeneity of our contemporary science is much more 
homogeneous.
Therefore, in conclusion it has to be said that the concept of 
semiosphere brings semiotics of culture again into contact with its 
history, as it also brings applicational cultural analysis into contact 
with the history of culture and with the newest phenomena in culture. 
The science of signs comes into contact with the art of signs. These 
contacts determine the place of the semiotics of culture among the 
sciences studying culture. And it is not paradoxical that semiosphere 
studies semiosphere and culture studies culture. This is so because all 
this takes place within one single semiosphere of human culture and 
each attempt to describe culture from any scientific position proves,
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on a different level, to be a self-description of culture. By creating 
treatments of culture, we also can be part of culture’s creativity.
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Семиосфера и/как объект исследования семиотики культуры
С 1984 года, когда была напечатана статья Ю. М. Лотмана, данное 
понятие кочевало из одного терминологического поля в другое. В 
терминологическом поле семиотики культуры тартуско-московской 
школы семиосфера связана с понятиями язык — вторичная модели­
рующая система — текст — культура. Из интердисциплинарных 
терминологических полей можно считать наиболее существенным 
примыкание к понятиям биосферы и ноосферы, с одной стороны, и 
логосферы, — с другой стороны. В качестве метадисциплинарного 
понятия семиосфера входит в методологию культурологии и связы­
вается с понятием целостности, а также части и целого. В качестве 
трансдисциплинарного термина семиосфера примыкает к понятию 
символа в символизме: символ как неопределяемое понятие подхо­
дит для передачи познания непознаваемого и в то же время символ 
может быть семантически насыщенным как редуцированный миф. В 
данном контексте семиосфера обозначает дополнительность дисцип­
лин, изучающих культуру, и движение в сторону создания общей 
культурологии и “понимающей методологии”.
Рассуждая о семиосфере на фоне развития современной науки 
следует помнить, что мы имеем дело одновременно как объектным так
и метапонятием. Семиосфера — это то, что изучается в культуре или в 
качестве культуры, и семиосфера является средством для изучения 
культуры. При помощи семиосферы изучается семиосфера это не 
парадокс, а обозначение диалога между объектом исследования и 
языком его описания. Динамика культуры как объекта исследования 
заставляет науки искать новые языки описания, но и новые языки 
описания в свою очередь влияют на динамику развития культуры, так 
как предлагают новые возможности для самоописания. С истори­
ческой точки зрения ноый язык описания часто является лишь методо­
логическим переводом. Так в понятии семиосферы объединены 
несколько разных концепций, связанных с семиотикой культуры и 
актуализованных в связи с динамикой развития культуры.
Понятие семиосферы сопоставляет семиотику культуры с ее исто­
рией, а также сопрягает прикладной анализ культуры с историей 
культуры и новейшими явлениями в культуре. От этих сопоставлений 
зависит место семиотики культуры среди изучающих культуру наук.
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Semiosfäär ja/kui kultuurisemiootika uurimisobjekt
1984. aastast, mil ilmus J. Lotmani artikkel “Semiosfäärist”, on see 
mõiste liikunud ühest terminiväljast teise. Tartu-Moskva koolkonna 
kultuurisemiootika distsiplinaarsel termimväljal on ta seotud mõistetega 
keel — sekundaarne modelleeriv süsteem — tekst — kultuur. Inter­
distsiplinaarsetest termini väljadest on ehk olulisem seotus mõistetega 
biosfäär ja noosfäär ühelt poolt ning logosfäär teiselt poolt. Meta- 
distsiplinaarsena on semiosfäär kultuuriteaduse metodoloogiasse kuuluv 
mõiste ning seostub seal holismi ning osa ja terviku mõistega. Ja trans- 
distsiplinaarsena on semiosfääri mõiste väga lähedane sümboli mõistele 
sümbolismis: sümbol on defineerimatu mõistena sobiv tunnetamatu tun­
netamise vahendamiseks, samas võib sümbol olla erakordselt suure tähen­
dusmahuga kui redutseeritud müüt. Selles kontekstis tähistab semiosfäär 
kultuuri uurivate distsipliinide komplementaarsust, liikumist üldise 
kultuuriteaduse ja “mõistva metodoloogia” loomise suunas.
Semiosfäärist tänapäeva teaduse suundumuste taustal rääkides tuleb 
meeles pidada, et tegemist on üheaegselt objekt- ja metamõistega. Semio­
sfäär on see, mida uuritakse kultuuris või kultuurina, ning semiosfäär on 
see vahend, mille abil kultuuri uuritakse. Semiosfääri abil uuritakse se­
miosfääri ei ole paradoks, vaid tähistab uurimisobjekti ja tema kirieldus- 
keele dialoogi. Kultuuri kui uurimisobjekti dünaamika sunnib teadust
otsima uusi kiijelduskeeli, kuid ka uued kirjelduskeeled mõjutavad oma­
korda kultuuridünaamikat, sest pakuvad uusi võimalusi enesekiijeldus- 
teks. Tihti on aga uus kirjelduskeel ajaloolisest vaatepunktist vaid meto­
doloogiline tõlge. Nii ühineb ka semiosfääri mõistes mitu erinevat 
kultuurisemiootikaga seotud kontseptsiooni, mis on kultuuri arengudünaa- 
mika taustal uutmoodi aktualiseerunud.
Semiosfääri mõiste viib kultuurisemiootika uuesti kokku oma aja­
looga, nagu ta viib ka rakendusliku kultuurianalüüsi kokku korraga 
kultuurilooga ja kõige uuemate nähtustega kultuuris. Need kokkupuuted 
määravad ära kultuurisemiootika koha kultuuri uurivate teaduste seas.
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Abstract. This article compares the methodologies o f two types o f sciences 
(according to J. Locke) —  semiotics, and physics —  and attempts thereby to 
characterise the semiotic and non-semiotic approaches to the description of 
ecosystems. The principal difference between the physical and semiotic sciences is 
that there exists just a single physical reality that is studied by physics via 
repetitiveness, whereas there are many semiotic realities that are studied as unique 
individuals. Seventeen complementary definitions o f the semiosphere are listed, 
among them, semiosphere defined as the space o f qualitative (incommensurable) 
diversity. It is stated that, paradoxically, diversity, being a creation o f com­
munication, can also be destroyed due to excessive communication.1
Semiotics is not simple, and cannot be simple, because it must take into 
account those aspects that natural-scientific approach would either 
overrule or not notice. But it is a paradox that the method used in order 
to make the world understandable — the building of models, both in 
semiotics and in natural sciences — simplifies by itself the state of 
affairs. If it is indeed so then the attempts to make things understandable 
may turn out to become a threat to semiotics. However, taking into 
account that model-building is a general feature of life2 — a different
1 The article is based on the presentation at the First International Meeting fo r  
the Study o f  the Semiosphere, organized by Irene Machado and her colleagues in 
Säo Paulo, Brazil, August 22-27, 2005.
2 “The understanding that biology models the activity o f model-building 
organisms is at the core o f biosemiotics” (Hoffmeyer 1999: 156). “This semiotic 
understanding is also achieved if  we include into the features o f this model the 
model-building itself, because models are not the sum o f their building blocks but 
are defined by being about something else; they are complex signs occurring in 
organisms” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 14). The statement that model-building, or 
Umwelt-building, is a universal feature o f all living systems (i.e., an attribute of 
life), including plants, has been further analysed in Kull 2000.
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answer is conceivable. Understanding, from a semiotic point of view, 
would not be achieved just via a good model, but requires mstead a 
continuous interchange between contradicting models.
In this paper I am going to study the relationship between the 
semiosphere and the sphere of ecological relationships. That means 
in which sense the study field of ecology (an ecosystem, the environ­
mental relationships of organisms and communities) could or could 
not belong to the semiosphere. In order to find a solution to this 
problem, we need not only to have a precise definition of the semio­
sphere, but also to make very clear, what the non-semiotic space 
would look like, or what is non-semiosphere. Below, I will list 17 
complementary definitions of the semiosphere.
1. Code duality, and being in multiple worlds
In several of his lectures, Juri Lotman liked to begin his talk with a 
paradox. Since semiosphere is a very general notion, a description of it 
via paradoxes might indeed be helpful. A paradox with what it would be 
appropriate to start here is the famous paradox of learning— Meno’s 
paradox. It has been formulated in the Platonic dialogue Meno, and it 
states that one cannot search for what one does not know and does not 
need to search for what one already knows. If so, then learning turns 
out to be impossible. Learning as acquiring knowledge of something 
else is essentially a sign process, and in this sense it requires an 
embeddedness into the sphere of signs. Eight hundred years after 
Plato, in D e Magistro, in a dialogue between Augustine and his son 
Adeodatus, Augustine says (e.g., King 1998; Chang 2002): When a 
sign is given to me, it can teach me nothing if it finds me ignorant of 
the things of which it is the sign; but if I’m not ignorant, what do I 
learn through the sign?
Juri Lotman, when describing the assumptions for communication, 
has described a similar paradox: If two individuals are absolutely 
different from each other, if they do not have anything in common, 
then meaningful communication between them is impossible. But if 
two individuals are absolutely identical, then, also, communication is 
impossible — actually, it is possible, but they just do not have 
anything to tell each other.
In its more general aspect, the same paradox sounds as the ever­
lasting controversy between identity and change: in order to continue, 
one has to remain the same — life itself, however, is the changing, life 
is permanent movement.
The solution to this paradox can already be found in Socrates — in 
the principle of dialogue. However, Lotman’s formulation is more 
precise. He claims that there is always more than one text, more than 
one code. There cannot be such thing as single language, or single 
culture. In order to have a message, at least two different codes, or two 
languages are required.
A text is a mechanism constituting a system o f  heterogeneous semiotic spaces, 
in whose continuum certain initial message is circulated. We do not perceive 
this message to be the manifestation o f a single language: a minimum o f two 
languages is required to create it. No text o f such kind can be adequately 
described in a perspective o f one single language. (Lotman 1981b: 7)3
To be defined as ‘text’, a message should be at least dually coded. (Lotman 
1981a: 4)
These can be seen as different formulations of the code duality prin­
ciple.4 It presupposes the coexistence of continuality and discreteness 
in any form of meaning-creating or significant communication. This 
principle has been similarly described by Jesper Hoffmeyer and Claus 
Emmeche (1991).
Code duality principle establishes the principal feature of semio­
sphere — the co-existence of complementary descriptions.5 And it is a 
very non-physical concept (or assumption) indeed — because, despite 
of N. Bohr’s complementarity principle, for physical approach it 
would be absurd to assume that a single description is by definition 
meaningless.
The semiosphere can be defined as the space o f  meaning-gene- 
ration. Indeed, there is only one way to generate meaning —  via 
multiple simultaneous descriptions; i.e., simultaneously to understand 
and not to understand; or, to recognize and not to recognize one and
Semiosphere and a dual ecology: Paradoxes o f communication 177
3 An English translation in Lotman 1994.
4 In analytic philosophy, the problem is often solved via a compositional theory 
o f meaning that every natural language has; or, via a duality or relationship 
between syntactic and semantic aspect o f messages (e.g., Schiffer 1987).
5 ‘Description’ is used here in a very broad sense.
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the same thing. J. Lotman (1992: 16) says: “non-understanding [•- |  
appears to be as valuable a mechanism of meaning as understanding . 
Without paradox there is no signification.
Thus, being, or living in all its forms, assumes multiple simulta­
neous interpretations. And that is what makes learning possible.
2. The semiosphere
I have been interviewing several participants of the conference on 
semiosphere,7 asking them to give a brief definition of semiosphere. 
As surprising as this may be — the answers turned out to be very 
diverse. Ten people gave ten different responses. Thus, it may not be 
uninteresting to list some of these definitions here.
This principle —  that neither a sign, an organism, a text, or a 
culture can exist alone, singly — it always requires another sign, other 
organisms, texts, cultures, in order to exist, to live — this principle is 
namely the one that has been formulated by Juri Lotman as the con­
cept of semiosphere (Lotman 2005 [1984]). He formulated this 
concept first in 1982, under the influence of Vladimir Vernadsky's 
concept of biosphere.8 Probably the first note on it is in Lotman's 
letter to Bons Uspensky from March 19, 1982, in which he wrote:
I am reading Vernadsky and [ ...]  I am stunned by one o f his statements. You 
know [...]  my opinion that a text can exist (i.e., it can socially be recognized as a 
text) only if  it is preceded by another text, and that any developed culture should 
be preceded by another developed culture. And now I find Vernadsky’s thought, 
deeply founded on the experience o f exploring cosmic geology, that life can 
arise only from living, i.e. that it is preceded by life. [ ...]  Only the antecedence 
of semiotic sphere makes a message a message. Only the existence o f mind 
explains the existence o f mind. (Lotman 1997: 629-630)
“[ ...]  nepor.imanie [ ...]  predstavlyaetsya stol’ zhe tsennym smyslovym  
mehanizmom, chto i ponimanie”.
The First International Meeting for the Study o f the Semiosphere Sao Paulo 
August 22-27, 2005.
8 See also Tornp 2005; Kull 1999; Kotov 2002; Kotov, Kull 2006
Thus, here we get the first definition — (1) ‘semiosphere is a textual 
whole, a text together with other texts that make it a text’.
From here we get also another definition — namely that (2) 
‘semiosphere is anything formed from the (endless) web of 
interpretations’. Or, (3) ‘semiosphere is the sphere of communication’. 
It “consists in communication” (Hoffmeyer 1997: 933). Thus, (4) 
‘semiosphere is a web of sign processes, or semioses’. As it has been 
pointed out:
The semiotic point o f view is the perspective that results from the sustained 
attempt to live reflectively with and follow out the consequences o f  one 
simple realization: the whole o f our experience [ . . .]  is a network or web o f  
sign relations. (Deely 2005: 16)
And this sort o f circle, according to which language, in the presence o f those 
who are learning it, precedes itself, teaches itself, and suggests its own 
deciphering, is perhaps the marvel which defines language. (Merleau-Ponty 
1964: 39)
And not only language, of course, but all varieties of sign systems. (5) 
“Semiosphere is the set of all interconnected umweiten. Any two 
umweiten, when communicating, are a part of the same semiosphere” 
(Kull 1998: 305).
Few additional definitions can be listed.
Almost identical to (4) is the definition: (6) "semiosphere is the 
space of semioses’. The concept of ‘space’ appears to describe an 
important aspect of the semiosphere, e.g., (7) ‘semiosphere is the 
space of meaning-generation’. Also, (8) ‘semiosphere is the space of 
whole-part relations’. This definition pays attention to the relational 
dimension of sign, allowing us to state that a sign is aways a part.
A tradition in semiotics that uses the idea of Gregory Bateson 
about information as a ‘difference that makes a difference’ could lead 
to the following formulation: (9) ‘semiosphere is where distinguishing 
occurs, where distinctions are made’. And as a reformulation of this 
definition, (10) ‘semiosphere is the space of qualitative diversity’.
Indeed, we may state that ‘diversity in a web’ is the main concern 
of semiotics. Semiosphere as a space of diversity provides us with the 
insight into the similarity between various processes of relational 
diversification, from biological speciation to conceptual categori­
zation.
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An existence of identity also assumes a possibility of destroying it. 
Accordingly, it is possible to think that (11) ‘semiosphere is a sphere 
of healing’. This is because in a non-semiosphere, there is no such 
condition as ‘healthy’ or ‘ill’ or even ‘broken’. There cannot be 
‘errors’ outside the semiosphere.
Unlike the physical world, which manifests a single truthful rea­
lity, (12) ‘semiosphere is the world of multiple truths, of multiple 
worlds’.
We may also state that (13) “the totality of ‘contrapuntal duets’9 
forms the sphere of communication — the semiosphere” (Emmeche et 
al. 2002: 21). According to T. Sebeok (2001: 164): “Biosemiotics pre­
supposes the axiomatic identity of the semiosphere with the bio­
sphere”. And (14) “semiosphere is thus the totality of interconnected 
signs, a sphere that covers the Earth” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 21).
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3. Semiotics and physics
When speaking about the semiosphere as the space of meaning- 
generation — or (15) ‘semiosphere as a continuum of culture’ — it 
would be helpful to compare it to the space that is not (part of the) 
semiosphere. For instance — atmosphere is obviously not semio­
sphere. Similarly, anything else about what a semiotician would use 
an expression “purely physical” would not be semiosphere. Thus it is 
reasonable to ask what is the difference between physical space and 
semiotic space (or semiosphere).
It is always necessary to consider that ‘semiotic’ means both an 
approach and an object. In addition to the semiotic study of semiosis 
(i.e. semiotics 5. str., including semiotics of culture and biosemiotics), 
there also exists a semiotic study of the environment that is not ne­
cessarily a living one or semiotic p er  se (this environment is studied, 
e.g., by semiotics of environment), which means the textualization of 
everything, independent of its nature. And, in addition to the non- 
semiotic study of non-semiotic (or study of “meaninglessness”, as in 
physics), there also exists a non-semiotic approach to the living, i.e. to 
semiosis-consisting objects (examples of this approach include large 
part of biology, and the natural scientific study of society) (Table 1).
9 On the notion o f ‘contrapuntal duets’ see Uexküll 1982: 54
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Table 1. Interrelation of semiotic/nonsemiotic methods and semiotic/non- 
semiotic things as generating a principal classification of sciences.
Things \ Non-semiotic Semiotic (textualised)
Methodologies (detextualised) approach approach
Non-semiotic physics s. str. semiotics of
(not alive) environment
Prim ary semiotic threshold
Semiotic biology s. s tr biosemiotics
(alive)
Secondary semiotic threshold
Semiotic sociology s. s tr semiotics of culture
(lingual)
This classification follows from the nature of semiosis that multiplies 
the reality. Consequently, (16) ‘semiosphere is the region of multiple 
realities’ (or, semiosphere is the world of several realities). However, 
the region and phenomena of multiple realities can be described as all 
belonging into one single reality (as the physical approach does). In 
addition, the regions of single reality can be projected into the mul­
tiple one via the description process itself (like semiotics does). Thus, 
four groups of sciences can be distinguished in this respect (Table 2).
Table 2. Projections of realities from two types of world (of one or seve­
ral realities) into two types of models (of descriptions in a single or 
multiple languages) as a basis for classification of sciences.
World \ Models Non-semiotic models Semiotic models
Non-semiotic 
(world of no semiosis)
Single reality into 
Single reality
Single reality into 
Multiple realities
Semiotic
(world of semioses)
Multiple realities into 
Single reality
Multiple realities into 
Multiple realities
According to John Locke, all human knowledge can be divided 
between three major sciences10 — ethics, physics, and semiotics. Let 
me try to compare here the last two.
These two principal types of inquiries, or sorts of sciences 
physica et semiotica — provide two distinct types of descriptions. A 
brief comparison of these two points of view' is presented in Table 3.
Both physics and semiotics have expressed their ambition to study 
everything in the world, or at least their ability to cover everything. 
Accordingly, these can be seen as types of sciences, or approaches, or 
points of view. In principle, any phenomenon can be studied both 
physically and semiotically.
From Table 3 it appears to be quite clear that the difference 
between physics and semiotics when studying seemingly one and the 
same thing is rooted in their methodology. Physics and semiotics are 
just two different methodologies, or two separate points of view12 — 
and two sets of methods — to study the world. A principal difference 
is that there exists just a single physical world that is studied by 
physics via repetitiveness, whereas for semiotics there exist many 
worlds that are studied as unique individuals.
For example, we may study the physics of an organism, and 
alternatively, we may study the semiotics of an organism. The former 
is about many things (its mechanics, dynamics, chemistry), but not 
about meanings. The latter is the study in terms of semiotic space, and 
accordingly emerging meanings can be studied.
It is important to note that both — physics and semiotics — make 
predictions. However, the methods of making the predictions are prin­
cipally different. The physical types of predictions are quantitative — 
either deterministic, or probabilistic, statistical. The semiotic predic­
tions are qualitative ones. For instance, when studying a text that is 
currently in the process of writing, it is possible to make a scientific 
prediction about the next word to appear. In case of a physical ap­
proach, a prediction w'ould use correlations between adjacent words in 
the language, and accordingly it will be possible to calculate the 
statistical probabilities for the next word. A semiotic approach, 
instead, w'ould look at the possible meanings of the expression, and 
provide a prediction about the next word on a purely qualitative basis.
J. Locke has used the expression ‘sorts o f  sciences’
‘ See Deely 2001: 593fT.
12 Cf. Deely 2005: 12ff.
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Table 3. Relationships between the two types of sciences — physical, and 
semiotic.
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Physics Semiotics
Study fields, 
e.g.
natural sciences sciences of meaning
study of quantities study of qualitative 
diversity
physical ecology semiotic ecology
biophysics biosemiotics
Objects 
(models) of 
study
physical space semiotic space, 
semiosphere
non-textual or detextualised Textual or textualised
things and interactions signs and semioses13
laws codes, habits
transformations translations,
interpretations
quantities qualitative diversity
multiple objects unique objects
world as non-living living world
Features of
objects
(models)
commensurability incommensurability
context-independence context-dependence
no errors in nature fallibilism
Methods of 
study
measurements qualitative methods
experimental experiential
from outside from inside
by independent researcher participatory
reductionism holism, mimesis14
statistical tests comparison
Truth, reality single multiple
Speaking about the environment and ecology in this context, one can 
notice that ecology is clearly twofold. There is an ecology that has 
been developed as a natural science, according to the Modernist model 
of science — a field of quantitative research of environment with 
organic systems in it, without any intrinsic value or meaning in itself.
13 Or objects, in the sense o f Deely 2005.
14 The role o f mimesis as a study method opposed to reductionism has been 
described by Rosen 1999.
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And there is an ecology that includes meaning and value. The latter 
would include ecophilosophy, biosemiotics, semiotic ecology. The 
first is a branch of physics, or biophysics, and the latter is a branch of 
semiotics. Thus, semiosphere is a concept of fundamentally post­
modern approach15 — in the sense of John Deely (2005).
Environment as a physical concept is not the same as semiosphere. 
But the situation is different if we speak about the ecosphere as a 
semiotic concept. According to the biosemiotic view, semiosphere 
coincides with the ecosphere. Hence, this is a concept that can deal 
with environmental problems without the nature-culture opposition; 
instead, these problems can be formulated in terms of specific features 
of sign systems.
Umwelt —  a concept introduced by Jakob von Uexküll — is a 
notion close to semiosphere. We may redefine it: um welt is a personal 
semiotic space. Thus —  Umweltforschung, or umwelt-research is a 
semiotic study, whereas there can also be, in parallel, a physical study 
of the environment — of the same environment, however, without any 
meaning-generation noticed.
O f course — the issue is more complicated, because one can 
distinguish between physical and semiotic things, physical and se­
miotic methods or approaches, and physical and semiotic models, 
knowledge.
If we look at the level of models, of knowledge, and semiosphere 
being a concept or model belonging to semiotic knowledge, then it is 
obvious that we can speak about semiosphere everywhere where 
semiotic knowledge extends. Also, everything physical can be viewed 
semiotically, can be textualised, and physical models can be seen 
(interpreted) as special cases of semiotic ones.
If we look at the level of methods, it turns out that physical method 
is not capable to discover meaning, meaningfulness. In order to detect 
meaning, we need a semiotic approach —  physical approach is 
insufficient for that (even more, physical approach is unnecessary' for 
that). Thus — semiosphere is a creation or a construct of semiotic 
method.
If to consider that semiosphere is not just a construct o f our theorv 
or method, i.e. that meaning-generation is actually taking place 
independent of its human descriptions — then semiosphere should 
exist also in the world of things.
15 This statement is also supported by M. Lotman 2002.
Semiosphere is formed by those who are capable of making diffe­
rences. The power of distinction-making is, in a way, also a method. 
Only those who use at least two codes, two languages, etc., can be a 
part of the semiotic world, the semiosphere.
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4. Diversity
Most briefly, semiosphere is the space o f  diversity,16 Which means 
that the semiosphere is heterogeneous space (or communicative me­
dium) enabling qualitative diversity to emerge, to fuse, and to sustain. 
Diversity is a relational phenomenon, and accordingly, it is based on 
communication, on the ability to make differences.
Diversity, accordingly, would be a central concept of semiotics. 
Semiotics can be defined as a study of qualitative diversity — as 
opposed to physics, the study of quantities.
Diversity means the existence of non-reducible differences, a lack 
of a common measure that would enable converting one into another. 
Thus, diversity also assumes certain non-convertibility, or incom­
mensurability.
This leads to a quite paradoxical definition — (17) ‘semiosphere is 
a communicative space of non-translatability’. And semiotics being 
the study of non-translatability.17
Let me give one example here. In most organisms, there cannot 
exist any interest in survival — despite of the fact that they appear to 
behave as if there was something like that. It is because most orga­
nisms cannot be informed about their own death — except humans, of 
course. Organisms have many needs, many animals have emotions, 
etc., which constitute their interests. There are many interests, qualita­
tively different interests (in finding food, finding partner, avoiding an 
enemy, etc.) that an organism can itself distinguish from each other; 
however, the interest in survival is evidently just applied via models 
and not recognized by most of organisms themselves. A claim about 
the existence of a general interest in survival and accordingly a
16 Cf. definition (10), above.
17 Cf. Lotman (1992: 15): “translation o f non-translatable carries the information 
o f highest value”; Lotman (1992: 42): “Semiotic space occurs for us as a multi­
layer overlapping o f different texts [...]  o f various translatability and o f spaces o f  
non-translatability”.
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common measure of survival — the quantitative fitness — is a typical 
example of how physical approach to an issue transforms it and 
removes qualitative diversity.
In order to communicate, participants not only need to share the 
semiosphere, but much more — their semiotic spaces have to be 
similar in several aspects. And there exists a trend of increasing si­
milarity between regular communicants.
It is a paradox that diversity, being a creation of communication, 
can also be destroyed due to excessive communication. Indeed — 
communication makes umwelten more similar to each other. Or in 
other words — too much communication can be described as a general 
reason for many ecological problems that lead to homogenization of 
the world and loss of diversity. This is the case both in biological 
communities and in cultures:
Communication between cultures makes them more similar to each other, and 
thus, indeed, too much communication would mean a threat to diversity and 
identity. On the other hand, cultural differences are not just a result of 
historical chance and development in separateness. The differences and 
identities themselves are very much o f communicative origin, so the diversity 
of cultures can be seen as a result o f dialogue. (M. Lotman et al. 2004: 143)
It is well known how the development of ecological understanding of 
ecological webs and recycling has shifted people’s approach and 
evaluation of many common habits that concern our environment, 
consumption, trash. In a similar vein, the development of semiotic 
understanding of the semiosphere would lead to shifts that concern 
many common habits in our cultural behaviour. These may be shifts in 
the evaluation of diversity and difference, and accordingly, of the 
communication sphere itself.18
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Семиосфера и двоякая экология: парадоксы коммуникации
Сравниваются методологии двух основных типов наук (в понимании 
Джона Локка) — семиотики и физики, — на основе чего характери­
зуется семиотический и несемиотический подход к описанию эко­
систем. Главное отличие между физическими и семиотическими на­
уками состоит в том, что для первых существует одна и единственная 
физическая реальность, которая исследуется с использованием при­
сущей ей повторяемости, в то время как семиотика признает су­
ществование многих семиотических реальностей, которые изучаются 
как единственные (уникальные, индивидуальные). В статье насчиты­
вается 17 разных, но согласующихся между собой определений се- 
миосферы. Согласно одному из них семиосфера является пространст­
вом качественного разнообразия (отсутствие единого измерения). 
Парадоксальным образом коммуникация оказывается как создателем 
разнообразия, так и — в случае чрезмерной коммуникации — его 
разрушителем.
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Semiosfäär ja  kahetine ökoloogia: Kommunikatsiooniparadoksid
Võrreldakse J. Locke’i poolt eristatud kahe põhilise teaduse vormi — 
semiootika ja füüsika — metodoloogiaid, iseloomustades sedakaudu se­
miootilist ja mittesemiootilist lähenemist ökosüsteemide kirjeldamisele. 
Peamine erinevus füüsikaliste ja semiootiliste teaduste vahel seisneb 
selles, et eksisteerib üks ja ainus füüsikaline reaalsus, mida uuritakse 
temas esinevaid korduvusi kasutades, ning palju semiootilisi reaalsusi, 
mida uuritakse kui ainulisi (unikaalseid, individuaalseid). Artiklis loetle­
takse 17 erinevat, kuid omavahel kooskõlas olevat semiosfääri määratlust. 
Neist ühe järgi on semiosfäär kvalitatiivse mitmekesisuse (ehk ühismõõ- 
dutuse) ruum. Paradoksaalselt on kommunikatsioon nii mitmekesisuse 
loojaks kui ka — ülemäärase kommunikatsiooni korral — selle hävi­
tajaks.
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Abstract. The origin o f culture remains in the sphere o f hypotheses. Although 
the hypotheses derive from two presumptions: first, how the structure o f  
culture is envisaged, and secondly, how culture is thought to function. Juri 
Lotman dealt with both aspects o f culture, initially the structural and typo­
logical and later the dynamic aspects. Thereby, he arrived at the cultural- 
philosophical hypothesis o f the autocatalytic origin o f culture. A catalyst is a 
component o f a chemical reaction which itself doesn’t transform during the 
reaction, but whose presence is needed to guarantee the reaction (or to 
stimulate it). Thus, autocatalysis is a paradoxical situation in which the 
genesis o f something presumes the pre-existence o f the final product. The 
paradox o f the autocatalysis o f  culture lies in the fact that culture cannot 
emerge from anything other than from culture itself, from its own germina­
tion. In 1988, speaking about the autocatalysis o f culture, Lotman refered to 
the cultural historicist Nikolai I. Konrad (1891-1970), who undoubtedly bor­
rowed this idea from Jacob Christopher Burckhardt (1818-1897). This 
undiscovered connection reminds us o f the fact, that a model for autocatalysis 
(or an autopoiesis) was basic to Naturphilosophie o f  the 19th century. In the 
20th century, this was represented by Vladimir I. Vernadsky (1863-1945), 
from whom Lotman in 1982 received the impetus to formulate the concept of 
semiosphere as well as o f the autocatalysis o f culture. The autocatalysis model 
of culture is culturally diachronical, the semiosphere is, however, a synchro- 
nical one. In both cases, the natural philosophical cytology o f the 19th century 
was Lotman’s semiotical meta-language.
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Models of cultural memory: The world of names
The cultural history reflected in consciousness can be modeled as a 
system of proper names, the nodes of which are the cultural pheno­
mena, which are indicated by proper names (more often personal 
names). The greatest portion of cultural memory is encoded in proper 
names, and participation in some culture primarily means the ability to 
orient among the culture’s proper names. Being cultured is the ability 
to speak using names.1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has aptly 
commented on the personal nature of cultural history: “There are two 
kinds of sequences {Folgerungen): some are just the working out of 
principles into further details; some, however, are the return to deeper 
principles; historicality consists of just this, to indicate which 
individuals possess such a subsequent deepening of thought and its 
unlocking” (Hegel 1830: xvii-xviii).
To the mythological consciousness it is self-evident, that looking 
back to the dawn of time, to the beginning of everything, there is One 
Very First Name. Together with names marking cultural phenomena 
all culture is collected into this primeval beginning. This One Very 
First Name belongs to the Creator of Culture, to the Demiurge, or the 
primeval being, “from whom all has gotten its beginning”, “from 
whom everything has started to be” — Bochica of the Indians of 
Colombia, the Polynesian Maui, the Egyptians’ Osiris and Toth, the 
Greek Prometheus.
Such a narrowing of the proper name network into the Very First 
Name, as a clearly mythological thought process cannot be acceptable 
to the scientific, purely logical understanding of the development of 
culture. The scientific cultural history operates on a concept of the 
dispersal of proper names, according to which looking back, personal
Here we cannot leave unmentioned a pertinent episode in “The Winners” (Los 
prem ios, 1960) by the Argentinian author Julio Cortazar, which describes the 
shipboard meeting o f two intellectuals starting out on a trip around the world: 
“Did you already find the bar? It is upstairs next to the dining room. Unfortunately
I also saw a piano in the comer, but we have the chance to cut the strings in the 
next day or two.” —  “Or to cause it to be so out o f tune that everything played on 
it sounds like Krenek,” answers the other. Later recalling the event the first 
remarks: see, the trip didn’t start off badly —  “someone in the ship’s corridor 
mentioned Krenek’s name —  just like that, in passing!” (Cortazar 1979- 72-73)
names thin out and finally disappear, giving ground to the anonymity 
of cultural carriers.
Positive facts, of course, confirm such an understanding. In the 
depth of time, people were quite dispersed. For instance, today we 
know of only 200—300 Neanderthals, i.e. about one individual per 
every thousand years! Here names cannot even be spoken of. 
Therefore, in scientific descriptions of the genesis of culture, we have 
to operate without names, and accept that the “four energy principles 
which our modem technology uses have come from unknown and 
unnamed ice age inventors, who lived on earth thousands of years 
before us” (Lips 1968: 93).
Yet, such anonymity makes thinking about culture uncomfortable, 
which is why hidden mythological tendencies can be found in even 
the most seriously scientific treatment.
Hidden mythological thinking doesn’t operate directly with the 
names of gods or heroes, but substitutes vague pre-historic people 
with a Man, as such, who starts to act as a mythological being: “From 
the beginning, man has tried by using different resources to lighten his 
work burden” (Lips 1968: 80). This Man, who is again mythologized, 
will successfully compete with Prometheus: “How man first came in 
contact with fire which he wished to tame and preserve, this remains 
undiscovered,” says scientologist John D. Bernal (1962: 43) figurati­
vely.
Such examples confirm, that the question is not just in stylistic 
clumsiness, but actually in a mythological thought process for the 
treatment of culturology which claims to be purely scientific: an 
anonymous collective is treated as an individual who has secretly been 
granted a researcher’s absolute consciousness.
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Nature and culture: Dualism or monism?
To conceive of Culture only as something different than Nature does 
not explain its genesis.
The hypothesis that the transition from Nature to Culture occurs 
with the help of some outside third force is made inevitable by the 
dualistic opposition of nature and culture.
This is not just a typical mythological, but also a religious and 
theological understanding of Culture’s (and civilization’s) relationship
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with Nature. Referring to Thomas Aquinas, who clearly emphasizes 
that intellect and the spiritual culture built on it cannot be a function or 
side function of some material, bodily (natural) organ but has a 
separate origin 2 The endurance of this conviction is confirmed by 
Pope Pius XII in his encyclical on the topic of evolution Humani 
generis (1950), which allows for the possibility of researching phy­
sical evolution, but emphasizes the divine origin of the soul and 
(spiritual) culture.
And finally, such a Nature and Culture dualism also characterizes 
such pseudo-religious conceptions of culture as Erich von Däniken’s 
hypothesis on the extraterrestrial origin of civilization: those from 
outer space cultivate the earthlings until they become reasoning beings. In 
such a way, E. von Däniken surmises that a new race can emerge, 
which can jump over a certain portion of natural evolution (Däniken 
1972: 95).
Notably more interesting, and problematic are efforts to explam the 
genesis of Culture monistically, efforts to build a bridge between 
Nature and Culture. These have existed for a long time and, at least at 
first glance, they can be divided into materialistic and idealistic. As 
the first example, we should mention Democritus’s understanding that 
human culture has developed as a direct imitation of animal activity: 
weaving-sewing taught by spiders, house building by swallows, 
singing by swans and nightingales. Therefore, culture has a natural, 
animalistic ongin.
Such primitivism and naturalism is contrasted with the common 
idealistic, pantheistic concepts of natural and divine beginnings, 
which — in case they are connected with the development idea — see 
the premise for the rise of Nature into Culture in the spirituality of 
nature itself. This is the legacy of natural philosophy.
The leading figure of modem natural philosophy became Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling with the works ‘'Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature” (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797), “On the World 
Soul ( Von der Weltseele, 1798) and “First Plan of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature" (Erster Entw urf eines Systems der Naturphilo-
S. th., P. I, qu. 7, art. 2 ad 3: “Hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se 
quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma non in 
materia, sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae Angelorum, vel ad minus 
potentia intellective, quae non est actus alicuius organi in anima intellectiva 
copori coniuncta” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1274).
sophie, 1799). Having studied mathematics, physics and medicine for 
two years at Leipzig University, he knew the contemporary sciences 
quite well, as Alexander von Humboldt, the great German naturalist, 
admits. F. W. J. Schelling’s main natural philosophical position was 
pantheistic hylozoism — life exists in all things as the finalistic 
principle of polarity and reproduces itself (as natura naturans).
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Theory of the autocatalysis of life
The cellular theory was founded 1838 by the German scientists, 
botanist Matthias Jacob Schleiden and anatomist-physiologist Theodor 
Schwann. They asserted that cells are the basic unit of all living orga­
nisms and that without cells there is no life. (The arguments on the 
topics of the life of viruses were a long way off.) In the period 
1860/70, the German physician Hermann Eberhard Friedrich Richter 
presented the slogan Omne vivum ab aetem itate e cellula — “From 
the beginning of time, everything living comes from cells”. The leading 
Prussian scientist Rudolf Virchow affirmed in his work “Cellular 
Pathology” {Die Cellularpathologie, 1858), that cells can only arise 
from cells (Omnis cellula e cellula).
During the 19th century, cell theory was still largely the arena of 
supposition. Recall Ernst Haeckel’s “theory of cell souls” ! Behind the 
views of R. Vichow, we can also recognize F. W. J. Schelling’s 
natural philosophy.
Actually the question of life’s biogenesis or a-biogenesis is also 
natural philosophical. (An example from the 19th century is Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck’s theory of the parallel genesis of soil as a compound of 
elements and plants as life form.) For instance, biogenesis is promoted 
today by Šrila Prabhupäda, the great teacher of Krishna with the very 
emotional argument: “We must teach that life is bom from life, not from 
material. We must make this fact known, because we possess the truth, 
while scientists rely on fallacies” (Prabhupäda 1999: 44).
With references to Indian religion, Vladimir I. Vernadsky confirms 
in the speech “Origin and Eternity of Life” (Nachalo i vechnost’ 
zhizni, 1921) that the origin of live matter only come from live matter. 
In addition to these religion-themed arguments, V. I. Vernadsky also 
refers to natural philosophy, most emphatically to the cytologist H. E. 
F. Richter. With positivistic arguments, V. I. Vernadsky actually de-
fends the postulates of natural philosophy claiming that, since the 
physical conditions on Earth were not conducive to life, “life could 
have arrived on Earth from outside”, as conserved particles from outer 
space, or that “life is a cosmic, not a specifically earthly occurrence”. 
In summary, he writes “Life is eternal in so far as the Cosmos is 
eternal, and it has always been carried forward by biogenesis” (Ver- 
nadskij 1989: 102, 104, 105).
In his arguments, V. I. Vernadsky relys on Francesco Redi’s, the 
17th century Italian naturalist’s, position omne vivum ex vivo — “all 
life is bom from the living” and recalls once more H. E. F. Richter’s 
cell theory, saying that “Redi’s principle can be applied to cells, as the 
smallest organized elements” (Vemadskij 1989: 113).
According to the knowledge of today, H. E. F. Richter’s theory 
does not, however, apply on the level of organelles. Many parts of 
cells, for instance mitochondria, as well as plastides in plant cells, in 
which an organism’s chemical energy source adenosine triphosphate 
(ATP) is produced and which contain DNA, are actually created by 
splitting from identical cell particles. All other cell particles, however, 
do not emanate from division but are produced internally from 
material synthesized in the cell.3
V. I. Vernadsky’s assertion that “the evolution process is nothing 
more than different expressions of one and the same substrate — the 
unitary life” is actually the core of F. W. J. Schelling’s Naturphilo­
sophie.
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The autocatalysis of culture
Significantly, semiotician Juri Lotman found an application for this 
model of natural philosophical biogenesis of life in the spiritual 
sphere. On March 19, 1982, he wrote to his colleague Boris A. 
Uspensky:
1 am reading Vernadsky with great pleasure and find many o f my thoughts 
there (I am writing articles on semiotics). Reading Vernadsky, I am struck by 
one o f his statements. You know, that once at our Moscow seminar [...] , I 
dared to express the belief that a text can exist (that is, be socially acknow­
ledged as text) when it is preceded by another text, and that every developed
3 The author thanks Andres Piirsoo o f the Tartu University for useful comments.
culture must have been preceded by developed culture. And now I discover in 
Vernadsky the deeply reasoned thought, based on long cosmic geological 
research, that life can only originate from the living, that is, only when it is 
preceded by life. Therefore, he defines living and dead (he says: inert) 
material as two primeval elements, which are expressed in different forms, but 
remain forever separated from and in contact with each other. I am convinced, 
however, that thought as well cannot develop evolutionally from non-thought 
(a separate issue is that apparently we should not deny thought in the case o f  
animals and maybe life without thought is impossible at all). For just as life 
consists o f all forms o f life activity from the work o f  anaerobic bacteria to the 
most complicated forms, so too thought (semiosis) takes both simple and 
complicated forms.
It is interesting, that Vernadsky constructs his arguments as an empiricist 
and positivist, taking care to distance himself from theological and mystical 
thought. He argues thusly: science only can be based on observable or 
constructed facts. The moment o f changing non-life into life is not traceable 
or constructable anywhere in the universe. Even going back a million years, 
we still find some forms o f organic life (or traces o f its existence) and non­
life. And all hypothesis o f the [non-living] origin o f  life are speculation, which 
are based on a hypothesis, that one [i.e. life matter] must develop from the 
other [i.e. non-life matter]. I believe for my part that neither the acceptance o f  
the existence o f primeval rationality needs a theological or opposing [i.e. atheistic] 
view. This only indicates a simple fact: we cannot decide, whether light impulses 
from stars are semiotic signals or not, because we lack the presumption of  
rationality. Only the previous existence o f  the semiotic sphere makes a message 
into message. Only the existence o f  intelligence explains the existence o f  
intelligence. (Lotman 2001: 683-684; my emphasis —  L. P.)
Six years later, Lotman presented a paper “University and science” 
(Universitet i пайка, 1988) in Bologna. He refers to the correspon­
dence of Nikolai I. Konrad, the Russian orientalist, with Arnold J. 
Toynbee, the English cultural historian (which was published in 
Russian in 1967):
N. I. Konrad wrote to A. Toynbee and argued against his ideas on the ruin o f 
culture, that “The Iliad  certainly does not mark the beginning o f a new 
literature; it is a summary o f all previous culture, but a summary, which has 
been made by a new people, who have inherited this culture. The real 
beginning o f Greek literature is the primitive poetry and prose, which we find 
in the “post-Homeric period”. (Lotman 1989: 51).
It should be said, that here N. I. Konrad is actually repeating a thought 
expressed by Jacob Christopher Burckhardt, the Swiss cultural
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researcher in his work “History of Greek Culture (Griechische 
Kulturgeschichte, 1898/1902):
Homer could not, at any rate, have been the first artistic poet; nevertheless his 
tone and style are possible only as the result o f  a long tradition o f rhapsodists 
and schools o f rhapsodists; this is the only way to explain the unerring 
assurance o f the treatment. Most probably the tone and the style o f such 
narrations were both created by very talented individuals during ancient times. 
(Burckhardt 1898/1902: 156-157)
Ample references to J. C. Burckhardt allow us to conclude with con­
fidence, that the Swiss author’s works were familiar to N. I. Konrad 
and significantly influenced his views.
Although N. I. Konrad creates a model situation from J. C. Burck­
hardt’s single observation, claiming analogous phenomena in Indian 
culture:
It seems to me that in the same way we can approach another enigmatic 
literary relic, the Indian Rämõyana. [ ...]  Perhaps there is a similar historical 
mystery here as in the case o f  The Iliad. In any case, the Rämäyana is not 
primitive. Is no starting point” (Konrad 1974: 278).
And he generalizes that “lost cultures are reborn not only transformed, 
but also as one with an enormous mass of matter which has been 
already created by its own [i. e. Rämäyana'’s] contemporary time” 
(Konrad 1974: 278).
By connecting these thoughts by N. I. Konrad with V. I. Ver­
nadsky’s natural philosophical views, Lotman puts into words the 
basic thesis of cultural autocatalysis: “We can assume, that the origin 
o f a developed civilization needs the existence o f  another developed 
civilization, even if the other one has already been destroyed” (Lotman 
1989: 51; my emphasis — L. P.).
From typology to dynamics
Two phases can be detected in the development of Juri Lotman’s 
cultural semiotical views — typological and dynamic (Torop 1999* 
3S1-A04).
In the phase dealing with typology, in “Articles on Typology of 
Culture’ (Stat'i po  tipologii ku l’tury), the collection published in 
1970, Lotman admits that “cultures are communciative systems, and 
human cultures are created on the basis of this all-encompassing 
semiotical system, which is natural language” (Lotman 1970: 13). 
This expresses Ferdinand de Saussure’s understanding, that natural 
language is the primary modeling system, and different cultural 
notations are but secondary modeling systems which have developed 
from this example: “Language is a system for expressing concepts and 
therefore it can be compared to the scripture, sign language of deaf- 
mutes, symbolic rituals, forms of politeness, military signals, etc. etc. 
It is just the most important of these systems” (Saussure 1977: 54).
But at the same time, Lotman drops a remark, which will later 
develop into his basic thesis of cultural semiotics: “A society, which is 
built on non-sign (for instance para-psychological) communications, 
would have a totally different choice of opportunities for building a 
culture” (Lotman 1970: 13).
From here Lotman’s linguistic-pictorial dualism starts to develop 
from F. de Saussure’s linguistic monism. Lotman admits here, that the 
primacy of natural language in today’s human communication is not 
the only possibility, rather at some point mankind stood — in a 
figurative sense — before a choice, whether to go the route of verbal 
or pictorial communication. At some time at the beginning of human 
culture, the choice was made in favor of verbal language.
The banishment of the picture by the word as an information 
carrier, the competition of the two in cultural history is repeatedly 
treated by Lotman, especially in his last book “Culture and explosion” 
(.Kul’tura i vzry\>, 1992) using dreams as an example of the purely 
pictorial medium, saying that
the speech sphere with its opportunities brought into play more powerful 
mechanisms and destroyed the potential possibilities o f dreams to become a 
developed realm o f a self-abundant consciousness. [...] The development of 
speech forced this cultural realm into the background and promoted its further 
simplification. (Lotman 1992a: 220-221)
The cornerstone of Lotman’s cultural dynamic model is the assertion 
that pictorial communications have not disappeared, but have 
preserved its primary role as the creator of basic heterogeneity in the 
culture and thereby as the motor of cultural dynamics.
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The dynamics of culture as a complete semiotic system is not 
derived from the fact that the existing languages of cultural texts are 
simply different and translatable from one to the other, but from the 
fact, that they are different in principle, founded on two equal primary 
modeling systems. In 1973, Lotman asserts in his article “Some 
remarks on the structure of a narrative text” (Zamechaniya о strukture 
poxes nova te l’ nogo teksta) that following in F. de Saussure’s footsteps 
and accepting natural language as the only primal language of human 
communication is “mere habit”:
In discrete verbal messages, the text consists o f  signs, in the other case [i.e. in 
the case o f pictorial texts] there are not signs, and the message is delivered by 
the text as a whole. And if  we add discretion, separating the sign-like 
structural elements, then we must treat this as the mere habit o f seeing verbal 
intercourse as the primary if not only form o f communicative contact and to 
equate pictorial texts with verbal ones. (Lotman 1973: 383-384)
Also in the speech, in which Lotman formulated the idea of cultural 
autocatalysis, he speaks about “the basic bilinguilism (of conventional 
and iconic languages) of a culture”, where
the existence o f  two such mutually untranslatable languages, conventional 
(discrete, verbal) and iconic (continuous, spatial), is the necessary' assumption 
for a new information generating (that is '‘thinking”) device (ustrojstvo). The 
tension between discrete and continuous mechanisms has been detected in 
every artistic text and in the culture as a whole (Lotman 1989: 50-51).
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The beginnings of culture
Juri Lotman's answer to the question about the provenience of cul­
ture's basic dualism is not derived from cultural theory, but from cul­
tural philosophy and is patterned on 19th century natural philosophy.
W e are dealing with a hypothesis. But there is not this only one.
In the article “On dynamics of culture” (О dinamike ku l’tury, 
1992), Lotman raised other hypotheses about the “very first 
beginning" of culture, surmising that “human culture got its beginning 
from a large-scale, maybe catastrophic, giant explosion”. As a result, a 
pre-ritualistic and pre-artistic language of gestures was created “a 
consentaneous system of movements, calls and melodic cries, which.
when semiosis became more complicated, changed from an “action 
speech into a “speech of conventional marks”. With the assertion, 
that from that moment “mankind’s future history changed into a 
history of using words”, where “semiotics (the function and role of 
speech) [becomes] the dominant mechanism of history” (Lotman 
1992b: 9-15), Lotman returns to his drafted hypothesis of 1970 that 
human culture could probably have developed into a pictorial medium 
dominant one.
Lotman had no opportunity to integrate his views on the origin and 
dynamics of culture; therefore their coherence still awaits explanation. 
It must certainly be noted, that Lotman, as a person with an extremely 
wide horizon, used different models to explain his concepts, which 
reflected the development and enrichment of his theoretical positions.
Thinking of semiosphere units, he sometimes obviously thinks of 
monads (as defined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz), writing:
In the same way that an individual is a part as well as a holistic analogue o f a 
collective, the isolated history o f literature, or o f some other art discipline, or 
of art as a whole, can be treated as well as a part o f cultural mix or as an 
analogue o f the whole. (Lotman 1992b: 18)
Let us compare this thought to paragraph 67 of G. W. Leibniz’s 
“Monadology” {La Monadologie, 1714): “Every portion of matter 
may be conceived as a garden full of plants and a pond full of fish. 
But every branch of a plant, every limb of an animal, and every drop 
of the fluids within it, is also such a garden or such a pond.”4
On the other hand, in Lotman’s mind’s eye he sees the semio­
sphere as an organism, which is devided into cells: “for the mentioned 
semiosphere [i.e. a subset unit of semiosphere] reality changes into 
“reality for itself’ only to the extent that it is translatable into its lan­
guage (just as cell can assimilate external chemical matter only when 
these have turned into appropriate biochemical structures — both 
cases are the examples of the same rule)” (Lotman 1992c: 14). 
Lotman compares the border of a semiosphere unit to the membrane 
of a living cell. For this reason, he always sees the border as a border 
of individuality — as opposed to Mikhail M. Bakhtin who treats 
borders “non-cellularly” (Bakhtin 1979: 405).
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The model of cultural autocatalysis is a temporal, even historical 
(diacronical) model, the semiosphere, however, is a cultural spatial 
(synchronical, although dynamic) model. However, in both cases, 
Lotman’s semiotic meta-language is the 19th century natural philo­
sophical cytology.
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Проблема автокаталитичности культуры 
в философии культуры Юрия Лотмана
Проблема возникновения культуры остается в области гипотез. Но эти 
гипотезы опираются на две предпосылки: во-первых, каким пред­
ставляют строение культуры и, во-вторых, каким представляется 
функционирование культуры.
Юрий Михайлович Лотман рассматривал оба аспекта культуры: 
сначала структурально-типологический, позже динамический. Отсюда 
возникла гипотеза об автокаталитическом возникновении культуры.
Катализатором называется компонент химической реакции, кото­
рый сам в ходе реакции не изменяется, но который обеспечивает или 
возбуждает реакцию. Автокатализ представляет собой парадоксаль­
ную ситуацию, где для возникновения чего-то нужно наличие этого- 
же “чего-то”. Автокаталитичность культуры заключается в пара­
доксе: культура не может возникнуть без наличия культуры.
В 1988 году Ю. М. Лотман указывает по поводу автокаталитич­
ности культуры на историка культуры XX века Николая Иосифовича 
Конрада (1981-1970), который несомненно вычитал эту идею у 
историка культуры XIX века Якоба Кристофера Буркгардта (1818— 
1897). Эта не раскрытая до сих пор связь указывает на факт, что 
автокаталитическая (или “автопойэтическая”) модель служила осно­
вой натурфилософии XIX века. В XX веке эту философию пред­
ставлял В. И. Вернадский (1863-1945), идеи которого послужили в 
1982 году Ю. М. Лотману при формулировании концептов как 
семиосферы так и автокатализа культуры.
Автокаталитическая модель культуры является диахронической, 
семиосфера — синхронической моделью культуры. Но в обоих слу­
чаях семиотическим метаязыком Ю. М. Лотмана была натурфило­
софская цитология XIX века.
Kultuuri autokatalüütilise päritolu problem Juri Lotmani 
kultuurifilosoofias ja ka sisukorras parandada
Kultuuri teke jääb hüpoteeside alaks. Kuid need hüpoteesid tulenevad 
ikka kahest eeldusest: esiteks, millisena kujutletakse kultuuri ehitust, ja 
teiseks, kuidas arvatakse kultuuri funktsioneerivat.
Juri Lotman käsitles mõlemat kultuuri aspekti — algul strukturaal- 
tüpoloogilist, hiljem dünaamilist. Seeläbi jõudis ta ka kultuurifilosoofilise 
hüpoteesini kultuuri autokatalüütilisest tekkest.
Katalüsaatoriks nimetatakse keemilise reaktsiooni komponenti, mis 
ise reaktsioonis ei muutu, kuid mille olemasolu alles tagabki reaktsiooni 
toimumise (või ergutab seda). Autokatalüüs kujutab endast niisiis para­
doksaalset olukorda, kus millegi tekkeks on vajalik sellesama asja eelnev 
olemasolu. Kultuuri autokatalüütilisus seisneb paradoksis, et kultuur ei 
saa tekkida millegi muu kui kultuuri olemasolu eeldusel, omaenda “juure­
tisest”.
1988. aastal viitab J. Lotman kultuuri autokatalüüsist rääkides XX sa­
jandi kultuuriloolasele Nikolai Konradile (1891-1970), kes selle idee 
kahtlemata sai XIX sajandi kultuuriloolaselt Jacob Christopher Burck- 
hardtilt (1818-1897). Too avamata seos juhib tähelepanu tõsiasjale, et 
autokatalüüsi (või autopoiesis'e) mudel oli üldse aluslik XIX sajandi 
natuurfilosoofias. XX sajandil esindas seda Vladimir Vemadski (1863— 
1945), kellelt J. Lotman 1982. aastal sai tõuke niihästi semiosfääri kui ka 
kultuuri autokatalüüsi kontseptsiooni formuleerimiseks.
Kultuuri autokatalüüsi mudel on kultuuri diakrooniline, semiofäär aga 
sünkrooniline mudel. Kuid mõlema puhul oli J. Lotmani semiootiliseks 
metakeeleks XIX sajandi natuurfilosoofiline tsütoloogia.
204 Linnar Priimägi
Sign Systems Studies S3.1, 2005
On the semiosphere
Juri Lotman
Translated by Wilma Clark1
Abstract. This article, first published in Russian in 1984 in Sign Systems 
Studies, introduces the concept o f semiosphere and describes its principal 
attributes. Semiosphere is the semiotic space, outside o f which semiosis can­
not exist. The ensemble o f semiotic formations functionally precedes the 
singular isolated language and becomes a condition for the existence o f the 
latter. Without the semiosphere, language not only does not function, it does 
not exist. The division between the core and the periphery is a law o f the inter­
nal organisation of the semiosphere. There exists boundary between the 
semiosphere and the non- or extra-semiotic space that surrounds it. The 
semiotic border is represented by the sum o f bilingual translatable “filters”, 
passing through which the text is translated into another language (or lan­
guages), situated outside the given semiosphere. The levels o f the semiosphere 
comprise an inter-connected group o f  semiospheres, each o f them being 
simultaneously both participant in the dialogue (as part o f the semiosphere) 
and the space o f dialogue (the semiosphere as a whole).
Contemporary semiotics is undergoing a review of some of its basic 
concepts. It is a well-known fact that at the heart of semiotics lie two 
scientific traditions. One of these goes back to Peirce-Morris and 
begins with an understanding of the sign as the first element of any 
semiotic system. The second is based on the theses of Saussure and 
the Prague school and has at its core the antinomy of language and 
speech (texts). However, despite the differences of these approaches,
1 [Translator’s note.] This article, regarded as a classic or seminal piece by 
many who have studied Lotman’s work, was first published in 1984 in Signs 
Systems Studies (Труды no знаковым системам) 17; 5—23, and includes one of 
the first mentioning o f the term ‘semiosphere’ coined by Lotman. Translated from 
the original Russian language version, published in Lotman 1992. We are not 
informed about any earlier English translation o f this article. (See also fh. 6.)
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they share one important commonality: they are based on a simple, 
atomic element, and everything that follows is considered from the 
point of view of its similarity to this. Thus, in the first instance, the 
isolated sign is analysed, and all subsequent semiotic phenomena are 
considered as a succession of signs. The second point of view, in 
particular, is expressed by the urge to consider a single communicative 
act — an exchange of communication between addressee and addres- 
sor — as the prime element and model of any given semiotic act. As a 
result, the individual act of sign exchange has come to be regarded as 
a model of natural language, and models of natural languages —  as 
universal semiotic models, whereas semiotics itself has sought to be 
understood as the extension of linguistic methods to objects not 
included in traditional linguistics. This approach, originating with 
Saussure, was expressed with maximum clarity by the late I. I. Revzin 
who, during discussions at the second Summer school on secondary 
modelling systems in Kääriku (1966), proposed the following defini­
tion: The subject o f  semiotics is any object, which acts as a means o f  
linguistic description.
Such an approach adheres to the well-known rule of scientific 
thinking: the movement from the simple to the complex — implicitly 
justifying oneself at the first opportunity. However, in this there is 
also the danger that heuristic expediency (the convenience of analysis) 
comes to be accepted as the ontological character of the object, which 
is assigned to it by the structure derived from the simple and clearly 
outlined atomistic elements, in accordance with their complexity. The 
complex object is thus reduced to the totality of the simple.
Over the last 25 years the path of semiotic research has permitted 
many alternative approaches to emerge. It may now be possible to 
suggest that, in reality, clear and functionally mono-semantic systems 
do not exist in isolation. Their articulation is conditioned by heuristic 
necessity. Neither, taken individually, is in fact, effective. They func­
tion only by being immersed in a specific semiotic continuum, which 
is filled with multi-variant semiotic models situated at a range of 
hierarchical levels.
Such a continuum we, by analogy with the concept of “biosphere * 
introduced by V. I. Vernadsky, will call the ‘semiosphere’. We must, 
however, warn against any confusion between the term “noosphere” 
used by V. I. \  emadsky and the concept of “semiosphere” here 
introduced. The noosphere — is a specific stage in the development of
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the biosphere, a stage connected with human rational activity. Ver­
nadsky s biosphere is a cosmic mechanism, which occupies a specific 
structural place in planetary unity. Situated on the surface of our 
planet and including within itself the totality of living things, the 
biosphere transforms the radiated energy of the sun into the chemical 
and physical, and is concerned with the transformation of the inert 
inanimate materials of our planet, the noosphere occurs when human 
rational activity acquires a dominant role in this process.2 If the 
noosphere represents the three-dimensional material space that covers 
a part of our planet, then the space of the semiosphere carries an 
abstract character. This, however, is by no means to suggest that the 
concept of space is used, here, in a metaphorical sense. We have in 
mind a specific sphere, possessing signs, which are assigned to the 
enclosed space. Only within such a space is it possible for commu­
nicative processes and the creation of new information to be realised.
V. I. Vernadsky’s understanding of the nature of the biosphere may 
be useful for defining the concept introduced by us, let us, therefore, 
look at this in more detail. V. I. Vernadsky defined the biosphere as a 
space, filled with living matter. “Living matter” — he wrote, — “is 
the totality of living organisms” (Vernadsky 1967: 350). It would 
seem that such a definition provides a basis for the supposition that, 
on this basis, we may take the atomic fact of a single living organism, 
the totality of which represents the biosphere. However, in reality, this 
is not so. The fact is that the living matter is already considered as an 
organic unity — a film on the surface of the planet —  and the 
multiplicity of its internal organisation is displaced at a second level 
by the unity of the cosmic function — to become a mechanism of the 
transformation of energy, received from the sun, into the chemical- 
physical energy of the earth, —  which, according to Vernadsky, re­
veals the primacy of the biosphere relative to the individual organism.
All these aggregates o f life are intimately connected. One cannot exist without 
the other. This connection between the variety o f living films and aggregates 
and their constant nature is a well-known feature o f the mechanism o f the 
earth’s crust, occurring throughout many geological periods. (Vernadsky 
1960: 101)
2 “The history o f scientific thought, o f scientific knowledge [...] is simul­
taneously the history o f the creation o f a new geological force in the biosphere 
prior to this scientific thought did not exist in the biosphere” (Vernadsky 1977: 
22).
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More specifically, this idea is expressed in the following formula:
The biosphere —  consists o f a quite definite structure, defining everything, 
without exception, which falls within it [ ...] . A thinking being, as he exists in 
nature, as do all living organisms, as does all living matter, is a function of the 
biosphere, in its definition o f the spatial-temporal. (Vernadsky 1977: 32)
An analogous approach to semiotic questions is also possible. The 
semiotic universe may be regarded as the totality of individual texts 
and isolated languages as they relate to each other. In this case, all 
structures will look as if they are constructed out of individual bricks. 
However, it is more useful to establish a contrasting view: all semiotic 
space may be regarded as a unified mechanism (if not organism). In 
this case, primacy does not lie in one or another sign, but in the 
“greater system”, namely the semiosphere. The semiosphere is that 
same semiotic space, outside of which semiosis itself cannot exist.
Just as, by sticking together individual steaks, we don’t obtain a 
calf, but by cutting up a calf, we may obtain steaks, — in summarizing 
separate semiotic acts, we don’t obtain a semiotic universe. On the 
contrary, only the existence of such a universe —  the semiosphere — 
makes the specific signatory act real.
The semiosphere is characterized by a range of attributes.
The existence of boundary
The concept of semiosphere is linked to a definite semiotic homo­
geneity and individuality. Both these concepts (homogeneity and indi­
viduality), as we shall see, are difficult to define formally and depend 
on systems of description, but this does not change their reality and 
positive activity on the intuitive level. Both these concepts imply a 
boundary between the semiosphere and the non- or extra-semiotic 
space that surrounds it.
One of the fundamental concepts of semiotic delimitation lies in 
the notion of boundary. Insofar as the space of the semiosphere has an 
abstract character, its boundary cannot be visualised by means of the 
concrete imagination. Just as in mathematics the border represents a 
multiplicity of points, belonging simultaneously to both the internal 
and external space, the semiotic border is represented by the sum of 
bilingual translatable “filters”, passing through which the text is
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translated into another language (or languages), situated outside the 
given semiosphere. “The isolated nature” of the semiosphere subsists 
in the fact that it cannot be contiguous to extra-semiotic texts or non­
texts. In order that these may be realised, they must be translated into 
one of the languages of its internal space, in other words, the facts 
must be semioticized. In this way, the border points of the semio­
sphere may be likened to sensory receptors, which transfer external 
stimuli into the language of our nervous system, or a unit of 
translation, which adapts the external actor to a given semiotic sphere.
From the aforesaid, it is clear that the notion of boundary correlates 
to the concept of semiotic individuality. In this respect, we may say 
that the semiosphere has a “semiotic personality” and combines within 
this property of personality both the empirically indisputable and 
intuitive manifestation of the concept and the difficulty of its formal 
definition. It is a given that the boundary of personality, as a pheno­
menon of cultural-historical semiotics, depends on the method of 
coding. Thus, for example, wife, children, dependent servants, vassals 
may in one system be included in the personality of man, master and 
patron, without independent individuality, and in others — may 
appear like separate personalities. This is clearly revealed in the relati­
vity of juridical semiotics. When Ivan the Terrible executed, together 
with the fallen boyars, not only his family, but all his servants, this 
was a product not of fear (as if a slave from the provincial patrimony 
might be a danger to a tsar!), but rather to the fact that, legally, they all 
belonged to one head and house and, consequently, the execution 
naturally extended to them.
For the Russian people, the “Terror” — the cruelty of a tsar — 
which lay in the wide application of execution to his people, together 
with the fact that amongst their number were representatives from all 
strata of the population, was for them natural. Foreigners, however, 
were revolted by the fact that the guilt of one man could cause another 
to suffer. As early as 1732 the wife of the English Ambassador, Lady 
Rondo (who was not exactly hostile to the Russian court and wrote in 
her letters of the friendship and sensitivity of Anna Ioanovna and the 
dignity of Biron) when reporting on the exile of the Dolgoruki family 
in her European correspondence, wrote: “You may be surprised at the 
exile of women and children; but here, when the head of the family 
falls into disgrace, then the whole family is subject to persecution” 
(Shubinskij 1874: 46). This concept of the collective (in this case —
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patrimonial), and the non-individual personality lies, for example, in 
the concept of the blood vendetta, where the killer’s relatives are 
regarded as a legally responsible person. S. M. Solovev convincingly 
connected this practice with the establishment of the collective patri­
monial personality:
It is understood, that through such strong patrimonial unity, through such 
responsibility o f all members o f a race one towards the other, the meaning of 
the individual person has necessarily disappeared in the face o f the meaning of 
the race; a single person would be unthinkable without a race; the famous Ivan 
Petrov was not thought o f as a singular Ivan Petrov, but was thought o f only in 
the sense o f Ivan Petrov and his brothers and nephews. Through such linkages 
of person and race, as is raised a singular person —  so is raised an entire race, 
as through the abasement o f a single member o f the race —  so the whole race 
is abased. (Solovev 1960: 679)
The border of semiotic space is the most important functional and 
structural position, giving substance to its semiotic mechanism. The 
border is a bilingual mechanism, translating external communications 
into the internal language of the semiosphere and vice versa. Thus, 
only with the help of the boundary is the semiosphere able to establish 
contact with non-semiotic and extra-semiotic spaces. As soon as we 
move into the realm of semantics, we have to appeal to an extra- 
semiotic reality. However, let us not forget, that this reality becomes 
for a given semiosphere “a reality in itself’ only insofar as it has been 
translated into the language of the semiosphere (in the same way that 
external chemical materials may be adopted by a cell only if they have 
been transformed into the internal biochemical structures characte­
ristic of it: in both cases — these are particular manifestations of one 
and the same law).
The function of any border or film — from the membrane of a 
living cell to the biosphere as a film (according to Vernadsky) 
covering our planet, to the delimitation of the semiosphere — comes 
down to a limitation of penetration, filtering and the transformative 
processing of the external to the internal. At different levels this inva­
riant function is manifested in a variety of ways. At the level of the 
semiosphere it represents the division of self from other, the filtration 
of external communications and the translation thereof into its own 
language, as well as the transformation of external non-communica­
tion into communications, i.e. the semiotization of incoming materials 
and the transformation of the latter into information.
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From this point of view, all mechanisms of translation, serving 
external contacts, lie within the structure of the semiosphere.
In instances where cultural space has a territorial character, the 
border is spatially located in elementary meanings. However, even in 
this instance, the border retains the idea of a buffer mechanism, a 
unique unit of translation, transforming information.
So, for example, when the semiosphere identifies itself with the as­
similated “cultural” space, and the world which is external to itself — 
with the realm of chaotic disorganised elements —  then the spatial 
distribution of semiotic forms takes the following shape in a variety of 
cases: a person who, by virtue of particular talent (magicians) or type 
of employment (blacksmith, miller, executioner), belongs to two 
worlds, operates as a kind of interpreter, settling in the territorial 
periphery, on the boundary of cultural and mythological space, whilst 
the sanctuary of “culture” confines itself to the deified world situated 
at the centre. In the early years of 19th century culture, the “destruc­
tive” zone on the outskirts lay in direct contrast with the town centre, 
which embodied the dominant social structure, outskirts described, for 
example, in Tsvetaeva’s poem (“Frontier Post”) as part of the town, 
and yet belonging to that place, which destroyed the town. Its nature is 
bilingual.
All great empires, bordered by nomads, whether “steppe” or 
“barbarians”, settled on their borders members of those same tribes of 
nomads or “barbarians”, hiring them to protect the borders. These 
settlers formed a zone of cultural bilingualism, ensuring semiotic con­
tacts between two worlds. Areas of multiple cultural meanings carry 
out the very same function on the boundaries of the semiosphere: 
town, trade route and other areas forming a kind of creolisation of 
semiotic structures.
A typical boundary mechanism is that of the “frontier novel” of the 
type of the Byzantine epic about Digenis or that which alludes to “The 
Tale of Igor’s Campaign”. Generally speaking, a subject such as “Ro­
meo and Juliet”, about a loving union, connecting two hostile cultural 
spaces, clearly reveals the essence of the “boundary mechanism”.
However, what must also be taken into account is that if (from the 
point of view of an immanent mechanism) the boundary unites two 
spheres of semiosis, then from the point of view of semiotic self- 
knowledge (self-description on a metalevel) in a given semiosphere, it 
divides them. To realise itself in a cultural-semiotic sense means a
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realisation of its specific character, in terms of its opposition to other 
spheres. This serves to accentuate absolutely those features by which a 
given sphere is outlined.
At different historical moments in the development of the semio­
sphere, one or other aspect may dominate, suppressing or fully 
neutralising the other.
The boundary has another function in the semiosphere: it is the 
area of accelerated semiotic processes, which always flow more acti­
vely on the periphery of cultural environments, seeking to affix them 
to the core structures, with a view to displacing them.
For example, the history of ancient Rome illustrates well a more 
general conformity to natural laws: a cultural area, growing rapidly, 
incorporates into its orbit external collectives (structures) and trans­
forms them into its own periphery. This stimulates strong cultural- 
semiotic and economic growth of the periphery, which translates its 
semiotic structures through to the centre, setting cultural precedents 
and, in the long run, literally conquers the cultural sphere of the 
centre. This, in turn, stimulates (as a rule, under the slogan: back “to 
basics”) the semiotic development of the cultural nucleus, in which 
new structures — linked to the path of historical development — are 
already visible, but which hides itself in the meta-categories of old 
structures. The opposition of centre/periphery is replaced by the 
opposition of yesterday/today.3
Insofar as the border is a necessary part of the semiosphere, the 
semiosphere also requires a “chaotic” external sphere and constructs 
this itself in cases where this does not exist. Culture not only creates 
its internal organisation, but also its own type of external disorga­
nisation. Antiquity constructs its “barbarians”, and “consciousness” -  
“subconsciousness”. It is irrelevant that these “barbarians”, firstly, 
might possess a significantly more ancient culture, or secondly, (not 
having established a unitary whole) that they might form a cultural 
gamut ranging from the high civilisations of antiquity to tribes in 
hugely primitive stages of development. Nevertheless, antique civili­
sation may only regard itself as culturally intact through the construc­
tion of this allegedly unitary “barbarian” world, the main sign of 
which was the lack of a common language with the culture of antique
[Translator’s note.] This whole paragraph is missing in Lotman 1992, but 
exists in the first publication (Lotman 1984).
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civilisation. External structures, distributed on that side of the semiotic 
boundary, are presumed to be non-structures.
An appreciation of internal and external space is not fixed. The 
very fa c t o f  the presence o f  a boundary is significant. Thus, in the 
Robinsoniads of the early 18th century the world of “savages” existing 
outside of the semiotics of the civilised world was valued positively. 
A similar situation is found with the artificially constructed worlds of 
animals or children — which are located outside of the “conventio­
nalities” of culture, that is, of its semiotic mechanisms.
Semiotic irregularity
From the aforesaid, it is clear that “non-semiotic” space may actually 
occur within the space of other semiotics. Thus, from an internal point 
of view, a given culture can look like the external non-semiotic world, 
which, from the point of view of the external observer, may establish 
itself as a semiotic periphery. In this way, the crossing point of the 
boundary of a given culture depends upon the position of the observer.
This question is made more complicated due to the inherited inter­
nal irregularity which is a rule of the organisation of the semiosphere. 
Semiotic space is characterised by the presence of nuclear structures 
(frequently multiple) and a visibly organised more amorphous se­
miotic world gravitating towards the periphery, in which nuclear 
structures are immersed. If one of these nuclear structures not only 
holds a dominant position, but also rises to a state of self-description, 
thereby separating itself from the system of meta-languages, with the 
help of which it describes not only itself but also the peripheral space 
of a given semiosphere, then the level of its ideal unity creates a 
superstructure which itself is above the irregularity of a real semiotic 
map. The active interaction between these levels becomes one of the 
roots of the dynamic processes within the semiosphere.
Irregularity on one structural level increases the fusion of levels. In 
the reality of the semiosphere, the hierarchy of languages and texts, as 
a rule, is disturbed: and these elements collide as though they 
coexisted on the same level. Texts appear to be immersed in languages 
which do not correspond to them, and codes for deciphering them may 
be completely absent. Imagine a room in a museum, where exhibits 
from different eras are laid out in different windows, with texts in
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known and unknown languages, and instructions for deciphering 
them, together with explanatory texts for the exhibitions created by 
guides who map the necessary routes and rules of behaviour for 
visitors. If we place into that room still more visitors, with their own 
semiotic worlds, then we will begin to obtain something resembling a 
picture of the semiosphere.
The structural heterogeneity of semiotic space creates reserves of 
dynamic processes and represents one of the mechanisms for the 
creation of new information inside the sphere. In peripheral areas, 
where structures are “slippery”, less organised and more flexible, the 
dynamic processes meet with less opposition and, consequently, 
develop more quickly. The creation of meta-structural self-descriptors 
(grammar) appears to be a factor which dramatically increases the 
rigidity of the structure and slows down its development. Meanwhile, 
sections which were not subjected to description, or registered in 
categories which are clearly inadequate or “at the expense” of 
grammar, develop quicker. This allows for the future displacement of 
the function of the structural nucleus to the periphery of the previous 
stage, and the transformation of the former centre to the periphery. 
This process can be clearly traced in the geographic transference 
between the centre and the ‘outskirts’ of civilised worlds.
The division between the core and the periphery is a law of the 
internal organisation of the semiosphere. The dominant semiotic 
systems are located at the core. However, if the fact of such a division 
is absolute, then the forms in which it takes shape are semiotically 
relative and are, to a considerable degree, defined by the selected 
meta-language of description — depending on whether there are 
elements of self-description (description from the internal point of 
view and in terms worked out in the process of the self-development 
of a given semiosphere), or whether this is conducted by an external 
observer through the categories of another system.
The formation of peripheral semiotics may be represented not by 
fixed structures (languages) but by their fragments or even separate 
texts. Falling into the category of “foreigners” within a given system, 
these texts fulfil the function of a catalyst in the whole mechanism of 
the semiosphere. On the one hand, the border with foreign texts 
always appears as an area of enhanced meaning generation. On the 
other, any fragment of the semiotic structure or separate text preserves 
the mechanisms for reconstruction of the whole system. Thus the
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destruction of integrity speeds up the accelerated process of “recol­
lection reconstructing the semiotic whole through its parts. This 
reconstruction of language already lost to the system, in which system 
the given text would have brought meaning, practically always brings 
the creation of a new language, as opposed to the reconstruction of the 
old one, as this appears from the point of view of the self-knowledge 
of culture.
The eternal flow in culture of specific reserves of text with lost 
codes leads to the process of creation of new codes, often understood 
subjectively as reconstructions (“recollections”).
The structural irregularity of the internal organisation of the semio­
sphere is determined, in part, by the fact that, having a heterogeneous 
nature, the semiosphere develops at different speeds and in different 
places. Different languages belong to different times and different 
quantitative cycles, thus natural languages develop at a significantly 
slower pace than mental-ideological structures. Therefore, its pro­
cesses cannot be synchronous.
In this way, the semiosphere repeatedly traverses the internal 
borders, assigning a specialized role to its parts in a semiotic sense. 
The translation of information though these borders, a game between 
different structures and sub-structures; the continuous semiotic “inva­
sions” to one or other structure in the “other territory” gives birth to 
meaning, generating new information.
The internal diversity of the semiosphere implies its integrity. Parts 
enter the whole not as mechanistic details, but as organs in organisms. 
The essential feature of the structural formation of the core mecha­
nisms of the semiosphere is the fact that each of its parts creates its 
own whole, isolated in its structural independence. Its connections 
with other parts are complex and are characterised by a high level of 
deautomatisation. Moreover, at higher levels, they acquire a beha­
vioural character, i.e. they gain the ability to independently choose 
programmes of activity. Relative to the whole, located at other levels 
in the structural hierarchy, they reveal an isomorphic quality. Thus, 
they are, simultaneously, the whole and its likeness. To clarify this 
relationship, we may take another example from the end of the 14th 
century, from the writer Tomasz Štitny. It is also like a face, which, 
wholly reflected in a mirror, is also reflected in any of its fragments, 
which, in this form, represents the part and yet remains similar to the 
whole mirror; so, too, is the integral semiotic mechanism and the
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separate text, relative to the isomorphism of all the texts of the world, 
and there is a distinct parallelism between individual consciousness, 
the text and culture as a whole.
Vertical isomorphism, which exists between structures located on 
different hierarchical levels, generates the quantitative growth of 
communications. In the same way that an object, reflected in a mirror, 
generates hundreds of reflections in its fragments, a communication, 
introduced into the integral semiotic structure, is circulated at the 
lower levels. The system facilitates the conversion of the text into an 
avalanche of texts.
However, the transformation of fundamentally new texts requires 
another mechanism. Here fundamentally different contacts are re­
quired. Here, the mechanism of isomorphism is constructed in a 
different way. Since, here, we don’t have in mind a simple act of 
transfer, but rather an exchange, between participants there must be 
not only a relationship that is similar, but also one that exhibits a 
specific difference. A simple condition for this form of semiosis could 
be outlined as follows: substructures participating in the act of se­
miosis must not be isomorphic to each other, but separately iso­
morphic to a third element operating at a higher level of the system 
which they seek to enter. Thus, for example, the textual and iconic 
languages of pictorial forms are not isomorphic to each other. But 
each of them, in a variety of ways, is isomorphic in the extra-semiotic 
world of reality, which they represent in a given language. On the one 
hand, this allows for an exchange of communication between these 
systems and on the other, for the not so trivial transformation of 
communication and the processes of their transference.
The presence of two similar but simultaneously different partners 
in communication is one of the most important, but not the only, 
conditions in which dialogic systems originate. Dialogue includes 
within itself a reciprocity and mutuality in the exchange of infor­
mation. But for this, it is necessary that the time of transference be 
superseded by the time of reception (Newson 1978: 33). And this 
implies discreteness — the possibility of interrupting the transmission 
of information. The possibility of giving information in portions 
appears to be a general law of dialogic systems — from the distribu­
tion by dogs of odorous matter in the urine to the exchange of texts in 
human communication. It should be borne in mind that discreteness 
can appear at a structural level at a point where, in its material
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rea isation, there occurs a cyclic change between periods of high 
activity and periods of maximal decrease in activity. In fact we might 
say that the discreteness of semiotic systems is generated by the 
description o f cyclical processes in the language of a discrete 
structure. Thus, for example, in the history of culture we may 
delineate periods when one or another form of art, situated at a high 
point of activity, transmits its texts into other semiotic systems. How­
ever, these periods are changed by others when a given type of art as if 
turns into “receipt”. This does not mean that by defining the isolated 
history of a given type of art we will encounter a break in continuity: 
studied as immanent, it will appear to be continuous. It is nevertheless 
worthwhile to set ourselves the goal of describing the whole of art 
within the framework of a given epoch, as this will clearly reveal the 
expansion of some and the “interruption”, as it were, in the history of 
others. This may explain still one more phenomenon, well-known to 
cultural historians, but according to the majority of cultural theories, 
theoretically non-sensical: such phenomena as the Renaissance, Ba­
roque, Classicism and Romanticism, generated within a given culture 
by universal factors, must be diagnosed synchronically, against diffe­
rent artistic areas and, indeed, wider still — different intellectual 
developments.
However, the real history of culture gives quite another picture: the 
moment of attack of similar epochal phenomena on a variety of 
different arts only levels out at the metalevel of cultural self-know­
ledge, crossing over then into research concepts. In the real substance 
of culture, non-synchronicity does not appear as a sudden deviation, 
but as a regular rule. At the apogee of its activity, the transferring 
agent simultaneously produces innovative and dynamic features. The 
addressees, as a rule, are still experiencing a former cultural stage. 
There are other, more complex relationships, but such irregularity has 
the character of universal conformity. Thus, thanks to the constant 
nature of this conformity (from the immanent point of view) the 
processes of development from the common cultural position appear 
discrete.
We might also look at this in terms of the greater natural cultural 
contacts: the processes of cultural influence of the East on the West 
and of the West on the East is connected to the non-synchronic 
sinusoids of their immanent development which, for the external
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observer, establishes a discrete change in their multi-directional 
activities.
A similar system of relations can also be observed in the diversity 
of other dialogic systems, for example, between the centre and 
periphery of cultures, their highs and lows.
The fact that pulsation of activity at the very highest structural 
level appears to be discrete should not surprise us, if we recall that the 
boundary between phonemes exists only on the phonological, but by 
no means at the phonetic level and does not exist in the sonic 
oscillogram of speech. We may also say the same, relative to other 
structural boundaries, for example, between words.
Finally, dialogue must possess still another property: insofar as the 
translated text and the response received from it must produce, from 
some other third point of view, the unitary text, and through this each 
of them, from their own point of view, becomes not only a separate 
text, but has the tendency to become a text in another language; the 
translated text must, anticipating a response, conserve within itself an 
element of transference into the other language. Otherwise, dialogue is 
not possible. John Newson, in the above-cited article showed that, in a 
dialogue between a nursing mother and her baby, a mutual transition 
into the language of the other which mimics spoken signals takes 
place. This dialogue, actually, may be distinguished from one-sided 
animal-training.
To this is linked, for example, the fact that 19th century literature, 
in order powerfully influence painting, had to include in its language 
elements of the picturesque. Analogous phenomena also occur in 
territorial cultural contacts.
The dialogic (in the wider sense) exchange of texts is not a 
facultative phenomenon of the semiotic process. The isolated utopia of 
Robinson Crusoe, a product of 18th century thought, conflicts with the 
contemporary understanding of consciousness as the exchange of 
communication: from the exchange between hemispheres of the great 
brain of man to the exchange between cultures. Meaning without 
communication is not possible. In this way, we might say, that 
dialogue precedes language and gives birth to it.
And this also lies at the heart of the notion of semiosphere: the 
ensemble of semiotic formations precedes (not heuristically but 
functionally) the singular isolated language and becomes a condition 
for the existence of the latter. Without the semiosphere, language not
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only does not function, it does not exist. The different substructures of 
the semiosphere are linked in their interaction and cannot function 
without the support of each other.
This is the sense of semiosphere in the contemporary world, 
steadily expanding into space over the centuries, it has now taken on a 
global character, and includes within itself the call signs of satellites, 
the verse of poets and the cry of animals. The interdependence of 
these elements o f the semiosphere is not metaphorical, but a reality.
The semiosphere has a diachronic depth, since it is allotted by 
virtue of a complex memory system without which it cannot function. 
The mechanism of memory occurs not only in individual semiotic 
sub-structures, but also in the semiosphere as a whole. Despite the fact 
that we are immersed in the semiosphere, it can nevertheless establish 
itself as a chaotic, irregular object, a collection of autonomous ele­
ments; it follows, however, that the presence of internally regulated, 
functionally connected parts can be assumed, the dynamic relationship 
of which establishes its behaviour. This assumption answers the 
principle of economy, as, without it, the obvious fact of separate com­
munications would be difficult to explain.
The dynamic development of elements of the semiosphere (sub­
structures) is dictated by their specifications and, consequently, the 
increase in internal diversity. However, this does not destroy the 
integrity of the semiosphere, as the basis of all communicative 
processes lies in the invariant principle, making them similar to each 
other. This principle is built upon the combination of symmetry- 
asymmetry (at the level of language this structural feature was 
described by Saussure as the “mechanism of similarities and diffe­
rences”) with the periodic ebb and flow of all vital processes in any of 
their forms. And these two principles can also be incorporated into a 
more general unity: symmetry-asymmetry may be regarded as the 
breaking-up of any form of unity by a plane of symmetry, as a result 
of which a mirror of the deconstructed structure appears, forming the 
basis for a subsequent growth in diversity and functional specification. 
The cyclic recurrence forms the basis of a rotary movement around the
axes of symmetry.
The combined effect of these two principles can be observed on 
very different levels — from the opposition of the cyclic recurrence 
(of the axis o f symmetry) in the world of the cosmos and the atomistic 
explosion of unidirectional movement, which predominates in the
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animal world and which appears as a result of a plane of symmetry — 
to the antithesis of the mythological (cyclic) and historical (directed) 
time.
Insofar as the combination of these principles has a structural 
character, impacting not only on the limits of human society but also 
the living world, and demands the creation of general structures 
similar to itself, for example, in poetical works, then the question 
naturally arises: is the whole universe not a form of communication, 
falling within an ever more general semiosphere? Is it not destined for 
a universal reading? It is doubtful whether we were able to find an 
answer to this question. The possibility of dialogue simultaneously 
suggests both heterogeneity and homogeneity of elements. Semiotic 
heterogeneity implies a structural heterogeneity. In this sense, the 
structural diversity of the semiosphere creates a basis for its mecha­
nisms. In truth, and so conforming to the problem of interest to us, is 
the following principle, which V. I. Vernadsky called “the principle of 
P. Curie-Pasteur”, may be interpreted as one of “the basic principles of 
the logic of science — an understanding of nature”:
“Dissymmetry may only be drawn out by a cause that itself already possesses
dissymmetry.” (Vernadsky 1977: 149)
The simplest and most widely disseminated form of combination of a 
structural identity and difference is enantiomorphism, mirror sym­
metry, through which both parts of the mirror are equal, but unequal 
through superposition, i.e. relating one to the other as right and left. 
Such a relationship creates the kind of correlative difference that 
distinguishes both identity — rendering dialogue useless — and non­
correlative difference — rendering it impossible. If dialogic com­
munication is the basis of meaning generation, then enantiomorphism 
divides the unity, and the rapprochement of the difference forms the 
basis of the structural correlation of individual parts in the construc­
tion of meaning generation (Ivanov 1978).
Mirror symmetry creates the necessary relations between structural 
diversity and structural similarity, which allow dialogic relationships 
to be built. On the one hand, the systems are not identical and give out 
diverse texts, and on the other, they are easily converted, ensuring 
mutual translatability. We may say that, in order for dialogue to take 
place, the participants must be distinct and yet simultaneously contain 
within their structure a semiotic image of counter-agent (Paducheva
1982), and thus enantiomorphism represents the primary “mechanism” 
of dialogue.
The proof that mirror symmetry can radically change the functio­
nality of the semiotic mechanism, lies in the palindrome. This pheno­
menon has seen little study, so that —  regarded as a piece of poetic 
fun — the fruit of “the game of word art” (Kvyatkovsky 1966: 190) 
has, until now, been openly and pejoratively regarded as “juggling 
words” (Timofeev, Turayev 1974: 257). In the meantime, even a 
surface examination of this phenomenon reveals very serious prob­
lems. We are not interested, here, in the ability of the palindrome to 
preserve the meaning of a word or a group of words through reading, 
whether in a straight line or in the opposite direction, but in the fact 
that, in so doing, the mechanism of textual formation changes and, 
therefore, also, the mechanisms of consciousness.
Let us recall the analysis of the Chinese palindrome, carried out by 
the academic, V. M. Alekseev. In declaring that a Chinese hieroglyph, 
taken in isolation, can only suggest the conceptual family of words, 
whereas its concrete-semantic and grammatical character are revealed 
only in correlation to the textual bonds so that, without the order of the 
word-sign, it is not possible to determine its grammatical category or 
the real semantic content, which makes concrete the generally abstract 
semantics of the isolated hieroglyph, V. M. Alekseev reveals the 
startling grammatical-conceptual displacement, which occurs in the 
Chinese palindrome, independently of the direction in which it is read. 
In the Chinese “palindrome” (i.e. a word appearing in normal verse in 
reverse orientation) all Chinese syllabic words, remaining punctually 
in their place, are called upon to play other roles, both syntactic and 
semantic (Alekseev 1951: 95).
From this, V. M. Alekseev drew the methodologically interesting 
conclusion: that the palindrome represents the best material for 
studying the grammar of the Chinese language.
The conclusions are clear:
(1) The palindrome represents the best possible means o f illustrating the 
interrelationship o f Chinese syllabic words, without resorting to the artificial 
lecture-theatre style o f displacement and unity exercised by students o f  
Chinese syntax, lacking in skill and talent.
(2) The palindrome represent the best Chinese material for the construction of  
a theory o f Chinese (and perhaps not only Chinese) words and simple 
sentences. (Alekseev 1951: 102)
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An observation of Russian palindromes has brought other conclusions. 
S. Kirsanov, in a short article, expresses a uniquely interesting 
reflection on the problem of psychology for the author of Russian 
palindromes. He notes that, “whilst still a student at the gymnasium” 
he “involuntarily said of himself
“Тюлень не лют” [The seal is not fierce] then suddenly realised that this 
phrase could be read in reverse. From then on I often threw m yself into 
reading words in reverse. [ . . .]  With time I was able to see words “as a whole”, 
and such self-rhyming words and their combinations appeared involuntarily. 
(Kirsanov 1966: 76)
Thus, the mechanism of the Russian palindrome lies in the fact that 
the word is seen. This then allows it to be read in the reverse order. A 
very curious thing occurs: in the Chinese language, where the word- 
hieroglyph seems to hide its morpho-grammatical structure, reading it 
in the reverse order helps to reveal this hidden construction, dis­
playing the hidden sequential choice of structural elements in a 
holistic and visible way. In the Russian language, however, the ability 
to “see the word as a whole” is required, i.e. to receive it in an 
integrated manner, in its natural hieroglyph. The Chinese palindrome 
transforms the visible and integral into the discrete and may be 
analytically differentiated from Russian — which transforms the exact 
opposite: visibility and integrity. That is to say, reading backwards 
activates the mechanism o f  different hemispheric consciousness. It is a 
primary fact of enantiomorphism that the form of the text changes the 
type of consciousness attributed to it.
Thus, the perception of the palindrome as a useless “jongleur’s 
tool” or a thoughtless joke resembles the opinion of the rooster in 
Krylov’s fable about the pearl. It is appropriate to recall the moral of 
this fable:
Fools judge precisely thus:
What they don’t understand, they regard as trivial. (Krylov 1946: 51)
The palindrome activates the hidden layers of linguistic meaning and 
represents exceptionally valuable material for experiments dealing 
with the problems of functional asymmetry of the brain. The palindro-
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me is not without meaning4, but has multiple meanings. At the highest 
levels the reading in reverse order has been linked to magical, sacred, 
hidden meanings. The text in its “normal” reading identifies itself with 
that which is “open”, and in its reverse state — with the “esoteric” 
sphere of culture. The use of palindromes in spells, magical formulas, 
on the gates of tombs, is significant i.e. its use on the boundaries and 
magically active places of cultural space — areas where earthly 
(normal) and infernal (inverse) forces meet. Thus, the authorship of 
the famous Latin palindrome; which the bishop and poet Apollinaris 
Sidonius attributed to the devil himself:
Signa te signa, temere me tangis et angis.
Roma tibi subito, motibus ibit amor.
(Cross thyself, you who plague and vex me without need.
For by these words you are about to reach Rome, the object o f your desire.)
The mirror mechanism, revealing symmetrical-asymmetrical pairings, 
is so widespread in all sense-making mechanisms, that you might call 
it a universal, including the molecular level and general structure of 
the universe, on the one hand, and a global creation of the human soul, 
on the other. For phenomena included in the term “text” it is, in­
disputably, universal. For, parallel to the antithesis of the sacral 
(direct) and infernal (inverse) structure, its spatial reflectivity is 
characterised by a convex Purgatory and a concave Hell, the con­
figuration of which, according to Dante is shared between one and the 
other as form and content. As the subject of a palindromic creation, 
we may look at the composition “Eugene Onegin” where, in move­
ment in one direction: “she” loves “him”, outlining her love in a letter, 
but receives a cold rebuff, and in a reverse parry “he” loves “her”, 
sending his love in a letter and receives, in his turn, a rebuff. This kind 
of repetition of the subject is characteristic of Pushkin (Blagoy 1955: 
lOlf). Thus, in “The Captain’s Daughter”, the subject is composed of 
two journeys: Grinev’s journey to the self-proclaimed “peasants” tsar
4 S. Kalacheva in an article, written from the position o f the Krylovian 
character, comments thus on the Khlebnikov’s poem, “Razin”: “the value, and 
sense o f words and word combinations ceases to interest the author [...]. The 
collection o f these features is justified only by the fact that it is possible, with an 
identical measure o f success, to read from right to left and from left to right” 
(Timofeev, Turayev 1974: 441).
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to save Masha and then Masha’s journey to the “noblemans” tsarina to 
save Grinev (Lotman 1962). Analogous mechanisms at the level of the 
character appear the doubles that inundate the romantic and post­
romantic literature of 19th century Europe, frequently connected to the 
theme of mirrors and reflections.
Of course, all these elements of symmetry-asymmetry are only 
mechanisms of meaning-making, and like the bilateral asymmetry of 
the human brain, characterise the mechanism of thought, without pre­
determining its content; they determine the semiotic situation, but not 
the content of this or that communication.
Let us give yet one more example of the way in which mirror 
symmetry changes the nature of the text. N. Tarabukin suggested the 
rule of pictorial composition, according to which the diagonal axis 
from the lower right to the upper left comer of a canvas gives the 
effect of passivity, whereas the inverse — from the lower left to the 
upper right — is active and intense.
Thus, it is interesting, from an observer’s point of view, to consider 
Jericho’s well-known painting “The Raft of Medusa”. Its composition 
is constmcted on two interweaving diagonals — the passive and the 
active. The trajectory of the raft, tossed by the wind, moves from the 
right to the left and into the depth. It personifies the spontaneous 
forces of nature, carrying along a handful of helpless people, the 
victims of a shipwreck. Along the inverse, active line, the artist has 
placed several human figures, gathering their final strength, so as to 
extricate themselves from their tragic situation. They have not given 
up the struggle. High above them is a single individual man, they are 
helping him to raise the flag, so as to draw the attention of a ship, 
which has appeared on the distant horizon (Tarabukin 1973: 479).
From this flows an experimentally corroborated fact: that one and 
the same canvas, transformed into the mirror symmetry of a printed 
engraving, transforms the emotional-semantic accent to its inverse 
state.
The reason for these notable phenomena lies in the fact that 
reflected objects possess their own internal structure of surface sym­
metry and asymmetry. Through enantiomorphic transformation, sur­
face symmetry is neutralised and cannot be displayed in any other 
way, and asymmetry becomes the structural signifier. Therefore, 
mirror-symmetry represents the primary structure for the dialogic 
relationship.
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The law of mirror symmetry is one of the basic structural prin­
ciples of the internal organisation of meaning-making constructions. It 
includes, at the topical level, such parallel phenomena as the “high” or 
comic character, the appearance of doubles, parallel topicality and 
other well-known phenomena in the duality of intra-textual structures. 
Also included in this are the magic function of the mirror and the role 
of the mirror motif in literature and art. The phenomenon of “texts 
within texts” also has the very same nature. In this respect, we may 
even compare a phenomenon examined by us elsewhere, which may 
be observed at the holistic level of national cultures: the process of 
mutual acquaintance and inclusion into a specific general cultural 
world causes not only the rapprochement of separate cultures, but also 
their specialization — after entering a specific general culture, a given 
culture begins to cultivate its own originality in a more acute fashion. 
In its turn, the other culture also considers it as “special”, “unique”. 
The isolated culture “to itself’ is always “natural” and “usual”. Only 
by taking part in a much greater whole, does it recognise the external 
point of view as specific to itself. In this way, cultural generalities of 
the type “West” and “East” are revealed in the enantiomorphic 
pairings of functional asymmetry.
Since all levels of the semiosphere — from human personality to 
the individual text to the global semiotic unity — are a seemingly 
inter-connected group of semiospheres, each of them is simulta­
neously both participant in the dialogue (as part of the semiosphere) 
and the space of dialogue (the semiosphere as a whole), in each can be 
seen manifestations of ‘rightism’ and ‘leftism’ and, whether lying to 
the right or left, each also includes within itself, at the lowest level, 
structures belonging to both right and left.
Earlier we described the basis of the structural creation of the 
semiosphere as the intersection of three-dimensional symmetry- 
asymmetry and the sinusoidal change of intensity and attenuation of 
temporal processes, which generates discreteness. After all is said and 
done, we can reduce these two axes to one: the development of right- 
left; that which, from the genetic-molecular level to the most complex 
information processes, forms the basis of dialogue — the basis of all 
meaning-making processes.
5 See the papers by V. V. Ivanov, P. H. Torop, Yu. I. Levin, R. D. Timenchik, 
and m yself in Text within Text (Sign Systems Studies 14, 1981).
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The publications of this article in Russian6
О семиосфере
Восходить от простого к сложному — естественный принцип науки. 
Однако в нем таится и опасность: эвристическая целесообразность 
(удобство анализа) начинает восприниматься как онтологическое 
свойство объекта, которому приписывается структура, восходящая 
от простых и четко очерченных атомарных элементов к постепен­
ному их усложнению. Сложный объект сводится к сумме простых.
Пройденный за последние двадцать пять лет путь семиотических 
исследований позволяет на многое взглянуть иначе. Как можно 
теперь предположить, четкие и функционально однозначные систе­
мы в реальном функционировании не существуют сами по себе, в 
изолированном виде. Вычленение их обусловлено лишь эвристи­
ческой необходимостью. Ни одна из них, взятая отдельно, факти­
чески не работоспособна. Они функционируют, лишь будучи погру­
жены в некий семиотический континуум, заполненный разнотип­
ными и находящимися на разном уровне организации семиоти­
ческими образованиями. Такой континуум, по аналогии с введенным 
В. И. Вернадским понятием “биосфера” мы называем семиосферой.
Семиосфера характеризуется рядом признаков, прежде всего 
отграниченностью и неравномерностью. Одним из фундаменталь­
ных понятий семиотической отграниченности является понятие гра­
ницы. Поскольку пространство семиосферы имеет абстрактный ха­
рактер, границу ее не следует представлять себе средствами конкрет­
ного воображения. Структурная неравномерность внутренней орга-
6 A German translation ( Über die Semiosphäre) has appeared in Studia Russica 
Helsingiensia et Tartuensia. Helsinki, p. 7 -24  (1989); and in Zeitschrift fa r  
Semiotik 12(4): 287-305 (1990). There exist also translations o f this article into 
Spanish, into Estonian, etc.
An earlier attempt to translate this article into English in order to publish it in 
Semiotica has been made in 1986, however, as Thomas Sebeok has described in 
his memoirs, the process unfortunately failed (see Sign Systems Studies 26: 29-31,
1998).
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низации семиосферы определяется, в частности, тем, что, будучи 
гетерогенной по природе, она развивается с различной скоростью в 
различных своих участках. Разные языки имеют различное время и 
различную величину циклов, так, естественные языки развиваются 
значительно медленнее, чем ментально-идеологические структуры. 
Поэтому о синхронности протекающих в них процессов не может 
быть и речи. Внутреннее разнообразие семиосферы подразумевает ее 
целостность. Части входят в целое не как механические детали, а как 
органы в организм. Существенной особенностью структурного 
построения ядерных механизмов семиосферы является то, что каж­
дая ее часть сама представляет собой целое, замкнутое в своей 
структурной самостоятельности.
Сознание без коммуникации невозможно. В этом смысле можно 
сказать, что диалог предшествует языку и порождает его. Именно 
это и лежит в основе представления о семиосфере: ансамбль семио­
тических образований предшествует (не эвристически, а функцио­
нально) отдельному изолированному языку и является условием 
существования последнего. Без семиосферы язык не только не рабо­
тает, но и не существует. Различные субструктуры семиосферы 
связаны во взаимодействии и не могут работать без опоры друг на 
друга. Поскольку все уровни семиосферы — от личности человека 
или отдельного текста до глобальных семиотических единств — 
являют собой как бы вложенные друг в друга семиосферы, каждая 
из них представляет собой одновременно и участника диалога (часть 
семиосферы) и пространство диалога (целую семиосферу).
Semiosfäärist
Liikumine lihtsamalt keerulisemale on teaduses loomulik põhimõte. 
Ometi peitub temas oht: heuristilist otstarbekohasust (analüüsi hõlpsust) 
hakatakse tajuma kui objekti ontoloogilist omadust ja objektile omista­
takse struktuur, mis lihtsatest ja kindlapiirilistest atomaarsetest elementi­
dest lähtudes j ärk-järgult areneb nende keerukustumise suunas. Keeruline 
objekt taandatakse lihtsate summaks.
Viimase kahekümne viie aasta jooksul läbitud semiootikauuringute tee 
lubab näha paljusid asju teisiti. Nagu nüüd võib oletada, pole kindla­
piirilisi ja funktsionaalselt ühetähenduslikke tähendussüsteeme reaalses 
talitluses omaette ega isoleeritud kujul olemas. Nende väljaliigendamist 
tingib üksnes heuristiline vajadus. Eraldi võetuna ei ole ükski neist tege-
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likult töövõimeline. Nad toimivad ainult paigutatuna teatavasse semioo- 
tilisse kontiinumisse, mis on täidetud eritüübiliste ja erisugusel korras- 
tusastmel semiootiliste moodustistega. Niisugust kontiinumit me nime­
tame semiosfaäriks — analoogia põhjal Vladimir Vemadski poolt tarvi­
tusele võetud “biosfääri” mõistega.
Semiosfääril on rida iseloomulikke tunnuseid, eelkõige piiritletus ja 
ebaühtlus. Semiootilise piiritletuse üks alusmõisteid on piiri mõiste. Et 
semiosfääri ruumil on abstraktne iseloom, ei ole vaja tema piiri enesele 
konkreetse kujutluse abil silma ette manada. Semiosfääri sisekorralduse 
struktuuriline ebaühtlus on muu hulgas tingitud sellest, et olles loomult 
heterogeenne, areneb semiosfäär oma eri piirkondades erineva kiirusega. 
Eri keeltel on erinev aeg ja  erisugune tsüklipikkus: loomulikud keeled 
arenevad märksa aeglasemalt kui mentaal-ideoloogilised struktuurid. 
Sellepärast ei saa juttugi olla neis kulgevate protsesside sünkroonsusest. 
Semiosfääri sisemine mitmekesisus peab silmas ta terviklikkust. Osad ei 
kuulu tervikusse mitte mehaaniliste detailidena, vaid nagu organid orga­
nismi. Semiosfääri tuummehhanismide struktuurse ehituse peamine ise­
ärasus on, et iga osa on ise tervik, suletud oma struktuursesse iseseis­
vusesse.
Teadvus ei ole võimalik ilma kommunikatsioonita. Ses mõttes saab 
öelda, et dialoog eelneb keelele ja  sünnitab keele. Just sellel põhinebki 
semiosfääri-kujutelm: semiootiliste moodustiste kooslus eelneb (mitte 
heuristiliselt, vaid funktsionaalselt) üksikule isoleeritud keelele ja on tema 
olemasolu tingimus. Ilma semiosfäärita keel mitte ainult et ei hakka tööle, 
vaid teda pole olemaski. Semiosfääri erisugused allstruktuurid on 
vastastikku seotud ega saa töötada ilma üksteise toeta. Et semiosfääri kõik 
tasandid — inimisiksusest või üksiktekstist kuni globaalsete semiootiliste 
ühtsustem — on justkui üksteise sisse asetatud semiosfäärid, siis on iga­
üks neist ühtaegu nii dialoogis osaleja (semiosfääri osa) kui ka dialoogi 
ruum (terve semiosfäär).
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